Category: Basketball

The Cleveland Cavaliers have penned what should be there final “big move” of the offseason. After weeks of rumors around the framework of a James Harden deal, it was reported by ESPN’s Shams Charania that Harden and the Cavaliers have come to an agreement.

The Cavaliers and Harden signed a three-year contract worth up to $97 million. The third year of the deal is a player option, and the contract includes a trade kicker as well. All three years are guaranteed.

Harden has been patient and very helpful with the Cavaliers’ offseason plans. With Harden declining his $42.3 million player option in June, it opened up the Cavaliers’ ability to navigate under the second apron.

The Cavaliers appear to be done with all their big swings after the recent acquisition of Peyton Watson. They’ve finally rewarded Harden for his patience through the LeBron James decision and then the trades of Dennis Schroder and Max Strus for Watson.

The Cavaliers were able to get Harden to lower his annual salary in a three-year deal to get under both the first and second aprons. For all the discourse about Harden and his approach to basketball on and off the court, it appears Harden was true to the rumors about giving the Cavaliers flexibility and was patient enough to allow the team to improve the roster.

While Harden’s deal will see him being paid around $32 million annually at age 39 is something that might be tough to swallow; it also needs to be noted that he has given the Cavaliers the ability to remain relevant in a greatly improved Eastern Conference in the short term.

Last season, Harden averaged 23.6 points, 8 assists, and 4.8 rebounds in 70 games for both the Cavs and Los Angeles Clippers. He appeared in 18 playoff games for Cleveland, averaging 19.2 points, 5.5 assists, and 5.1 rebounds.

As the Buss siblings battle each other for the right to sell their minority stake in the Lakers, at least one of the other minority shareholder is sticking with the team.

Patrick Soon-Shiong, the owner of the Los Angeles Times, is not selling his stake in the Lakers.

Soon-Shiong bought a 4% stake in the team from Magic Johnson in 2010. His family attorney, Chuck Kenworthy, said that Soon-Shiong has no interest in selling his stake amid a high-stakes ownership transition.

“We love the Lakers,” Kenworthy told The Times. “We believe in the Lakers. We believe in the future of the Lakers and the championship years they are going to have. And we believe they are still undervalued.”

Read more:Jeanie Buss contests family sale of Lakers ownership stake to Bob Iger, Joshua Kushner

A group led by former Disney chief Bob Iger and venture capitalist Joshua Kushner agreed last week to buy controlling interest in the Lakers from Mark Walter at a $12.5-billion valuation — a record price for an American sports team. The sale is still pending approval by the NBA board of governors. Walter, who owns a majority stake in the Dodgers, is the subject of multiple federal investigations.

Jeanie Buss, whom Walter had agreed could remain as the Lakers’ governor for five years, is challenging her siblings’ decision to sell the family’s 17.8% stake in the team.

Real estate developer Edward P. Roski, one of the Lakers’ other known minority owners, has not disclosed whether he intends to sell his 3% stake in the team. He has owned a stake in the team since 1998. Todd Boehly purchased a minority stake in the Lakers in 2021, but it’s unclear whether all his shares folded into business partner Walter’s majority stake.

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This story originally appeared in Los Angeles Times.

Despite all the noise and rumors, the Golden State Warriors ultimately had an extremely quiet offseason. The Dubs are heading into 2026-27 season with largely the same roster that finished 37-45 last year. Rookie first-round pick Yaxel Lendeboorg is currently the only addition currently slated to play a large role in head coach Steve Kerr’s rotation. The Dubs barely reached the Play-In Tournament last season, finishing 10th in the Western Conference. However, the West seems far deeper this season. Where will Golden State finish this season?

Well, in a poll of Dub Nation by SBNation Reacts, the majority of fans expect them to finish among the top-10 teams in the conference once again. 47% of respondents expect the Warriors to reach the Play-In Tournament, 29% expect them to finish fifth or sixth, 19% expect them to miss the postseason entirely, and 5% expect them to finish with a top-four seed. That’s a surprising amount of confidence from a fanbase that has been justified in its complaints about a questionable supporting cast around an ageing core.

The NBA is a business.

We often hear that phrase when a player is traded or when contract negotiations go sour. It’s true. It’s a league run by billionaires, many of them running their franchises like assets.

You can tell players not to take it personally, but how could they not? Sure, they make millions of dollars and have the ability to live a life most of us could only dream of, but they’re human beings. And not just human beings, but human beings with extraordinary athletic talents, along with plenty of pride and ego.

So, as Brad Stevens sat at his press conference following the trade of Jaylen Brown to the rival Sixers, selling the fan base on how getting rid of Brown was best for the Boston Celtics, how the hell is Brown supposed to feel?

During his introductory press conference a couple weeks ago, Brown said all the right things. As a guest on Jimmy Kimmel Live! (with actor Anthony Anderson filling in as host), the two-time All-NBA pick continued this level of diplomacy.

But make no mistake — Jaylen Brown will be the most motivated player in the NBA next season.

The full NBA schedule for the 2026-27 season came out last week. Unsurprisingly, LeBron James and the new-look Sixers will feature heavily on national TV.

It felt like a no-brainer for the league to have the Sixers take on the defending champion New York Knicks at MSG on opening night. And sure, it makes sense for LeBron to return to L.A. to face the Lakers on Christmas Day.

But it was still mildly surprising for Brown’s return to Boston not to be featured in a marquee matchup. That game won’t happen until January — and you’ll need a subscription to Amazon Prime to watch it. It doesn’t exactly scream “game we definitely want people to watch” by the schedule-makers.

Brown spent a decade with the Celtics. He was a five-time All-Star and won Finals MVP when Boston defeated the Dallas Mavericks in 2024. Add to that the offseason smear campaign Brown was the victim of before and after ultimately being traded to the rival Sixers — for what most deemed a poor return — and you have a storyline juicier than the ribeye served on an Angelo’s cheesesteak.

When Brown got the news he was being dealt to the Sixers after a decade with the Boston Celtics, he threw his phone.

Hey, who among us when we’ve gotten difficult news?

Fast forward to a month later and Brown was sitting at Franklin J. Myers Rec Center in West Philly, surrounded by most of the Sixers’ brass, a swath of media and dozens of adoring young fans wearing No. 7 shirseys.

