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One of the things the Cubs lacked in their 92-win team in 2025 was a good, traditional backup outfielder.

They had Vidal Bruján backing up Pete Crow-Armstrong in center field, and that, as you know, was hardly optimal. Willi Castro and Jon Berti also played outfield for the Cubs last year. Apart from Ian Happ, PCA, Kyle Tucker and Seiya Suzuki, the only true outfielder who played for the 2025 Cubs was Owen Caissie.

The Cubs are attempting to address this by adding some outfield depth. Last week they signed Chas McCormick, formerly of the Astros, to a minor-league deal with a NRI to Spring Training (Bluesky link):

McCormick had a really good year for Houston in 2023, batting .273/.353/.489 with 22 home runs in 115 games, good for 3.4 bWAR. Injuries ruined McCormick’s last two years; he played in just 64 games in 2025 and didn’t crack a .600 OPS either of the last two seasons.

I don’t think the Cubs are looking for miracles here, though McCormick has been a useful outfielder at times in his career. He turns 31 in April. Most likely, he gets stashed at Triple-A Iowa as outfield insurance. He does have 33 games of postseason experience.

Oh, and his actual given name is… Chas. It’s not short for “Charles.”

There’s been no official announcement by the team regarding another signing, but there’s a clue from this social media post:

So, if Dylan Carlson is working out with Cubs players at the Sloan Park complex, I’d think that’s a pretty good sign that he’s also, as noted, been signed to a minor-league deal with a Spring Training NRI.

Just five years ago, Carlson was a Top 20 prospect in all of baseball. Indeed, he had a really good year with the Cardinals in 2021, batting .266/.343/.437 with 31 doubles and 18 home runs. That got him a third-place finish in Rookie of the Year voting.

His numbers declined in 2022 and by 2023 he was a backup outfielder with the Cardinals. As was the case with McCormick, injuries appear to have been a lot of the issue here, including a hamstring strain, oblique strain, shoulder strain. Lastly, there was an ankle sprain that eventually required surgery.

In 2025, Carlson rode the Orioles’ Triple-A shuttle, recalled and optioned the maximum allowed five times, and batted just .203/.278/.336 in 83 games with Baltimore. He did hit well in 28 games at Triple-A Norfolk, .294/.421/.451.

Fun fact: At the trade deadline in 2024, Carlson was traded to the Rays from the Cardinals for Shawn Armstrong. Exactly a month later the Cardinals waived Armstrong and the Cubs claimed him. Armstrong posted a 4.91 ERA and 1.909 WHIP in eight games for the Cubs in September 2024. He’s played for eight teams, which makes him a great Immaculate Grid answer.

Carlson is only 27. If he’s healthy, perhaps he can recover some of that ability that made him a top prospect. At this point, on a NRI he’s certainly worth it. If he can’t play, he just gets released. If he can? Maybe he makes the team and Kevin Alcántara goes back to Iowa. Carlson’s a switch-hitter, so there’s that.

Just thought this would be a useful topic of discussion on a January day when there’s not much news.

After six months of intermittent rumors, the Mets finally completed a trade for Luis Robert. The 28-year-old center fielder heads to Queens in exchange for Luisangel Acuña and Truman Pauley, the Mets’ 12th-round pick in last year’s draft. Robert is under contract for $20M in 2026 with an additional club option for $20M in 2027.

If you’re a Robert skeptic, I hear you. He batted only .223/.297/.364 for the White Sox last year, posting a pitiful 84 wRC+ equivalent to his 2024 mark. A history of hamstring, hip flexor, and other injuries (groin, calf, and wrist among them) has prevented Robert from ever topping 145 games in a season; he’s only topped 100 games twice in his six-year career. We’re now three years removed from Robert’s last above average offensive season, his career-best 2023 in which he hit 38 HR, posted a 129 wRC+, and accrued 4.9 fWAR.

Let’s lay out the positives, though. Even as his offense has fallen off the last two seasons, Robert has remained a high-quality defender in center field (1 OAA in 2024, 7 OAA in 2025). The physical skills—chiefly his bat speed and sprint speed—are both pretty clearly intact given the better-than 90th percentile marks he posted last season. Even his strikeout rate, which increased in 2023 and peaked over 30% in 2024, improved markedly in 2025, driven by both a higher contact rate and better swing decisions. In fact, Robert ran a 95th percentile SEAGER last season, the highest mark of his career.

