Category: Sports News

2026 stats: .324/ .360/ .440, 121 wRC+, 10 FRV, 3.8 fWARover105 G, 464 PA w/Giants.

Luis Arráez was arguably the best thing about the San Francisco Giants 2026 season. The best because it was so unexpected. The best because there are so few good options to choose from.

Luis Arráez’s freakish bat-to-ball skills in an era of swing-and-miss offense has set him apart from his peers, giving him a certain sheen that some teams can’t resist. We’ve known his name since he emerged his rookie year in 2019 because he’s different. He’s been elected to four All-Star teams in the past five years because isn’t that how you treat players who hit pitches without fail?

The point of baseball is to hit the baseball. As much as that essential truth has been flat-out refuted and refused by slug-hungry analysts, it’s hard to get around the fact that hitters need to hit. It’s right there in the name. Arráez is a hitter. Thanks to this unique skillset became a continent-traversing hired gun. An outsider. A man from a different era, maintaining his relevancy because a high-average, zero-power hitter has always been relevant. The Twins traded him to Miami in January of 2023. The Marlins traded him to San Diego in May of 2024. Two leagues, three coasts (if we count lakes), three different time-zones, and three batting titles. Each move he’s flown first class with his bat swaddled in the seat next to him. But tossed unceremoniously in with the other luggage, stuffed in the plane’s cargo hold like a dark secret — Arráez’s glove.     

Going into the 2026 season, Arráez had a career -54 Fielding Run Value. His best defensive season according to that metric (excluding the shortened 2020 season) was the 2021 season with the Twins when he logged more innings at third than second and patrolled left field for more than 100 innings. Across those three positions he accrued a -4 Run Value. The year he won his first batting title in 2022 his FRV dropped to -5.

In Miami, primarily at second base, his FRV fell to an untenable -11. He only hit 10 homers. Two numbers that aren’t directly related, but illustrative. Generally if you allow runs because of your glove, it’s nice to balance things out by scoring runs with your bat. That’s not Arráez. 2024 was split between Miami and San Diego, second base and first, and again he posted a dismal -11 FRV. He knocked just four dingers.

San Diego kept Arráez tethered to first base in 2025 and even with him tucked in the corner, he once again accrued a -11 FRV while hitting just 8 homers. He also fell off the batting average pedestal for the first time since 2021. The fall wasn’t far. His .292 average ranked fourth in the league, but slipping below .300 number is never a good look for a supposed batting champion. His 104  wRC+ in 2025, essentially league average, was the lowest of his career, as was his 0.9 fWAR. 

The timing was awful considering the well-traveled Arráez was entering into free agency for the first time. He had just posted a -33 FRV in three years. He couldn’t play the field. He couldn’t hit for power. He was too good at making contact to walk. On top of that his bat appeared to be splintering.  No wonder he sat on the shelf for most of the winter. Even Buster Posey, with his old-school love of batting average and low-K rates, seemed reluctant to dig this can of lima beans from the pantry. But by the end of January, options for filling the perceived hole at second base were limited. Arráez was certainly not the second base solution fans envisioned. Brady put words to what many of us were feeling when the news broke of the one-year, $12 million deal. 

Posey took a swing. A swing he really didn’t have to make. A swing better described as a lunge, a reflexive hack at a pitch in the dirt — but not only did he make contact, the baseball found a hole.

Luis Arráez was unexpectedly good in 2026. Good measured against himself, and good measured against his adjacent peers. While the rest of the Giants’ lineup taxied on the runway at the start of the season, Arráez took off. His monthly splits climbed from .324 in April, to .340 in May, to .354 in June. Similarly his slugging skipped skyward as well, from .394 to .490 to .536.   

By the end of June, Luis Arráez led the team with a .331 batting average, 15 points above Jung Hoo Lee. His .836 OPS was second to Bryce Eldridge’s .841, and 30 points above breakout star Casey Schmitt, as well as 75 points, 100 points higher than club core of Rafael Devers, Willy Adames and Heliot Ramos and Matt Chapman.