But Brown didn’t give himself much time to sulk following the trade. Nor did he sound bitter. In fact, whenever you consider he was traded to the Celtics’ direct rival — and the team he battled for 10 years and that overcame a 3-1 deficit to beat Brown and his Boston team last season — needing time to adjust is understandable.

For all the discourse about who Brown is as both a player and a person this offseason, it feels like his humanity has been lost in the shuffle.

When there’s an insinuation a player is selfish, to the point where he can no longer play for your franchise, there’s a strong chance that player is going to be motivated to prove that narrative wrong. It’s not like we’re talking about a player who’s chucked up 30 shots a night throughout his career or who doesn’t given effort on the other end of the floor.

We’re talking about a player who sacrificed to help his team win an NBA Finals two years ago. Maybe he wanted the ball more last season, but the Celtics also gave him the ball. They had to with Jayson Tatum missing most of the season. Relationships between star players can fizzle out over time, but acting like Brown is solely responsible — or even mostly responsible — for Boston blowing a 3-1 series lead to the Sixers is wild.

Analytics are a tool. Simply watching the game doesn’t give you the whole picture, either. Even covering the team on a daily basis only gives you so much insight. It’s all a part of the equation. There’s nuance to all this that gets lost in arguments and short-form videos on social media.

Brown will need to make sacrifices. As will everyone else in the Sixers’ ridiculously talented starting group. But we don’t have to go back very far to point to an example where Brown has done it before. Now, he’s going to be more motivated than ever to show he can do it again. He’s won at the highest level. To think he can’t do so while surrounded by four supremely gifted players is shortsighted.

The best way to shut up the nerds and the naysayers, the attention-seekers and hot-takers, is to win. Another Finals MVP wouldn’t hurt, either.

But it won’t be personal.

Strictly business.

Tom Thibodeau is an unfortunate tale in modern basketball when you think about it. He joined a fraternity of coaches that includes Mark Jackson and Dwane Casey of being someone who helped build the foundation of a champion, only for the organization to look elsewhere for someone to get them over the top. It wasn’t clear for a while that the Knicks would replicate the success of Steve Kerr and Nick Nurse’s hirings, but what they got in Mike Brown was a resounding success.

The real tragedy with Thibodeau isn’t just his semi-rare distinction; it’s worse with added context. This is a man who eats, sleeps, and breathes basketball. He broke off an engagement in college to pursue his dreams of coaching, having been hopelessly obsessed with the game since. He’d been a coach in the NBA for 30 years, bouncing from an assistant on the Knicks to the defensive maestro on the ‘08 Celtics to his two attempts at building foundations in Chicago and Minnesota.

His third head coaching gig was the one he always wanted. As a kid from Connecticut, he said that the Knicks were always his dream job. Everything seemed perfect as he helped bring the team back to relevance, but his own limitations as a coach and a roster that failed to gel in Year 1 prompted a tough decision after five years in charge. Now, a year later, he had to watch an identical version of that team win with a different coaching philosophy. Bittersweet, to say the least.

I’ll always appreciate what Thibs did here, mostly because he was the gold standard as a coach for a relatively young fan who didn’t get to watch the 90s. Hell, up until him, Mike Woodson was my gold standard. I think it’d be foolish if anyone looked past how important it is to set a foundation, because you don’t go from LolKnicks to champs overnight.

And as crazy as it sounds, as the Knicks draw closer and closer to beginning their title defense, there’s something from the Tom Thibodeau era that the Knicks can use to weather the storm of a task that has devoured and, in some cases, torn apart much of the seven teams that came before them.

What’s that, you ask?

Stamina.

Thibs’ downfall was the minutes. By the time the Knicks made the Eastern Conference Finals against the run-and-gun Pacers, they were exhausted. Three of the top five in total minutes wore orange and blue. The lack of lineup versatility doomed them against a deep, fresh Pacers team. No matter how conditioned the Knicks were, the human body had limits.

The change was made to Mike Brown, who completely changed things in New York despite very similar personnel. Deeper rotations, using the regular season to experiment with the depth, and lighter workloads for the starters across 82 games. It paid off come playoff time, where, despite a championship run, four of the team’s five starters accrued less mileage than they did the year before:

2024-25 vs. 2025-26, including playoffs:
Brunson: 2,981 vs. 3,292 (+311)
Hart: 3,539 vs. 2,608 (-931)
Bridges: 3,742 vs. 3,300 (-442)
Anunoby: 3,411 vs. 2,810 (-601)
Towns: 3,156 vs. 2,900 (-256)

Now, part of that is due to just how dominant they were in the playoffs. The Knicks played only one more basketball game in 2025-26 than they did the year before. After three six-game series the season prior, they needed just 19 total games to win a title this year, with a memorable 16-3 run. Still, aside from Brunson, everyone played considerably less, especially Hart and Bridges.

This is pretty unprecedented. If you combine the five starters, they played 16,829 minutes in the final season under Thibs and 14,910 minutes under Brown. You rarely see a team run back the same starting five in a non-title season and go on to win one, but it’s even rarer to see said team not sustain a major injury to their starting five in those consecutive seasons. Thank you, Casey Smith!

While cumulative wear and tear is a concern, the real concern that plagues most defending champions is fatigue off the championship season, coupled with a shorter offseason. The workload increase is a real thing. Didn’t you see how tired the Spurs looked late in the NBA Finals?

Four of the Knicks’ starters saw a sizable reduction in their minutes in the championship season compared to the season before. How many teams can say that?

How Many Starters Played Fewer Minutes During Title Season Than Year Before, Recent Title Winners:
2026 Knicks: 4 (Hart, Bridges, Anunoby, Towns)
2025 Thunder: 2 (Holmgren, Hartenstein)
2024 Celtics: 3 (Brown, Tatum, Porzingis)
2023 Nuggets: 0
2022 Warriors: 0
2021 Bucks: 1 (PJ Tucker)

Here’s the real kicker when comparing them to these prior teams. Holmgren played 30 fewer games due to injury; Brown and Tatum only played 100 minutes left after a similarly brutal 2023 playoff run. Hart played nearly 19 fewer games’ worth of minutes, Anunoby played over 12 fewer games’ worth, Bridges played nine fewer games’ worth, and Towns played 5.5 fewer games’ worth. That’s a whole lot less mileage to deal with the truncated offseason.