That paints the picture of a player with a pretty solid floor, a high-quality center fielder with speed and power. There’s real upside here beyond that, though, as Robert was one of the unluckiest hitters in baseball last season by xwOBA. It’s not because his spray angles suck either, as he manages above average pulled fly ball rates. If you’re a fan of arbitrary endpoint analysis, we might’ve already gotten a glimpse at a more accurate representation of Robert’s output from June to August last season; .262/.326/.431, with a 109 wRC+.

We’ve not addressed the injuries of course, and indeed the date window above ends in August because Robert pulled his hamstring and missed the rest of the season. The Mets are particularly well positioned to accommodate this sort of injury prone upside play because of Carson Benge.

Benge is the #2 prospect in the system and is going to be a consensus top-20 or higher name by the end of the offseason (BA had him 19th, BP will have him higher). The Mets are pretty clearly giving Benge runway to win a job out of spring training and run with it, something they’re incentivized to do under the PPI system. With Robert around, Benge now projects as the starting left fielder, but he’s completely capable of sliding over to center if/when Robert misses time. If things really go south for whatever reason, Benge can stay in center with Brett Baty in left. Or maybe A.J. Ewing is ready. Or maybe the Mets make a trade for a corner bat (something that is usually pretty cheap at the deadline). The point is that the Mets have the optimal roster construction to roll the dice on a high-upside, injury prone center field option like Robert

In a vacuum, the return here is not strictly nothing. Luisangel Acuña has enough defensive utility to be an interesting bench bat and could maybe get the offense to passable given enough runway to figure it out. Truman Pauley is a fun prospect, a Harvard sophomore who never posted impressive stats but popped on stuff models. Both of those profiles have some level of value.

For the Mets, though, the cost is fairly inconsequential. Acuña’s bat is a weakness (no, you shouldn’t care about his Winter League home run barrage) and his ability to play shortstop doesn’t matter with the Mets’ current roster. Critically, he’s also out of options, meaning the Mets would have had to either carry a sub-optimal player on the bench and give him no development runway or lose him through waivers. Trading him is a far better outcome, both for the Mets and Acuña, who should get an extended run to see if things click in Chicago.

As for Pauley, you’d love to keep all of these guys, but the Mets drafted literally four other arms that fit this broad description with higher picks in the same draft, and have shown a penchant for improving most any arm they bring into the system. Moving this kind of player is an option afforded to you by having the best pitching development apparatus in baseball.

So in total, the Mets got a high-upside center field option with a clear floor independent of his top-line offensive output. They have the right roster construction to appropriately hedge the associated injury risk. If things work out, they can keep Robert for another season at only $20M; if not, they can decline the option and move on. And to add this player, they paid a cost that is inconsequential to the organization. Every part of this is a slam dunk win, making this move a clear A+.

If you’ve been paying any attention over the last few years, you’ll have noticed thata smaller and smaller percentage of movies to make it to the theaters. These days, many if not most are being released directly to streaming. This used to be the sort of thing movie production companies only did when they had absolutely no faith that a movie would be well-received, now it’s the norm.

Thing is, movie companies own the streaming services, much like they used to own the theaters before the US Government forced them to divest in an anti-trust case. And the movie companies prefer the steady income of a subscription model to the boom-or-bust of the theater, so they release their movies directly to streaming – much to the frustration of the artists creating the films – because that’s all they really care about. It removes a lot of the risk from the equation for them – as long as they continue to create content and host old content that people still enjoy, they’ll get their $5-$20 bucks a month. A movie might be a critical bomb, but in this set up it can’t really be a commercial bomb – assuming they budget correctly for how many subscribers they have. On the other hand, without that risk, there’s no reward for a movie that does incredibly well, either. K-Pop Demon Hunters was a surprise smash hit for Netflix, but because it’s on their streaming service instead of in movie theaters, it couldn’t add hundreds of thousands in ticket sales; it simply maintained their subscriber numbers or maybe bumped them a little.*

*This has nothing to do with the point I’m trying to make, but spelling things out like this really gives you insight into why Netflix views “content” the way it does. Why would you give the creatives a little more time or money when it won’t benefit you in potential additional profits?

“What does this all have to do with baseball?“ I can hear you shouting, and, well, that’s easy. Baseball, with its focus on being a business, has adopted a very similar low-risk, low-reward plan. With a handful of exceptions.

The big-spending baseball teams buck the trend

People complain about the Dodgers and the Mets spending. But they don’t complain about the Yankees – except out of remembrance for what they did in the late ‘90s and early 2000s. I haven’t heard anyone complain about the Blue Jays, White Sox, Cubs, or even Red Sox despite those teams also residing in super-sized markets. Why is that? Well, because the Dodgers and Mets are doing what precious few other teams have been willing to do in recent years. They’re taking “risks.”