His plate appearances became a drink of cool water for parched fans. Posey was right — it was fun to see basehits. But it wasn’t just the dinks and doinks, it was the expressiveness of his at-bats. An Arráez plate appearance was a sensory experience from start to finish. Hitting was a dance with the pitcher, the opposite of Buster ball with his khaki stoicism. He’d often take a first pitch without breaking eye-contact with the pitcher. Sometimes he’d taunt a ball he knew was off the plate, guiding it into the catcher’s glove before doing a  little tango step and shoulder-shimmy in the box. His bat was a conductor’s baton, a shovel, a rapier. He parried away pitches, yipped at foul balls, bat-flipped singles. He invited two-strike counts, batting a MLB-leading .299 with his back against the wall while striking out just 8.8% of the time. The next lowest K-percentage in two-strike counts was Nico Hoerner’s 18.5%. Willy Adames saw a third strike nearly 50% of the time. 2026 was the fifth time in his career that his walk rate was higher than his strikeout rate. His 20 at-bats-per-strikeout was the third highest rate for a Giant in the San Francisco era (min. 300 PA). 

Despite leaving at the trade deadline, two months prior to the end of the season, Arráez ended the year leading all Giants players with a 3.8 fWAR.

That 3.8 mark is the best of his career because this season was by far his best all-around year. The aforementioned offensive numbers weren’t surprising. His bat improved from 2025, but it didn’t come out of the blue. What did feel like it was conjured up from nothing was his performance on defense.

Arráez completely transformed himself as a member of the Giants’ infield. His -11 Fielding Run Value in 2025 was nearly flipped perfectly on its head to +10 FRV. A 21 run swing that put him in the 91st percentile of the league. His 12 outs above average was fifth most among all second basemen.

These results border on the miraculous. Water into wine type stuff, and watching Arráez out at second base felt a bit like a party. He didn’t play like a reprogrammed fielding robot. He played with flair and lightness, born again. He picked short hops with attitude and exaggerated underhand feeds with a whole-body lunge. He relished throwing off one foot, on the run, contorting his body to look like a Baroque sculpture as he discovered new ways to deliver the ball to first. Fielding coach Ron Washington, hired a couple months prior to Arráez, was the miracle worker, the one to touch the infielders clumsy oven-mitt hands and make them soft. But it wasn’t just a physical change, but a mental and spiritual one as well. Washington had Arráez out on the field in Scottsdale, morning dew still clinging to the grass, peppering him with grounders, and he had him laid out on the couch as well, delving into his subconscious, his anxieties and fears in order to reclaim second base as a field to roam, to frolic, to literally play in. Matisse said he spent his entire career trying to relearn how to draw like a child. Maybe that’s what Arráez did in the 2026 season. He rediscovered the joy.  

Though he fell short of a fourth batting title (.310, 2nd in NL to Gabriel Moreno’s .311) and a career first Gold Glove nomination, Arráez’s 2026 was one to remember. A year to hang a bat, hat, and glove on. He played so well that he played himself out of the orange-and-black uniform, which is maybe not the ideal situation, but a pretty good one considering the initial risk taken.

So let’s give credit where credit is due. Posey got this one right. The problem became that a lot of the other things went wrong. Adames never figured out his offense or defense. Chapman hobbled around the diamond for a little bit before going completely AWOL. Devers launched into the stratosphere pretty much the moment Arráez shipped off to Philadelphia. The four of them seemed to enjoy making faces across the infield while whipping the baseball at each other, but they never could coordinate how to turn their wheels in the same direction at the same time. A shame, for a number of reasons — one of them being that we didn’t get to watch Luis Arráez play baseball the last two months of the season.

Frelick and Pratt lift Brewers to 5-4 comeback win over Rays and 2-0 World Series lead originally appeared on NBC Sports Bay Area

Sal Frelick tied the score with his first home run in three months, Cooper Pratt hit a go-ahead single in the seventh inning and the Milwaukee Brewers stunned the Tampa Bay Rays 5-4 on Saturday night for a 2-0 World Series lead by overcoming a four-run deficit for the second time in the postseason.

Tampa Bay, which won the AL pennant by forcing opponents into mistakes, committed one error, made two other misplays that could have been charged as errors and had a runner thrown out at the plate.

Down 4-0 in the first inning, Milwaukee rallied for its seventh comeback win of this postseason. The Brewers also rebounded from a 4-0 deficit to beat the Los Angeles Dodgers 6-4 in Game 4 of the NL Championship Series, completing a four-game sweep.