As I saw during my research on recent champions earlier this week, multiple recent champions have dealt with injuries in the aftermath of their title. The stress, fatigue, and wear and tear on NBA players’ bodies over the course of seasons are something that can’t be discounted.

LeBron and AD missed extended time in 2021. Khris Middleton got hurt in the 2022 playoffs. The aging Warriors stumbled through the regular season in 2023. Half of Boston unraveled after their elimination in 2025. Jalen Williams missed much of the season and playoff run in 2026. These are key players, all of whom saw either a significantly increased workload or, in the case of Boston, a prolonged high workload over years and years.

The parting gift for Thibs might be the key to avoiding this fatigue as long as possible. What made the transition from him to Coach Brown so effective is that they had the ability to play larger minutes in their back pocket based on the experience of playing for Thibs, while Brown managed their minutes in the meantime by playing the bench. If you’re gonna transition two styles of coaches mid-window, that’s how you do it.

In a stacked East, there might not be many nights that the Knicks can take it easy, but you’re going to have to be reasonable with regular season workloads after last year. Come playoff time? They’ll be ready to play large minutes, and it’s their old coach they have to thank.

When it was reported that Mark Walter would buy the controlling stake in the Lakers at a $10 billion valuation in June 2025, many fans — me included — rejoiced.

We rejoiced that the owner of the Dodgers — the same organization that had become the model franchise in all of Major League Baseball and was in the process of winning their second straight World Series — would bring that same acumen and thirst to win to a Lakers organization that could sorely use an injection of that same spirit and leadership.

We rejoiced at the idea of Walter’s deep pockets supplanting those of the Buss Family, who had traditionally run the Lakers as a “mom and pop business” that, even while historically spending money on players and (some) head coaches, had proven more frugal when investing in areas like front office staffing, scouting, analytics, and health and wellness among other areas not governed by the collective bargaining agreement.

We rejoiced that the more insular, inner-circle-reliant approach to leadership that Jeanie Buss had adopted over the years would be replaced by a more expansive, forward-thinking mindset to organizational structure. The prospect of broadening the search for talent across the front office and business operations was an idea many — again, including me — welcomed.

And, ultimately, we rejoiced at the idea of how these three ideas would merge to reposition the Lakers as not only the most significant brand in the NBA, but the best run and most successful organization too. The Lakers would not only be well-run and well-funded, but also on a fast track to reclaiming their spot at the top of the NBA franchise hierarchy.

If this all sounds like wish-casting optimism, one only needs to remember the general response to Walter’s purchase by those who don’t root for the Lakers (or, even more, root for their failure), which was, for lack of a better word, fear.

Fear of what seemed like almost an inevitability: the Lakers, under Walter’s leadership, would begin capitalizing on their historical standing as the league’s glamour franchise by investing heavily in all the modern mechanisms that promote team success.

Only 14 months later, Walter is stunningly out as the Lakers owner, seemingly before his ownership could even gain real traction. And, while there are clear reasons to be skeptical of (or even unnerved by) the Josh Kushner and Bog Iger led group that Walter is selling his majority stake in the Lakers to, I actually find myself rejoicing some in the fact that Walter will not be around to try to see out all those grand plans to take the team I love back to the top of the league.

That might sound harsh or extreme, but if I’m being honest, it’s the feeling I simply cannot shake in the aftermath of Walter’s decision to deal away the franchise he’d only officially taken control of last October. Because the more I read about Walter, and the more I learn about the federal investigation into his finances, the more I’m grateful that he will not be the team’s owner during this exact period of what is sure to be the most challenging of his professional (and, maybe, personal) life.

I mean, let’s be real. With every ensuing report, the ricketyness of Walter’s financial position is being revealed in real time, undermining much of the appeal his ownership group was supposed to provide in the first place. From dumping the Lakers to working to sell off his stake in the Chelsea Football Club to reports of him trying to cash out early from both the Dodgers and Lakers TV contracts with Spectrum for a lump sum payment, Walter is clearly scrambling for his financial — and, maybe, literal — freedom in ways that almost certainly would have had a negative effect on his ability to lead the franchise forward. Especially if we’re talking about pure finacial resources.

And even if you don’t necessarily believe this would have all come to a head in this upcoming season, I think it’s more than fair to speculate whether he’d have been the deep-pocketed leader many fans (and analysts) were projecting him to be well into the future. And whether or not you would argue that was his main appeal in the first place, it’s hard to disagree with the fact it was certainly one of the top reasons for excitement with him taking over the franchise.

And this is just the sunniest version of the possible negative outcomes that are on the table. There are versions of this story where even if he’s able to put Humpty Dumpty back together again by patching together the money needed to make the loans who reportedly took out from his related insurance companies whole, protracted legal issues follow him around like the stench on Peanuts’ Pigpen that continue to chip away at both his standing in the business community and his general effectiveness as a leader and steward for the organization.

That’s not the sort of context I’d want for the Lakers generally, but particularly not at a time when they are supposed to be transitioning to a new era with Luka Dončić as the face of the franchise. This is a time for stability and focused discipline to push the team forward into an extended period of contention. It’s hard to imagine that being the case when your principal owner is under federal investigation.

Maybe if the Lakers were actually in the same position as the Dodgers, where there was a decade-plus worth of infrastructure built out under Walter’s ownership, I’d feel differently. That’s the sort of foundation that can better withstand this sort of disruption with both business and team-building operations more naturally insulated because of their longer tenured and more established track records of success.

The Lakers, however, are not yet fully set up in that same way. The first season of Walter’s ownership was supposed to be a feeling out period and, as we’ve seen, it’s only been in the last four to six months where more change has been instituted in terms of staffing changes and updates to the business and basketball operations structuring.

And while I fully understand that disrupting that path forward now in favor of a new ownership group’s vision feels similar to the point I’m making about Walter’s issues, the prospect of all that is happening with him lingering or being more long-lasting is not far-fetched at all. So, I’d rather press the reset button now and have a new direction established with all the attention and intent of a new group over what could be extended uncertainty with Walter’s ongoing and developing legal issues.