The Mets have an owner who has thrown the team’s maximization of profits out the window in an effort to chase wins because he’s a fan of the team first, and a business owner in his other endeavors – as I have often advocated MLB owners should be. The Dodgers are buoyed by not only a TV contract significantly better than most of the rest of the league, but one that they are not responsible for sharing with anyone else due to loopholes added to the team when MLB needed to find a buyer.

But the reasons these two teams are willing to outspend everyone are less important than the reality that they are willing to do it. The Yankees and Blue Jays didn’t get Kyle Tucker because they were simply unwilling to take the risks that the Dodgers were. And this is the thing that sets these two teams apart.

Some teams could have been doing much better

But it’s not just the Yankees who have been playing things safe. This brings us to the Milwaukee Brewers, a team held up as the modern ideal of a middle-market club in MLB. Last week, the Brewers traded away their ace, Freddy Peralta, for prospects – high-level prospects, to be sure, but prospects. They explicitly made their team worse in 2026, a year after reaching the National League Championship Series. Why did they do this? Was it because they couldn’t afford Peralta’s $8M salary? No. It was because they decided that they weren’t going to try to offer him an extension to keep him around for the rest of their young core after this season and they could improve the franchise’s total talent over the next few years by trading him. They traded known talent now for future potential talent. This is the kind of move that used to be reserved only for teams approaching the trade deadline who realized they had very slim odds of reaching the playoffs, but which are now common among the “smart” mid-to-small market teams such as the Brewers, Guardians, Rays, and even Mariners.

The Brewers, as I said earlier are held up as the best franchise going that doesn’t spend a ton of money. Royals owner John Sherman even pointed to them as the franchise he hoped to mold the Royals into. And, on the surface, that sounds like a good thing. They’ve made the playoffs seven of the last eight seasons. They’ve won their division five times in that span, including in each of the last three years. What Royals fan wouldn’t salivate over that kind of success?

But they’ve also only made it to the Championship Series twice, getting swept out of it last season, and they’ve gotten knocked out in the Wild Card round four times in those seven playoff appearances. They haven’t made the World Series even once. And after taking the Dodgers to a CS Game 7 in 2018, they haven’t gotten close.

The Cleveland Guardians have made the playoffs in seven of the last ten seasons. They have made it to the Championship Series twice, the World Series once – in 2016. They haven’t won it all. The Rays have made the postseason five of the last seven seasons, but neither of the last two. They’ve made the Championship Series and World series once each, in the same season. The Mariners have won more games than they’ve lost in each of the last five seasons, but made the playoffs only twice and the Championship Series in 2025 was the limit of their reach. It was also, notably, the first time in years that they approached the deadline by adding some of the best available talent in Josh Naylor and Eugenio Suárez at the deadline instead of trading away some of their players for more prospects.

How different might things be if these teams took a few more risks? Sure, there’s a chance they’d make a dud move like signing Albert Pujols, Anthony Rendon, or Jason Heyward. But if one of these teams had been the ones to add a Teoscar Hernández or Brandon Nimmo or Cody Bellinger, how much more success might they have had? But risk-aversion means they play it safe, consistently win games, but never end having a real shot at glory. They do just enough to keep their fans invested, but never enough to get over that hump because they’re more terrified that they’ll miss than motivated to try to win.

The Royals are different – but only a little

The Royals have set themselves apart from these other small market clubs with their willingness to spend in recent years. Two offseasons ago they went out and gave real dollars – though not a ton of them – to pitchers Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha to stabilize their rotation. Then, over the past two seasons, they’ve given those guys extensions to keep them around while their farm system catches up. At the trade deadlines, while other teams with similar records like the Guardians and Diamondbacks were selling, the Royals were buying. This off-season, it’s easy to be frustrated with how little the Royals have done, but look around the league at what other teams are doing.

The Guardians have added no one, though at least they’ve also not lost anyone of note. The Rays have traded away Kam Misner, Shane Baz, Brandone Lowe, Jake Mangum, and Josh Lowe. They refused to tender Pete Fairbanks despite him being one of the better relievers in baseball last season. They’ve added only Gavin Lux, Cedric Mullins, and Steven Matz – once-good players nearing the ends of their respective careers. The Mariners kept Josh Naylor and added Rob Refsnyder, but let Jorge Polanco and Eugenio Suárez go.