After losing Friday’s opener 3-2, the Rays burst ahead against rookie Logan Henderson but the Brewers started to claw back with two runs in the bottom half against Tampa Bay ace Drew Rasmussen.

David Hamilton cut the deficit to 4-3 with a run-scoring grounder in the fourth and Frelick capped a nine-pitch at-bat against Ian Seymour in the sixth by driving a fastball over the center-field fence.

Frelick had gone 103 plate appearances without a home run since his July 11 drive off Pittsburgh’s Braxton Ashcraft and had not gone deep against a lefty pitcher since opening day against Tyler Gilbert of the Chicago White Sox. Frelick sped around the bases in 18.72 seconds, half the time of some theatrical trots this postseason.

Screaming fans at the second game of Milwaukee’s first World Series since 1982 were fired up during the seventh-inning stretch, dancing to the “Beer Barrel Polka” played by Mike Schneider, an accordionist from Clinton, Wisconsin.

Brice Turang doubled against losing pitcher Tyler Wells on the second pitch of the bottom half, advanced on Garrett Mitchell’s flyout to right and scored when Pratt, a 22-year-old who debuted in June, looped a sinker from Kevin Kelly into short right field.

Abner Uribe pitched 1 1/3 hitless innings for the win.

Jonny DeLuca doubled off Aaron Ashby starting the ninth, then Victor Mesa Jr. struck out when he couldn’t check his swing. Pinch-hitter Ben Williamson’s groundout advanced the runner and Yandy Díaz struck out when he couldn’t check his swing on a full-count pitch.

Ashby has three saves in the postseason while not allowing a run.

Milwaukee won its seventh straight game, becoming the fifth team to twice overcome four-run deficits for victories in a single postseason and the first since Philadelphia in 2022.

Game 3 of the matchup between teams seeking their first title is Monday night at Tropicana Field in St. Petersburg, Florida, where the Brewers last played in 2023.

Of the 57 previous teams to take 2-0 World Series leads, 46 claimed the championship.

Tampa Bay took a 4-2 lead in the highest-scoring Series first inning since 1993’s Game 4 as teams combined for seven hits, tying the most in an opening frame.

Still, Milwaukee improved to 13-0 in games started by Henderson, dating to his 2025 debut. He followed Jacob Misiorowski in the Brewers’ rotation, the first time teammates 24 or younger started the first two games of the Series since Cincinnati’s Gary Nolan and Ross Grimsley in 1972.

Henderson started on 11 days’ rest and struggled as the Rays fouled off 13 of 35 pitches in the first. He gave up four runs — three earned — in three innings.

Given an extra day of rest, Rasmussen allowed three runs and six hits over 3 2/3 innings in his shortest start since July 9.

Pratt made his fourth error of the postseason at shortstop, the Brewers’ ninth in 10 games, bouncing his throw past first baseman Jake Bauers on a leadoff grounder by Díaz. Chandler Simpson and Junior Caminero followed with RBI singles, and Liam Hicks hit a two-run homer.

Jackson Chourio and Bauers started the bottom half with singles and first baseman Jonathan Aranda allowed Contreras’ one-out foul pop to bounce out of his mitt near netting in front of the seats.

With Bauers running on a full-count pitch, Contreras bounced an RBI single to the left of second baseman Richie Palacios, who had taken a step toward the base. Mitchell’s two-out single cut the deficit to 4-2.

Hamilton hit an RBI grounder in the fourth that bounced under Aranda’s legs for an error.

Chourio threw out Hicks from left for the final out of the sixth when third base coach Brady Williams waved the slow-footed catcher to try to score from second on Mesa’s single.

Up next

Rays RHP Freddy Peralta, who became a two-time All-Star when he pitched for the Brewers from 2018-25, starts Game 3. He was the AL Championship Series MVP and is 2-0 with a 1.08 ERA in three postseason starts and one relief appearance. He will be opposed by Brewers LHP Robert Gasser, who allowed one run over nine innings in his first two postseason starts.

A little over two weeks ago, the New York Yankees were eliminated from World Series contention in the American League Division Series for the second consecutive campaign. At times, they didn’t even put up a fight, being swept by the Tampa Bay Rays 3-0 in the best-of-five series. Prior to that, they won 93 games and finished 4.5 behind the Rays in the race for the AL East. That’s a solid season for virtually any other team, but losing the division and experiencing such an early postseason exit is often associated with frustration and disappointment in the Bronx.