This isn’t necessarily an endorsement of Iger and Kushner, either. But I’d much rather take a chance on the unknown with them over what we currently know about Walter and his ongoing financial and legal troubles.

You can follow Darius on BlueSky at @forumbluegoldand find more of his Lakers coverage on the Laker Film Room Podcast.

Floor generals and shooters provided flash, while power forwards added bruises, but the center position is the bedrock of Knicks history. To understand New York’s basketball DNA is to understand the titans who ruled MSG’s paint.

Historically, this is the deepest and most top-heavy group in the organization’s existence. Selecting four faces to represent the Knicks Center Mt. Rushmore requires navigating a field of statistical anomalies, transitional eras, and shifting tactical philosophies. Evaluating the five-spot means balancing iconic moments and statistical peaks against modern offensive spacing and defensive architecture.

Two spots on the mountain are non-negotiable locks. Filling the remaining two spots, however, means making tough decisions.

Here is the definitive New York Knicks Center Mt. Rushmore.

Willis Reed

Willis Reed is the ultimate symbol of Knicks championship basketball. Even today, the image of him limping out of the tunnel for Game 7 of the 1970 Finals is still Madison Square Garden’s most iconic moment. It set the emotional standard by which all future New York big men are measured.

Beyond that legendary game, Reed was a complete force to be reckoned with. He captured two NBA Championships in ’70 and ’73, took home Finals MVP both times, and won league MVP in 1969-70. An elite two-way anchor, Reed set highly effective screens, freeing up guards like Walt Frazier and Earl Monroe. He also had a reliable mid-range shot that fit perfectly with Red Holzman’s motion offense. The first face on our mountain, Reed established the standard for winning basketball in New York.

Patrick Ewing

Patrick Ewing is the heart and soul of modern Knicks history. Even without a championship to his name, he single-handedly kept the franchise in the title conversation for over a decade, during the most physically punishing era of big-man basketball.

Ewing’s statistical dominance is incredible. He remains the team’s all-time leader in points, rebounds, blocks, and games played, and he earned 11 All-Star bids. Offensively, he was a dominant low-post scorer with a baseline fadeaway that served as the Knicks’ primary safety valve. On defense, Ewing was an intimidating rim protector, carrying a large two-way workload each game. Statistically, Ewing is the undisputed GOAT of the franchise, making his place on the mountain unquestionable.

Karl-Anthony Towns

Individual numbers carry a lot of weight. However, altering the floor spacing to secure an NBA Championship also cements a legacy forever. Acquiring Karl-Anthony Towns completely changed how New York’s offense operated, providing the spacing needed to crown the Knicks champions again after 53 years.

Town represents the peak of modern offensive versatility at center. Serving as an elite perimeter threat, he forces opposing rim protectors out of the paint. This shift opened driving lanes that didn’t exist before, allowing Jalen Brunson to play at an MVP level within Mike Brown’s system. Delivering the vital offensive advantage needed to break a half-century drought, Towns firmly earns the third spot on our mountain.

KAT's numbers these playoffs 🤯

🔥 15.9 PPG
🔥 10.6 RPG
🔥 4.9 APG
🔥 1.3 SPG
🔥 1.3 BPG
🔥 55.1 FG%
🔥 45.6 3P%
🔥 90.9 FT%

The highest playoff plus-minus (+258) since 1971… Karl-Anthony Towns was SPECIAL this postseason! pic.twitter.com/QZ81YztjxC

— NBA (@NBA) June 16, 2026

Tyson Chandler

Okay, I assume this is where I start getting yelled at.

While Towns represents the best of offensive spacing, Tyson Chandler represents the ultimate defensive anchor. When he arrived, Chandler instantly transformed a weak defense into a top-tier unit. His immediate impact earned him the 2011-12 NBA Defensive Player of the Year award, making him the only player in Knicks’ history to win that particular hardware.

The vocal engine behind a team that won 54 games, Chandler provided elite pick-and-roll rim-running, stretched the floor offensively, and stopped drives on the other end. Establishing an accountability culture missing for over a decade, he proved that an elite center can completely overhaul a team’s identity without demanding a ton of shots. His individual hardware and cultural impact provide him with the final spot on Mt. Rushmore.

No game today, so here’s the only DPOY in Knicks history, Tyson Chandler, putting the clamps on the entire league pic.twitter.com/XY4or3DqDc

— KNICKS BEAST (@KnicksBeast) March 22, 2024

The Snubs

With the top four set, it is important to look at the fierce battle for those final spots and explain why certain statistical titans and fan favorites missed the cut. Putting up massive numbers on average teams or providing specialized skills does not automatically give you franchise immortality.

If the criteria relied strictly on stats, both Bob McAdoo and Walt Bellamy would demand consideration. Acquired mid-season in ’76, McAdoo spent parts of three seasons with the Knicks, averaging 26.5 points and 12.8 rebounds during the 1977-78 season. With an outside jumper difficult to block, he was a matchup nightmare long before the stretch-five became a household identifier. Similarly, Bellamy spent roughly three and a half seasons as New York’s workhorse, averaging 18.9 and 13.3 rebounds per game in the mid-60s. Unfortunately, both players produced at these high levels during non-contending eras. McAdoo’s perimeter-oriented game resulted in big numbers but lacked meaningful playoff success. Bellamy was highly efficient, but his most significant contribution to New York’s championship pedigree was being traded for Dave DeBusschere. That move balanced the defense and sparked the 1970 title run.

Then you have one of the most underrated offensive centers in franchise history, Bill Cartwright. Drafted third overall in ’79, he immediately earned an All-Star spot as a rookie, averaging 21.7 points and 8.9 rebounds. He possessed great footwork, an effective turnaround jumper, and elite free-throw shooting. Unfortunately, severe foot injuries ruined a majority of his prime in the mid-80s. By the time he became healthy again, the franchise had fully moved into the Ewing era. Cartwright then moved into a secondary role before being used as the primary trade chip for Charles Oakley.

On defense, Marcus Camby provided elite, specialized skills. With high-energy, elite shot-blocking, he was a key member of the miraculous run to the NBA Finals. He covered a ton of ground and blocked shots from every spot on the court, fitting perfectly into the identity of the late 90s. Unfortunately, his offensive limitations and frequent injury struggles keep him off the mountain.