The Brewers, the so-called model franchise, let Rhys Hoskins go before dealing away Nick Mears, Isaac Collins, Tobias Myers, and Freddy Peralta. They’ve added no one projected to be worth even a single fWAR to their major league team.

This isn’t a defense of the Royals. They’d be easy favorites for the division if they’d been willing to take the risk of signing Cody Bellinger or Bo Bichette. But they’re still trying harder than their peers, and that means something. At least for now. As I said earlier, John Sherman wants to ultimately become a Brewers clone. If he ever gets there, we might be in for the same frustration that I am sure Brewers fans feel right now of watching their team sit right on the edge of greatness but unwilling to ever take a step forward toward the ultimate prize for fear of tripping over their own feet.

Jonathan India is the prime example of the Royals sitting in the middle-ground

If Jonathan India hadn’t played for the Royals last year, and KC had given him the deal they did, many Royals fans would be celebrating the choice to bring a bounce-back candidate in to give Michael Massey some competition for his roster spot. Especially because at one year and $8 million, it’s an extremely reasonable contract to give a guy who is still only entering his age-29 season, who still showed elite chase rates in 2025, and was a productive major leaguer for the previous four seasons. It would be a risk, sure, but a reasonably smart one.

Instead, because he did play for the Royals last year it reads as an extremely safe play, a choice to preserve the floor he represents to the team rather than go out and take a real risk by signing someone like Jorge Polanco or Bo Bichette. And that, I think, is the lens through which to view their move in keeping India.

The problem with keeping India isn’t that his contract is a little risky, it’s that the upside of such a risk is so low as to feel pointless. Let’s be clear, the Royals could have cut him and “played it safer”; certainly other teams made those choices such as when the Rays moved on from Christopher Morel or the Brewers dealt Isaac Collins. But it’s one of the “safest” risks the Royals could have made. And that’s why it disappoints so many of us. Go big or go home, as the saying goes.

The Royals are trying to straddle a line that pretty much no other team is even willing to approach. We’ll have to see both if it pays off in 2026 and if they’re willing to continue being even this aggressive into the future.

24. Wilder Dalis (93 points, 11 ballots)

The 19-year-old Venezuelan switch-hitting third baseman and shortstop was signed as an older 16-year-old in May 2023 (most of the highly touted prospects sign in January) to a small enough bonus that it wasn’t reported, indicating that Dalis wasn’t highly sought after as a prospect. No matter — Dalis went straight to the Dominican Summer League and though he struggled in 2023 there (69 wRC+), he was much improved when he repeated the DSL in 2024 (144 wRC+, 21 SB, more walks than strikeouts).

Dalis impressed again in fall instructs, then was a key player for a very good Rockies ACL team in 2025, where he was 1.6 years younger than league average. In 219 plate appearances, Dalis hit .352/.440/.525 with three homers, five triples, and 12 doubles along with 10 steals while walking in 13% of PA — good for a 149 wRC+ and a top 10 ranking in many offensive categories. He was even named the organizational player of the month for July.

After the ACL season ended, Dalis got a nice birthday present with a late July promotion to full-season ball with Low-A Fresno, where he was 3.2 years younger than league average. He got off to a hot start in Fresno with two multi-hit games off the bat, but he cooled off down the stretch. In 31 games at the level, Dalis hit .241/.333/.379 (100 wRC+) in 137 plate appearances, including three homers and seven doubles. On the year, Dalis was more effective hitting lefty (.890 OPS) than in a 46 plate appearance sample hitting right-handed (.733 OPS).

In the field, Dalis played mostly third base for the complex team but saw nearly half of his action in Fresno at shortstop with some second base sprinkled in. He committed 10 errors in 58 games at third, four in 22 games at shortstop, and another two in six games at second base.

Here’s some video of Dalis in Fresno this past season, including some slo-mo looks at his swing:

Eric Longenhagen of FanGraphs identified Dalis as a prospect of note last January, describing him thusly:

Dalis is a medium-framed 18-year-old Venezuelan infielder who had a good second year in the DSL, where he was among the team’s leaders in hard-hit rate.

Dalis has clearly become a prospect to watch with his strong stateside debut, though the national scouts haven’t quite caught up yet. He’ll likely begin 2026 back with Fresno, where he’ll still be one of the younger players in the league. Dalis is at least a 35+ FV player for me pending updated scouting reports and continued good performance in full season ball, ranking just off my top 30 list.