This week, chairman and managing general partner Hal Steinbrenner faced the media and didn’t even hesitate for a second to put it all on the players, particularly the offense.

“I don’t think you can pin the season and the unacceptable end to it on Aaron [Boone],” Steinbrenner said on a Zoom call. “I don’t think you can pin it on [Brian Cashman], based on the roster he put together.

“In the end, the majority of the responsibility — I’ll say it for the fifth time, in my mind, my opinion — lies with the position players and the inability to score on a consistent basis throughout the course of the entire season, for the most part,” Steinbrenner said. “Not on the shoulders of Aaron Boone does the blame lie.”

Usually, in these cases, those who make the decisions and have to face the press either take the responsibility themselves or adopt a shared blame approach. Throwing the players under the bus like this doesn’t seem like a particularly good idea, especially when Steinbrenner decides to employ Cashman as his GM and Boone as his manager — these two are the ones actually choosing the players who step into the box and onto the mound.

One has to think that the Steinbrenner conference didn’t sit well with Aaron Judge, Cody Bellinger, Giancarlo Stanton, and other veterans on the roster. No one knows what is said behind closed doors, but it’s hard to envision the players loving the Zoom conference.

Now, nobody is saying that the players should be on the clear. On the contrary: they deserve a sizable portion of the blame. They were, after all, the ones competing on the field and failing to execute when it mattered against the Rays and, for stretches, during the regular season.

Austin Wells had one of the worst halves in Yankees history for a regular and even after rebounding, he committed a game-changing baserunning mistake in Game 1 of the ALDS. Jazz Chisholm Jr. was inconsistent and error-prone, Ryan McMahon was an offensive liability all year, and Anthony Volpe had another uneven season, just to name a few other disappointments. Trent Grisham had a .613 OPS in the second and then hit .133 in five October games with an awful AB to end the season. Who insisted on using Grisham in both center and then the leadoff spot in the finale, though? And who was responsible for the offense not having any contingency plans at catcher and third base? Yes, the men at the top. Surely they deserve at least some slice on the Blame Game pie chart and not total absolution.

Regarding Grisham at the leadoff spot, no other circumstance, stat, or situation other than “gut feeling” was behind the decision to use him at the top. He had been bad up there all year, and the numbers back it up:

Once Boone and Cashman make a decision, they tend to stick with it even if the house of cards is falling. The ability to adapt and adjust is just not there, nor is the willingness.

The complete lack of self-criticism from Steinbrenner was baffling, and honestly, a bit frustrating. Maybe the players need to be blamed the most for the postseason fiasco, but when the same mistakes occur year after year, it shouldn’t be on the players anymore. Althought the rosters have changed, there have been two constants for every postseason failure from 2018 onward: Boone and Cashman. The Yankees have a losing playoff record under them at 27-30, and the latter’s spotty résumé goes back even longer.

The Yankees have issues in roster and lineup construction, scouting, player development (hitting-wise, at least), and several other departments. Unless they improve some of their resources and practices, they are doomed to keep striking out in October, literally and figuratively.

As the Milwaukee Brewers and Tampa Bay Rays battle for a World Series title, Chicago’s struggles with runners in scoring position reveal an offensive weakness the White Sox must address.

The Rays spent six months making runners in scoring position (RISP) a strength. On Friday night, six missed opportunities helped turn their 2026 World Series opener into a loss.

Tampa Bay went 0-for-6 with runners in scoring position against the Brewers, falling 3-2 despite advancing the tying run 90 feet from home in the ninth inning. A team that led Major League Baseball with a .283 batting average in those situations suddenly found itself searching for one more productive swing.

“We had traffic on the bases pretty much all night,” Rays shortstop Taylor Walls told MLB.com. “But [we] weren’t able to get that big hit, that timely hit, the double with a runner on first or a single with runners in scoring position.”

More than 1,200 miles away, the White Sox could recognize the frustration.

Chicago’s postseason ended against Cleveland with a different statistical problem but a similar consequence: Runners never reached home plate.

The White Sox hit .243 with RISP during the regular season, ranking 22nd in the majors. They struck out 397 times in 1,361 official at-bats in those situations, a 29.2% K-rate.