The New York Knicks Center Mt. Rushmore features Willis Reed, Patrick Ewing, Karl-Anthony Towns, and Tyson Chandler. This group perfectly captures the heart, statistical dominance, defensive grit, and modern championship spacing that define the best of Knicks basketball.

The Denver Nuggets were already into the dreaded second apron before they re-signed restricted free agent Peyton Watson. The Cleveland Cavaliers were desperate after missing out on LeBron James in free agency. The Los Angeles Clippers were waiting to take advantage of a good deal that came their way. One of the biggest questions lingering ahead of the 2026-27 season found a resolution on Wednesday night with a three-team deal that accomplished an objective for everyone involved. The Washington Wizards and Charlotte Hornets got in on the action too to make this an even bigger trade.

The Cavs acquired Watson, but that’s just the start of this massive deal. Here’s the end result:

Cavs acquire: Peyton Watson, Cam Whitmore

Nuggets acquire: Cleveland’s unprotected 2031 first-round pick, 2032 Sacramento Kings second-rounder

Clippers acquire: Max Strus

Wizards acquire: Tre Mann, 2027 Philadelphia 76ers second-rounder (via the Clippers)

Hornets acquire: Dennis Schroder

The Nuggets gained a valuable future asset, but could take a step back this season. The Cavs paid a heavy price for Watson. The Clippers picked up a good player for nothing, and the Wizards added a scoring guard who still has some upside. Let’s grade this deal for every side.

Cavs trade grade for Peyton Watson deal

Watson signed a new four-year, $88 million deal with a player option to complete his sign-and-trade to Cleveland. The Cavs have been looking for a fifth starter in their “core four” model for years, and in some ways it’s easy to see Watson’s appeal. A 6’8 wing with with a 7’1 wingspan, he’s had a strong defensive reputation as a wing stopper who has often drawn the toughest assignment on the floor during his early years with Denver. His impact numbers don’t necessarily match his reputation — 48th percentile defensive EPM, slight negative defensively in most other metrics — but it still feels like he has a lot of upside on that end now that he’ll have better interior defenders behind him in Evan Mobley and Jarrett Allen.

The offense feels like a bigger question for Watson to me. Strus was a good fit in Cleveland as a super high-volume three-point shooter. Watson takes a lot of midrange shots — 80th percentile in mid-range frequency last season, per Cleaning the Glass — that seemingly won’t be available on the Cavs with the ball in Donovan Mitchell and James Harden’s hands. Watson was a knockdown corner three shooter at 52% last year without a ton of volume, so it will be interesting to see if Cleveland can get him more chances in those spots. Watson broke out in January of last season when Jokic was out with injury, averaging 21.9 points, 5.5 rebounds, and three assists per game on 49% shooting from the floor and 46.2% shooting from three. It felt like his hot shooting on that stretch was unsustainable, and then he suffered a season-ending hamstring strain once Jokic came back.

I respect Cleveland for getting aggressive to find a starting wing after missing on LeBron. I predicted the Cavs would land Watson earlier this month. But in some ways I feel like Strus was a better fit for what they needed than Watson. Giving up a far out unprotected first is a highly valuable asset, and I’m skeptical that Watson has done enough in his career to warrant that. I have no problem with the contract, and would laud Cleveland if they just signed him for money. Instead, they lost Dennis Schroder, Strus, and an unprotected 2031 first rounder just to add Watson during a time when depth is so important. Taken in full, this feels like an overpay to me.

Cavaliers grade: C

Nuggets trade grades for Peyton Watson deal

The Nuggets should be trying to win the championship in every season when Nikola Jokic is at this point in his career. Jokic turns 32 years old before the playoffs, and he still has a case for being the best player in the world, though it’s starting to feel like Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and Victor Wembanyama have passed him. Jokic is still good enough to be the best player on a championship team, but the Nuggets haven’t put a championship team around him. By trading Watson, they’re taking a step back for the upcoming season. It’s hard to argue with that.

The Nuggets painted themselves into a corner with their cap situation. They were going to be deep into the second apron if they kept Watson. Overpaying Christian Braun and Zeke Nnaji was their first mistake, and Aaron Gordon’s lack of availability feels even more problematic. I just don’t think Denver was going to be championship material even if they kept Watson. I had some questions about his fit with Jokic, and ultimately just don’t think Watson is that good. Getting this type of return for him could be critical for rebuilding the team around Jokic moving forward, assuming he signs an extension after this season.

Watson essentially got traded for the same thing as freaking LaMelo Ball, who grades out as a borderline top-20 player. Watson is nowhere near that level, so to be able to land an unprotected far out first rounder for him is great value for Denver in a vacuum. To me, this pick gives Denver a lifeline to make another big splash, even if it doesn’t happen this season. Trading Braun’s contract plus the pick could get them a good player eventually, especially if Braun can bounce back a little this season. I don’t think the Nuggets were really going to push the best of the West this year, and I’d rather have Cleveland’s unprotected 2031 first than Watson. People are crushing Denver for this deal, but I like it for them, even if it’s depressing that they are essentially punting Jokic’s age-31 season.

Nuggets grade: B+

Clippers trade grade for Max Strus deal

The Clippers are probably going to be bad this year. Kawhi Leonard is still likely off to the Toronto Raptors pending the NBA’s bogus investigation into his obvious cap circumvention, and the Clippers got an awesome return for him if the deal goes through as intended. Strus turns 31 years old in the second half of this season, and he isn’t helping the Clippers’ future. He’s still a good player who can contribute right now for a team that owes its 2027 first-round pick to the Thunder. Tanking is dead with the lottery changes, and the Clippers couldn’t even tank under the old system this year, so I like the idea of picking up a high-volume three-point shooter with some size to buzz around the floor splashing shots. Strus’ gravity should help out Keaton Wagler’s development in his rookie year, and also help balance the floor for all those Brandon Ingram mid-range attempts.

This trade won’t move the needle that much for the Clippers, but it’s still a good asset play, and they deserve credit for that.

Clippers grade: A

Wizards trade grades for Tre Mann deal: B. Mann grades out really poor in impact metrics, but he’s fun to watch when he gets cooking with his off-the-dribble shooting. Is it crazy to think I like him more than Bub Carrington? Just don’t expect anything other than buckets for him.