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Editor’s Note: We are privileged to have today’s piece written by former Let’s Go Tribe/Covering the Corner writer, Matt Schlichting, who is one of my (Quincy’s) all-time favorite baseball writers. He writes the number nine prospect recap for us each season. Thank you, Matt!

Thank you, Brian, for inviting me to contribute to the Prospect Countdown once more. In previous years, I’ve had a lot of fun with the ninth spot on the Prospect Countdown. Ralphy Velazquez invented interstellar travel by smashing an airplane past Voyager 2 last year.

Today, there is no back catalogue of backs, zydeco tapes, or stock footage of an ambulance. There is simply Juan Brito, our no. 5 prospect as voted by readers in 2024 and 2025.

The infielder entered last season as a top contender to start at second base. In 2026, he is one of many vying for the role. Thumb surgery and a hamstring strain can do that, and they also fog the statistical lens. EXAMPLE:

Brito slashed .256/.365/.443 in 652 plate appearances across 144 games for the Triple-A Columbus Clippers in 2024.

In 2025? Ninety-Nine plate appearances. Twenty-four games. .256/.357/.463. While the slash line looks familiar, his strikeout rate rose 5% to 21.2%.

Prior to the injury, Brito posted a 143 wRC+, slashing .320/.390/.540 with a 15/10 K/BB/% in fourteen games. Injuries limited other second base prospects, including former first overall pick Travis Bazzana. However, missed opportunities often hurt worse than their causes.
-Matt Schlichting

Juneiker Caceres, OF (Age 18)
2025 (CPX) 160 PA, .289/.419/.469, 3 HR, 5 SB, 16.9 BB%, 11.3 K%, 139 wRC+
2025 (A): 130 PA, .250/.331/.345, 1 HR, 2 SB, 6.9 BB%, 13.1 K%, 103 wRC+

Impressed at the complex league, then hit the ground running in a late season promotion to Single-A before running out of steam late in his age-17 season. Loaded with potential.

Jaison Chourio, OF (Age 20)
2025 (CPX) 27 PA, .261/.370/.304, 0 HR, 1 SB, 14.8 BB%, 37.0 K%, 95 wRC+
2025 (A+): 353 PA, .235/.380/.284, 2 HR, 9 SB, 18.7 BB%, 21.8 K%, 103 wRC+

Chourio was lining up to be Cleveland’s top prospect after a sensational 2024, but he was slowed in 2025 by a nagging shoulder injury and had a very average season. He’s looking to bounce back in 2026.

Josh Hartle, LHP (Age 22)
2025 (A+): 22 GS, 103.1 IP, 2.35 ERA, 3.06 FIP, 24.0 K%, 8.9 BB%, 1.05 WHIP
2025 (AA): 2 GS, 10.0 IP, 4.50 ERA, 2.79 FIP, 16.3 K%, 4.7 BB%, 1.50 WHIP

Acquired from Pittsburghin the Spencer Horwitz trade, Hartle was one of Cleveland’s most successful starting pitchers in its minor league system in 2025. Stands 6-foot-6, but doesn’t have a ton of velocity.

Jace LaViolette, OF (Age 22)
2025 (NCAA) 262 PA, .258/.427/.576, 18 HR, 7 SB, 21.8 BB%, 25.2K%, 120 wRC+

Cleveland’s first round pick in the 2025 MLB Draft, the 6-foot-6 LaViolette instantly becomes one of the top power hitting prospects in the system. Strikeouts and contact have been an issue, however.

Alfonsin Rosario, OF (Age 21)
2025 (A+) 354 PA, .268/.362/.490, 16 HR, 12 SB, 10.8 BB%, 25.1 K%, 139 wRC+
2025 (AA): 145 PA, .211/.303/.391, 5 HR, 2 SB, 10.3 BB%, 33.1 K%, 105 wRC+

One of Cleveland’s most impressive hitters in its minor league system during his stint at High-A Lake County as a 20-year-old. Rosario has a unique combination of speed and power, but will need to overcome his strikeouts.

Kahlil Watson, OF (Age 22)
2025 (AA) 253 PA, .247/.337/.461, 8 HR, 7 SB, 10.3 BB%, 28.5 K%, 134 wRC+
2025 (AAA): 176 PA, .255/.358/.477, 8 HR, 10 SB, 12.5 BB%, 26.7 K%, 121 wRC+

Acquired in the Josh Bell trade, Watson had his best season in 2025 after switching to the outfield from shortstop. Possesses a unique blend of speed and power mixed with great athleticism.