By comparison, Tampa Bay hit .283 with RISP, while Milwaukee followed at .276. Both clubs combined consistent contact with aggressive baserunning, providing a different offensive model than Chicago’s power-oriented lineup.

The problem became particularly evident during the American League Division Series.

Although the White Sox hit .275 with runners in scoring position across seven postseason games, they struck out 21 times in 51 at-bats with RISP. Cleveland pitchers struck out 75 Chicago hitters during the five-game ALDS, including an all-time record of 21 in the decisive Game 5.

Manager Will Venable acknowledged that the problem extended beyond chasing pitches outside the strike zone, to misses in the zone, and his assessment revealed a fundamental challenge: Against elite pitching, even hitters making reasonable swing decisions can struggle to produce contact.

That becomes particularly costly with a runner on third and fewer than two outs, as a sacrifice fly or a well-placed ground ball can score a run without a hit. A strikeout, however, leaves the runner exactly where he started.

Modern hitting philosophies emphasize power, patience and avoiding unnecessary outs. Those principles have merit, but postseason baseball frequently demands a more situational approach.

Milwaukee demonstrated that on Friday.

Christian Yelich drove home Jackson Chourio with a first-inning triple, William Contreras followed with an RBI single, and Chourio added a two-out RBI single in the seventh.

The Brewers went 2-for-8 with runners in scoring position, but those hits helped secure a one-run victory.

Milwaukee scored 832 runs during the regular season despite hitting only 154 home runs. Chicago hit 211 homers but scored 776 runs. The Brewers also stole 162 bases compared with Chicago’s 93, demonstrating another way to create offensive pressure.

Those differences suggest the White Sox do not necessarily need to abandon power. They need a more balanced offensive approach.

That balance has been an organizational question throughout the past decade, as Chicago has cycled through rebuilding rosters, veteran lineups and postseason contenders. The 2026 results provide another reason to examine whether the club has consistently struggled to convert scoring opportunities.

For players such as Colson Montgomery, Kyle Teel and Miguel Vargas, improvement must include producing quality plate appearances against elite pitching. Montgomery’s power remains valuable, but the White Sox need consistent contact throughout the lineup.

Free agency could provide additional options.

Luis Arráez offers a contact-oriented offensive profile, while potential free agents Bo Bichette, Ian Happ and Seiya Suzuki represent different combinations of hitting ability and overall production.Simply acquiring a hitter with a high RISP average, however, would not guarantee improvement. 

Tampa Bay’s World Series opener demonstrated that even baseball’s most productive situational hitters can struggle when opportunities arise.

Rays manager Kevin Cash remained confident despite the loss.

“This is an extremely confident group,” Cash said. “They’re going to be fine.”

Chicago’s challenge is finding that same confidence while developing the offensive consistency needed to advance deeper into October.

The White Sox proved they could hit enough home runs to reach the postseason. Cleveland demonstrated that power alone was not enough to survive it.

And as Milwaukee showed Friday, sometimes the difference between winning and losing isn’t the ball that leaves the park. It’s the one that brings the runner home.

I think its important when evaluating front office performance to also evaluate the moves the team could’ve made but chose not to just as much as you evaluate the deals they made. Last December, one of the major storylines of the entire MLB offseason was whether or not the Arizona Diamondbacks were going to trade Ketel Marte. Marte was just wrapping up another typical season for himself in which he created a lot of value, but was also a major source of off the field distraction. The narrative at the time was that they were ‘listening’ on Ketel Marte but not actively trying to move him. Even with his pending 10 and 5 rights that were set to vest at the beginning of the 2026 season in April. This led to plenty of speculation by the industry as to whether he might be moved and where he might end up.

The Boston Red Sox seemed to ultimately get the closest and according to Alex Speier at the Boston Globein February of 2026, the Red Sox were heavily interested and had offered a package of Payton Tolle and Franklin Arias for Marte. According to Speier, the Dbacks insisted that Marcelo Mayer be included in the deal and the Red Sox refused. That would effectively seal Marte’s fate with the Dbacks for 2026 and potentially beyond. But what would this team have looked like if Hazen and co hadn’t been so insistent on Marcelo Mayer and just said yes to Tolle and Arias for Marte? This article will rewind the clock and examine just that.