Hornets trade grades for Dennis Schroder deal: B+. Schroder is still pretty solid as a backup point guard. The Hornets are going to chuck a ton of threes, and didn’t really have a guard who could offer a changeup of generating paint touches. That’s what Schroder does, and I like the idea of Charlotte picking him for nothing as a backup to Coby White after Christian Anderson struggled so badly in summer league.

After being taken by the Bucks with the 60th pick in the 2026 NBA Draft, Malique Lewis is expected to reach a deal with the NBL’s Cairns Taipans for the upcoming season. Of course, Lewis knows the league well, having spent the last two seasons with the Southeast Melbourne Phoenix; last year, he averaged 6.9 PPG, 4.3 RPG, and 2.0 APG to go with nearly two stocks.

Malique Lewis is nearing a deal with the Cairns Taipans, sources told ESPN. Discussions between the Trinidadian forward and Taipans are in the advanced stages; there’s confidence a deal will soon be agreed for #NBL27. Lewis would be an import, and Cairns’ final roster spot.

— Olgun Uluc (@OlgunUluc) August 20, 2026

As I’ve mentioned, the 21-year-old made real strides last season and started to look at least vaguely like a player who one day might play in the NBA. He’s a three-and-D player who can’t do much else—which caps his ceiling—but if he does that role well, which he did, there might be a role for him. Lewis took a huge step back in Summer League—as we noted in our player grades—but hopefully he can reclaim some confidence in a league he knows well and come back next year looking much better.

Crucially, Lewis will now be classified as an import, not an NBL Next Star, which was his classification for the last two seasons; once a player is drafted, they can no longer hold the Next Star title. For those who don’t know, the Next Star program is an NBL initiative that lets NBA prospects bide their time in the NBL instead of college or other overseas opportunities. They do not count as imports, nor does their salary count against their team’s payroll. As we know, Lewis is not the only Buck to have gone through the program; Ousmane Dieng was a Next Star, as was ex-Buck AJ Johnson.

Best of luck, Malique.

In the first episode of Season 3 of How I Met Your Mother, the primary storyline revolves around breakups, and the idea that every time two people split there is a winner and loser. 

If the 2026 offseason was HIMYM, the big breakup that occurred this offseason would be the divorce that transpired between the most storied franchise in league history (the Los Angeles Lakers) and (probably) its greatest player (LeBron James) after eight years of being happily married. 

To most people, it seems like James won the breakup. After all, the Philadelphia 76ers, James’ new significant other, just assembled the league’s latest superteam in a conference that is much more manageable. Meanwhile, the Lakers are left to deal with the two behemoths (the San Antonio Spurs and Oklahoma City Thunder) out West. 

However, I’m here to tell you that, by losing James, the Lakers got way better, and, in turn, won the breakup. 

How The Lakers Got Better Without James

Listen, this isn’t some Skip Bayless inspired anti-James propaganda. As I noted before, James is probably the best player to ever grace the hardwood, and he was certainly the most productive 41 year old of all-time last season. 

With that said, we have enough of a sample size now to say that James and Luka Doncic were an imperfect fit. According to PBP Stats, the Lakers were better when only one of the two jumbo ball handlers was on the floor than when they shared the court together. 

At the end of the day, both James and Doncic are better when a team is being molded in their likeness, rather than when they need to placate to others’ wants and needs. 

We saw a couple of years ago when the 2023-24 Dallas Mavericks went to the NBA Finals what the Platonic Ideal for a Doncic team would look like. A second fiddle who knows how to oscillate between playing on and off the ball (Kyrie Irving), wings/forwards who will do Doncic’s dirty work (Derrick Jones Jr., PJ Washington, Josh Green), shooters (Tim Hardaway Jr.), and centers who can protect the rim and catch lobs (Daniel Gafford and Dereck Lively II).

The Lakers haven’t perfectly imitated this formula (more on this in a bit), but they have come pretty close. While not possessing quite the same resume, Austin Reaves does a pretty serviceable Irving impression. Quentin Grimes, Matisse Thybulle, Cameron Carr (an excellent choice by the Lakers with the 24th overall pick, by the way), and Jarred Vanderbilt are all excellent athletes with the desire to do Doncic’s bidding on defense. Grimes, Collin Sexton, and Sandro Mamukelashvili are all ready to let it rip from downtown (Sexton also gives you some nice regular season innings eating as a creator). And Walker Kessler, Los Angeles’ big ticket signing, is going to do his best to replicate the value of Doncic’s former twin tower pick-and-roll partners. 

i've got two words for you. luka doncic and cameron carr. must see TV pic.twitter.com/uFZYMmnPTJ

— Ben Pfeifer (@bjpf_) June 24, 2026

Last season, the Lakers’ best lineup that played over 200 non-garbage time possessions featured Doncic, Reaves, Marcus Smart, Rui Hachimura, and Deandre Ayton. That group outscored opponents by 23.3 points per 100 possessions (92nd percentile, per Cleaning the Glass). 

Doncic and Reaves are still there, and it wouldn’t take much arguing to convince someone that a trio of Kessler/Grimes/Carr (or whoever you prefer in that fifth spot) wouldn’t be more potent than the triumvirate of Ayton/Hachimura/Smart. Plus, you no longer have to worry about laboring through minutes where Doncic is forced to share the floor with another uber-high-usage ball handler. The bottom line is that we already have proof of concept that the model the Lakers have built is conducive to winning. 

The Lakers Will Be Better Than The 76ers Next Season

According to FanDuel, the 76ers odds of winning 50 or more games this season are set at -115 (an implied probability of 53.5%), while the Lakers are set at +250 (28.6%). So, the consensus view seems to be that the 76ers are better than the Lakers. 

I will concede that the 76ers have more raw talent than the Lakers. But to win in this league, you need talent, depth, and fit. So many times over the last few years we’ve seen teams try to stack stars, only to crash and burn because their skillsets overlapped too much and they sacrificed so much of their salary cap to put them together that the players behind them aren’t good enough to fill the cracks. 

This iteration of the Lakers isn’t a super team, but they do have a top five-ish player, a borderline All-Star, and a cavalcade of versatile chess pieces to slot around them. Their roster certainly makes a lot more sense than the team that James left them for. Now, I’m not saying that they are a lock to be better than the 76ers, but where oddsmakers currently have these two teams does not paint the proper picture. 