Daniel Espino, RHP (Age 25)
2025 (AAA): Threw 0.2 innings in Columbus at the end of the season, and threw 4 and 2/3rds innings in the Arizona Fall League. In those 5 and 1/3rd innings, he struck out 8 batters and walked 3. He gave up 7 hits (some rough batted ball luck)
2024 (IL): Missed all of 2024 and 2023 due to shoulder capsule repair issues, but as a 20 year-old in High-A in 2021 he had a 14.92/3.38 K/BB/9 and a 3.08 FIP

Espino has long been an object of wistful dreaming for Guardians’ prospect aficionados with his upper 90’s fastball and slider that might be even better than the heater. The question is whether he can ever be healthy enough to make the big leagues, where his path is probably now as a reliever.

VOTE BELOW:

Our list so far:
1. Chase DeLauter, LHH OF
2. Travis Bazzana, LHH 2B
3. Parker Messick, LHP
4. Ralphy Velazquez, LHH 1B/RF
5. Angel Genao, SH SS
6. Braylon Doughty, RHP
7. Cooper Ingle, LHH C
8. Khal Stephen, RHP
9. Juan Brito, SH 2B/1B/RF/3B

When Brewers fans talk about the bullpen, names like Trevor Megill or Abner Uribe usually dominate the conversation. That makes sense. Closers and flamethrowers tend to get the attention. But one of the most important arms in Milwaukee’s bullpen is not the one finishing games or lighting up the radar gun. It is Jared Koenig, a pitcher whose value lies in how often he keeps games from getting away in the first place.

Koenig is not flashy, and he does not fit the archetype of the modern reliever who racks up saves or piles up strikeouts in highlight clips. His stat line — 2.67 ERA, 3.31 FIP, 131 Ks, 128 IP over 127 appearances in 2024 & 2025 — doesn’t blow you away either.

What he does instead is quietly stabilize games. Over the course of the last two seasons with Milwaukee, he has taken on a steady diet of meaningful innings and turned them into outs with remarkable consistency. That kind of contribution rarely drives headlines, but it often determines whether a team survives the grind of 162 games.

His path to this role makes his emergence even more notable. Koenig was drafted in the 35th round in 2014 and spent years bouncing around independent leagues, including stops overseas, simply trying to keep his career alive. There was no fast track, no top-prospect pedigree, and no guarantee he would ever see sustained major league time. That background usually leads to a brief appearance in the majors, not a dependable role on a contending roster. Yet Koenig has carved out exactly that.

The Brewers have built much of their recent success on finding value where others do not, particularly with pitching. Koenig fits neatly into that organizational identity. He commands the strike zone, limits free passes, and misses enough bats to escape trouble. As a left-hander, he provides matchup flexibility, but he is far more than a situational specialist. Milwaukee has shown a willingness to deploy him against a wide range of hitters and in a variety of leverage spots, which signals genuine trust rather than simple necessity.

What makes Koenig especially important is the role he plays in the middle innings. Not every game is decided in the ninth, and many are won or lost in the sixth or seventh, when a starter exits and the opposing lineup turns over again. Koenig has been one of the Brewers’ most reliable options in those moments. He does not just bridge innings. He prevents momentum from swinging. When he enters with runners on base or a slim lead, the game often slows down.

That reliability matters even more for a roster built on depth and flexibility. Milwaukee rarely leans on a single dominant bullpen arm for long stretches. Instead, responsibility is spread across multiple relievers, with roles shifting as performance ebbs and flows. Koenig’s ability to absorb innings without drama allows the Brewers to protect their higher-octane arms and avoid overexposing younger or less consistent relievers. Over a long season, that kind of workload management can be the difference between a bullpen holding together in September and October or unraveling.

There is also reason to believe Koenig’s performance is not a fluke. He showed signs of breaking out last season, and rather than regressing, he has built on that success. That kind of year-to-year stability is rare for relievers, whose results are often driven by small-sample volatility. Koenig’s continued effectiveness points to a skill set that is more repeatable than random.

Pitchers like Koenig are easy to overlook because they do not fit neatly into traditional narratives. They do not close games, do not collect awards, and do not dominate trade deadline discourse. But teams that consistently reach October almost always have several players like him. They are not stars, but they are indispensable. They turn close games into wins and prevent losing streaks from spiraling.

If the Brewers are going to sustain success and push deeper into the postseason, they will need contributions beyond the obvious names. Koenig represents the kind of hidden value that has defined Milwaukee’s approach for years. He is not the most exciting Brewer, but he may be one of the most important.