In fairness, I need to put the disclaimer here that none of the results are guaranteed on the new teams because there are a ton of factors that dictate player performance. I also don’t have a crystal ball, so for the purposes of this exercise lets just assume the players had the same 2026 regardless of what team they were on. Also in fairness to Mike Hazen, it is easy to play captain hindsight. It is much harder to make the moves in the moment. However for entertainment purposes only, lets revisit the trade that almost was and analyze the ripple effects.

Trade: Bos Recieves: Ketel Marte Ari Recieves: Payton Tolle and Franklin Arias.

The Dbacks acquire the fastball heavy prospect Payton Tolle and they finally get the bat missing controllable arm they have coveted. They also would acquire a top middle infield prospect that would’ve likely started the season in Amarillo and got promoted to Reno and honestly could’ve pushed for some big league time, however for the purposes of this exercise lets assume Arias would’ve spent the season in the minors and not contributed any major league value.

In a corresponding move, Ari signs 3B Alex Bregman 5yr $175 million

If the Dbacks traded Marte, it is widely speculated that they would’ve signed Alex Bregman. There was a lot of reporting that Bregman wanted to play for the Dbacks and live where he played year round similar to the Corbin Burnes situation. Especially if the Dbacks had traded Ketel Marte as reported by Ken Rosenthal in The Athletic For the purposes of this exercise lets assume the exact same contract only its entirely likely he wouldve came at a slightly cheaper rate. I also think its not just a coincidence that the day after Arizona acquired Nolan Arenado on 1/12, Bregman signed with the Cubs. In my opinion, he was clearly holding out for a deal with Arizona. So in this world, Dbacks trade Marte and to fill the gap in the middle of their lineup, they sign Alex Bregman.

Moves that then Would’ve Never Happened: Sign Zac Gallen and trade for Nolan Arenado

By signing Bregman and acquiring Tolle, I think its all but certain the Dbacks dont sign Zac Gallen and it likely they dont trade for Arenado although I suppose there is another world out there where Arenado reportedly was willing to play first base. We wont go there though for the purposes of this. So no Nado and no Gallen.

What Would’ve Been the Net Effect?

In fairness to Hazen and Co, this is a little hand wavey assuming that the Dbacks are able to get the same breakout out of Tolle that the Red Sox were. However it is also kind of offset by the breakout the Dbacks were able to get out of Arenado. But for the purposes of this exercise, lets assume the same production in 2026. The result? An additional 4.4 wins almost completely from acquiring Tolle and not signing Gallen. This is where it really hurts:

The Money

To add insult to injury, this version of the 2026 Dbacks roster would’ve likely been about 10-11 million cheaper than they were:

Here is what this would’ve looked like long term financially:

So essentially, the trade would’ve saved 10-11 million in 2026 and cost almost that same amount back for 2027.

Franklin Arias

In addition, this organization would also have a clear consensus top 100 prospect in Franklin Arias who is currently MLB Pipeline’s #2 prospect in all of baseball after the 20 year old SS had a steller 2026 batting .323 with 25 HR in 117 games. Arias has posted elite contact rates at all levels of the minor league’s to go along with some pop at a premium position. This would’ve also solved much of the ‘lack of impact talent’ label this farm system as a whole currently holds and given this team a SS or 2B option of the future with Ketel Marte gone.

Conclusion

I think its fair to assume this is likely a move Mike Hazen and co would want back. Especially considering you add 4 wins to this 2026 club and you likely have a 90 win playoff contender. In addition you also add long term stability to your starting rotation and middle infield at league minimum cost. Had this trade been made, you likely were playing baseball the past couple of weeks, and head into the 2027 season with the rotation anchored by a solid pairing of youth and experience in Burnes and Tolle. You also have Alex Bregman and his leadership coming off of a near 6 WAR season anchoring the middle of the order for years to come and the #2 prospect in all of baseball per MLB Pipeline heading into the offseason.

As I mentioned, there are a ton of variables that could’ve impacted performance one way or the other. Especially when you consider guys playing on different teams and the team dynamics changing. Its not as simple as adding and subtracting WAR in my opinion. We are also basing all of this on reporting from reputable outlets like the Boston Globe and The purposes of this analysis is purely an exercise to further evaluate the decision making of this organization and a fun little ‘what could’ve been’ experiment.