Are The Lakers A True Inner Circle Title Contender?

The Lakers are going to be really, really good. They have a good blend of talent, depth, and fit. The issue is that a handful of other teams have a better mix of those three variables. 

As of right now, I’d say that the Spurs, Thunder, New York Knicks, and Toronto Raptors (if the Kawhi Leonard trade ends up going through) are all firmly better than them. I’ll also hear arguments for the Denver Nuggets, Houston Rockets, Boston Celtics, Minnesota Timberwolves, and Indiana Pacers. 

The big thing holding this group back is their lack of a true power forward. One who can hit open shots, attack closeouts, handle various wing assignments, and use their size and length to offer some secondary rim protection. They’ve managed to almost perfectly copy that Mavericks team that won the West in 2024 (Doncic, Reaves is Irving, Grimes is Jones Jr., Kessler is Gafford/Lively), but they need their own version of Washington. 

Vanderbilt can check those boxes defensively, but he’s a complete negative on the offensive side of the floor. Ditto with Thybulle. Mamukelashvili has size and skill, but lacks the lateral mobility to be trusted shadowing high-level forwards. Carr is too short and too unproven. 

Until this problem is addressed, either via trade or unexpected emergence, the Lakers will be a tier below the true inner circle of title contenders – meaning that they will need more than a couple of lucky bounces to reach, let alone win, the NBA Finals. Still, this team projects to be pretty darn scary, which should be enough for them to win their breakup with James. 

The Suns surprised just about everyone (including me) by winning 45 games in 2025-26 despite losing their second-highest-paid player (Jalen Green) for most of the season. There are hopes, and even expectations, that the Suns will win even more with a year of continuity, fewer injuries, the addition of Miles Bridges, and development by young players Ryan Dunn, Khaman Maluach, Rasheer Fleming, and Koa Peat. Conversely, this optimism should be tempered with 5 reasons why the Suns could easily regress this upcoming season.

Poor roster balance

The Suns enter the season with Devin Booker, Jalen Green, Dillon Brooks, Miles Bridges, and Mark Williams as the nominal starters. The problem is that two of them are shooting guards, two are small forwards, and none is a point guard or power forward.

I have written about this before, but the Suns were at their best last year when they played Collin Gillespie next to Booker, and the Suns’ best season with Booker was when he was paired with Chris Paul. Conversely, the Suns were a much worse team when Jalen Green came back. They were also a much better team when they played a true power forward (Isaiah Livers or Rasheer Fleming) at that spot, even if neither of those players was exactly setting the world on fire with their box score statistics.

The Suns are going to be forced to choose between playing guys out of position and being a worse team for it or putting their highest paid players on the bench in order to avoid handing favorable mismatches to opponents. We saw last year that they’d rather be a worse team than let their star money ride the pine and sulk. I don’t expect this year to be different unless they reach the All-Star break and it has become clear the roster clearly isn’t working (and I think this is a strong possibility).

Three-point shooting percentages

The starting lineup of the Suns is terrible from three-point range. Keep in mind, the league average is 36%, and that Mark Williams has attempted a grand total of five three-pointers in his NBA career.

Player	2025-26 3PT%
Booker	33.0%
Green	31.3%
Brooks	34.4%
Bridges	33.3%

The results are likely to be disastrous. Without a three-point threat, defenses will sag, and none of the supposed “penetration” abilities of Green and Bridges will matter. It’s also worth noting that those abilities look pretty overrated when viewed through the lens of actual statistics and metrics. It’s difficult to understate the value of spacing as offensive magic.

It’s why Channing Fry was either first or second on the team during the Nash-era in on-court/off-court per 48: spacing meant almost as much to the team as having Steve Nash on the court. There might be three-point shooters on the bench who are great like Luke Kennard and Collin Gillespie, but then you run into the same problem as issue number one: you’re paying guys a lot of money (looking at Green and Bridges again here) to park their butts on the bench in order to field a viable team.

The new tanking rules

This one has a simple explanation: the Suns were basically the worst team that was still trying to win games last year. Basically everyone else was tanking hard. The Suns were 24-7 against teams that were below .500, and 21-30 against teams above .500. They also tended to blow out lottery-bound opponents, like the 45-point win versus the Pacers in November of 2025. With the new NBA anti-tanking rules in place next season, a lot of those easy Suns wins are going away. That could easily shave five or six wins off their total.

Rebounding/size and roster composition

This is something of a corollary to number one, but one of the consequences of playing small forwards at the power forward position is a lack of rebounding and interior defense. The Suns were 8th-worst in the league in opponent field goal percentage by allowing 65.8% shooting inside five feet. They were the 10th-worst in the league in defensive rebounding percentage. Over the offseason, their solution was to replace one small forward playing power forward with another.

It reminds me of the Suns’ decision to just throw Hedo Turkoglu (who spent his entire career as a small forward) at the power forward slot and hope for the best back in the 2010-2011 season. It was an unmitigated disaster. The Suns finished 40-42 in Nash’s last season with the team. Turkoglu got ragdolled every game, looked miserable, and promptly departed in free agency.

The only true power forward on the roster is Rasheer Fleming (Koa Peat is a tweener rookie who can’t shoot the three ball). They will be a lot better on the court when he plays, but those opportunities will be limited because every minute he plays takes away minutes from Brooks and Bridges.

Young player development

One of the assumptions is that the Suns’ young players will make a difference. However, there are significant barriers to this theory of improvement.

We already know that Ryan Dunn has struggled to find minutes because his three-point shot never developed, and his other offensive skills aren’t coming along enough either. Koa Peat is a 19-year old tweener SF/PF whose three-point shot is also suspect, and is fighting for minutes with Brooks, Bridges, Dunn, Highsmith, and Fleming as a developing player on a team intent on winning now.

I’ve already discussed how Fleming probably should be starting, but won’t because the team is already paying almost $60 million a year to a pair of SFs who expect to start. (Side note: nothing is a morale killer quite like getting paid less and being kept off the good projects than being better than the under-qualified, over-paid rock-stars). So, again, poor roster construction is going to impede this part of team success as well.