We have hit the lull in between the hot stove league and Spring Training. There will be more deals made between now and then, but your Houston Astros are probably winding down their additions and changes. This affords us time to dive into some side conversations that could prove interesting. Last week, the BBWAA elected former Astro Carlos Beltran into the Baseball Hall of Fame along with Andruw Jones. This year’s induction ceremony will feature two former Astros.

The Hall of Fame index is a systemic way to look at Hall of Fame fitness, but like most methods it needs context and counterbalances to be meaningful. The index combines baseball-reference WAR and Fangraphs WAR into one number. It is similar to JAWS in that it combines career value and peak value for one tidy number. The number itself is only relevant if we compare it to other players at the same position. Since Beltran spent much of his career as a center fielder, we will compare him with the four players closest to him in the index.

We will look at the index itself, but we will also look at offensive metrics, fielding metrics, overall metrics, and a deeper dive into WAR to see how those wins were parceled out. We do that because some people are not big on WAR and WAR itself has its own secret sauce which is difficult to understand for many fans. We want to look at its components so that it makes more sense. We will start with the index itself.

The Hall of Fame Index

There are two important parts of the index that make it different from JAWS. The first thing is the addition of FWAR. is the first major difference. Different WAR formulas look at performance slightly differently and including both of those gives us a richer view of the player. Fielding seems to be most significant difference, but there are some differences on the offensive end as well. The second major difference is a ten year peak versus a seven year peak. The additional three seasons adds key data, but the biggest reason is that it takes ten seasons to be eligible for the Hall of Fame, so it felt appropriate to make the peak ten seasons.

The key is how we interpret the index. It is not meant to rank order players. It is meant to measure fitness. Beltran is not necessarily better than Jones. They are virtually similar in terms of value. Furthermore, all of these players are similar in value. It is more accurately used like Bill James’ similarity scores. If a player is similar to others that are universally seen as Hall of Famers then they are probably a Hall of Famer. If they are similar to players that are not seen as Hall of Famers then their case is a little more shaky.

We look at the other numbers (offense, fielding, and durability numbers) to provide more context and determine how WAR was arrived at. On the offensive end, we are using OPS+ which compares players with the league at the time. 100 is considered to be average with most of these players coming above that. We also include offensive winning percentage which assumes a regular lineup of nine players identical to him with average pitching. We will also use real offensive value and bases per out that I have used in previous articles. Real offensive value combines batting average and secondary average. Bases per out combines total bases, walks, stolen bases, and hit by pitches and divides that by total outs.

Offensive Numbers

Offensive winning percentage is one of my favorite metrics. Imagine a team that has a .731 winning percentage. it is staggering. Hamilton’s numbers are just stupid. A part of the problem with 19th century players is that some of the data is unavailable. So, his numbers are relevant in comparison with his contemporaries, but not as relevant in comparison with these guys. However, that BPO is ridiculously good. He combined high average, on base skills, and speed to enormous value.

The biggest takeaway here is that Edmonds looks a lot better than we thought he would and I imagine better than most of the voters thought. In comparison, Jones and Beltran look a little more ordinary. Of course, hitting is not the only part of value. No single test qualifies or disqualifies a player. We take them all in concert to get an overall look at a player. This is why numerous statisticians like stats like WAR. It aims to include everything a player does into one tidy number. I include all of the components because WAR is not universally recognized as a valuable tool.

In terms of fielding we are looking at Rfield from baseball-reference.com. It is closely correlated to defensive runs saved, but obviously predates that for most of these players. DWAR and FG are similar numbers that measure a player against the replacement level fielder. In this case, it is an overall look at the baseball universe, so certain positions are assumed to be more valuable than others. Some of these players played other positions than center field, so their DWAR and FG will be affected. However, the differences between DWAR and FG can help explain the differences between BWAR and FWAR. In the last category we simply look at the Rfield for just center field.

Fielding

I don’t think it is hypebole to say that Jones is the most valuable defensive center fielder in the game’s history. He surpasses Willie Mays in Rfield and DWAR. Obviously, all rating systems include some level of subjectivity. However, Jones performance here helps explain where his value comes from. When you include off the charts defensive value with good offensive value you get a compelling case for the Hall of Fame.

When we remove Snider, we see that the other three are pretty similar in value. Hamilton’s DWAR and FG lag behind largely because of the era. Other positions were considerably more valuable and most of those came on the infield. It was likely the nature of the game itself which was what historians would call “inside baseball”. If homers are depressed then players will focus on line drives and ground balls. That puts more of a premium on infield defense.

In Beltran’s case, we see overall good defensive value and offensive value. When you are good at both then you are very good overall. The last leg of the value puzzle is longevity. We use Bill James’ total runs formula to calculate that. We add runs created, fielding runs, base running runs, and a positional adjustment to come up with total runs.

Total Runs

This is the missing piece. Beltran doesn’t look overwhelming when we look at the offensive and fielding value numbers, but these numbers are staggering. If a good player adds 100 total runs a season then he has three seasons worth of production over all of these players. It helps explain how Hamilton could be so good in the value numbers, but similar in overall value to the other four.

When we combine these three tests we get a pretty clear picture of these five players. However, we have one more test to go. In this case, we are looking at BWAR seasons to determine how often they were among the league’s best. It isn’t always universal, but five WAR seasons make you among the league’s best. Four win seasons are usually all-star campaigns. Solid regulars get three WAR. Additionally, we will note how often each player led the league in BWAR.

BWAR Seasons

A lack of leading the league does not make someone unfit for the Hall of Fame. Obviously, the reverse is also true. However, it does add needed context to a career. Players can accumulate WAR over 20 seasons or 12. This table helps illustrate that. Most baseball fans are captivated by greatness. In many ways, that is the deciding factor when looking at a borderline Hall of Famer. How often were they great?

Each of these players end up being pretty close in that regard. I’d say the biggest takeaway is that Beltran overwhelmed through longevity, Jones overwhelmed with defense, and Jim Edmonds has gotten the shaft to date. He should be next in line.

The Mets have one of the best farm systems in baseball -- even after trading two of their top prospects in the Freddy Peralta deal -- and they're well-represented on The Athletic's new top 100 prospects list ahead of the 2026 season.

Here's how the Mets on the list stack up:

No. 15: RHP Nolan McLean
No, 18: OF Carson Benge
No. 72: RHP Jonah Tong
No. 98: OF A.J. Ewing

Law heralds McLean as someone who could be a top-of-the-rotation starter, and writes that Benge could end up being an above-average defender in center field. 

Regarding Tong, Law says he has the upside of a No. 2 starter.

As far as Ewing, Law notes that he could profile as a regular in center field, adding that there's a chance he becomes a star "if he lifts the ball a little more to get to more home run power."

McLean dazzled in 48.0 innings over eight starts during his big league debut last season, posting a 2.06 ERA and 1.04 WHIP while striking out 57 batters. He is expected to slot near the top of the 2026 rotation.

Benge, who ended the 2025 season with Triple-A Syracuse, is expected to compete for a spot on the Opening Day roster -- and could be the starting left fielder if he makes it.

The other two prospects on the list could open 2026 in the minors. 

Tong showed flashes during his first taste of the majors in 2025, but his arsenal can use some refining. 

As far as Ewing, he had a breakout season in 2025, slashing .315/.401/.429 (.830 OPS) across three levels, ending with Double-A Binghamton. The speedy Ewing smacked 10 triples and 26 doubles while swiping 70 bases. 

Jett Williams and Brandon Sproat, the prospects the Mets traded in the Peralta deal, ranked No. 45 and No. 75, respectively. 

San Diego Padres pitcher Joe Musgrove said he is anxious to get back on the mound for his hometown team and a year of good health as he and the Padres look to return to the postseason according to Kevin Acee of the San Diego Union-Tribune. Musgrove spoke at a ribbon-cutting ceremony at San Dieguito Community Park where he and centerfielder Jackson Merrill were in attendance for the re-opening of a ballpark that is used for the Miracle League of San Diego. Musgrove said he wants to have a normal season but understands that the ultimate goal is to pitch in October.

Padres News:

• Gaslamp Ball conducted a poll and asked readers which of three free agent pitchers they would prefer the Padres to sign, Lucas Giolito, Nick Martinez or Justin Verlander? The three pitchers were named as possible targets for San Diego by Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic. Readers overwhelmingly prefer to see Giolito on the mound for the Padres in 2026.

Baseball News:

• MLB.com reported many teams are interested in signing Giolito and the most recent team to express its interest is the Detroit Tigers according to a report from MLB Network insider Jon Heyman.
• Pittsburgh Pirates mainstay outfielder Andrew McCutchen expressed his disappointment in being excluded from PiratesFest. He has not yet signed with a team for the 2026 season.
• Free agent pitcher Tomoyuki Sugano is not planning to return to Nippon Professional Baseball according to a report on MLB Trade Rumors.