Finally, Khaman Maluach looked like the best player in the summer league. But he’s also competing for minutes with Mark Williams and Oso Ighodaro. Maluach’s three-point shot means he could probably play alongside Oso if he slid to the PF spot, but again, this takes away minutes from Bridges and Brooks. Additionally, Ighodaro is the best defensive big on the team, with top-tier abilities to switch, pass, and slip screens. It is unclear how Man-man will get minutes outside of injuries or sitting players paid three times what he is making.

Conclusion

National media was not a fan of the Suns’ offseason, particularly the Miles Bridges trade, and it’s not hard to see why. They went from playing a $10 million per year small forward at power forward to a $ 25 million per year small forward to do the same thing, but with a much worse three-point percentage. The roster is a mess of duplicative shooting guards and small forwards. Their starting lineup can’t hit threes, and as a group they’re probably going to lose significantly more games to lottery teams than they did last year. If the Suns regress towards .500 or slightly below, it should not come as a complete shock.

Welcome to Volume II of our “Choose Your Own Adventure” starter series, where we explore the Milwaukee Bucks’ options at each position. Read along, make your choice, and share your pick in the comments—if you dare!

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This season, the Bucks will start their best shooting guard in a decade.

Marinate on that.

For a franchise coming out of arguably its best-ever era, this is no small feat.

A decade ago, the Bucks hadn’t won a second title. John Hammond was GM. Jason Kidd was head coach. Jabari Parker averaged 20 a game. So did Giannis—for the first time in his career.

Over the last ten years, in reverse-chronological order, the Bucks’ primary starters at the two have been AJ Green, Andre Jackson Jr., Malik Beasley, Grayson Allen, Donte DiVincenzo, Wes Matthews, Malcolm Brogdon, and Tony Snell. Brogdon and DiVincenzo aside—and there are even arguments there—the archetype has been clear: 3-and-D, low usage spacer. Considering the staples in the other starting slots, this was logical. Of course, in reality, it’s more often than not been 3-or-D, especially over the last five years. And, honestly, the Bucks haven’t had a whole lot of options.

Now, Milwaukee has an abundance of choice. Need a 20-plus per Boy Wonder, who can create off the dribble and hit from the logo? They’ve got that. Rather unleash a blue-chip rookie with the potential to become a guy? Got that too. What about rolling with a secondary playmaker, circumventing traditional wisdom for an overpaid vet, or reverting back to the status quo with someone who can snipe from the farm and sky? Check, check, check.

But with so many options, who should it be?

_{Disclaimer: Ryan Rollins isn’t listed below. Perhaps he should be, he can certainly play the position. But it’s a safe enough bet that he’ll be starting at the point—at least as far as I see it.}

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Start your adventure, go on to OPTION 1.

1. The whodidit: Tyler Herro

The logic for starting Tyler Herro is simple: he’s instantly the best two-guard the Bucks have had since Michael Redd and the best option the Bucks currently have as a go-to offensive option. A flat-out scorer, Herro can and does hit from everywhere on the court—70% from 0-3 feet, 56% from 3-10, 52% from 10-16, 42% from 16-3P, and 38% from three (per Basketball-Reference)—leading to an elite true shooting percentage of 60%. But he’s more than just a shooter. Herro is also a legitimate shot creator for others, especially in a secondary playmaking role (career 21% assist percentage), and turns it over less frequently (10.2% turnover percentage) than all of the other ball handling guards on the roster—and even AJ “I don’t dribble” Green.

Stats aside, Herro is the most proven commodity the Bucks have at the two and you just know he wants a revenge tour after being the subject of trade rumours for what feels like the entirety of his career. Fostering that, inflating his output leaning on his winning tradition and monetising celebrating his homecoming, might be the best long-term play for the Bucks too.

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If you need someone to talk to (especially online), choose Herro. If not, turn to OPTION 2.

2. The blue-chipper: Brayden Burries

I’m not one to spit hyperbole—or overreact to summer league—but if you’ve seen Brayden Burries in action with a Bucks jersey on it’s hard not to fall in love with his game. Dude just has it. On or off ball, Burries is a straight killer—a wrecking ball on the way to the cup and a marksman from deep.

“Buzzer-Beater Burries” already showed he’s not afraid of the moment. And with offence so sweet you can see him morph into Book and defence so mean you might confuse him with Jrue, he’s the perfect guy to build around moving forward. He just needs the time—and a starting gig. In fact, Burries has so much potential that he should only ever be written about in future tense.

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If you’ve got a ladder to get to his floor, choose Burries. If not, go to OPTION 3.

3. The secondary playmaker: Kevin Porter Jr.

Talk about a whirlwind. After being traded for MarJon Beauchamp before the trade deadline in 2025, Porter has gone from backup to starter to injured on opening night to playing out of his mind to injured again to balling out (but forgetting how to shoot) to being shut down for good to the operating theatre. Caught your breath?

Now, with the Bucks reloaded in the backcourt, Porter finds himself on the outer once again. In fact, despite being arguably the team’s best player last year, his decision to pick up his player option was a curious one, with the general feeling of (a) surprise, thinking he could have gotten something more lucrative (salary or duration) elsewhere, or (b) disenchantment, thinking we’ve had that experience and it’s time to move on.

Anyway, I digress. Porter is a Buck and he’s still one of the most talented players on the roster (if not the most). And while not the shooter you’d like to see at the two, he’s perhaps the best combination of scorer (17.4 PPG), playmaker (7.4 APG, 33.8% assist percentage), and defender (2.2 SPG, third in the league; 4.3 DRPG, 14.6% defensive rebounding percentage) the Bucks have at the position. Now that’s a reason to start him.

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If youlike your offence with a side of chaos, stick with Porter. If not, turn to OPTION 4.

4. The Klutch one: Gary Trent Jr.

This time last year, Gary Trent Jr. was the third-ranked Buck in our Ranking the Roster series. As it turns out, it was for the worse. But while we were wrong—so, so wrong—Trent isn’t the drongo he showcased last season, either. And, in case you missed it, he did just re-up with Milwaukee for four years and $64m—so at least someone in the Bucks front office thinks he’s pretty good too!

Realistically, Trent shouldn’t be the Bucks’ starting shooting guard. But he might be the purest two on the squad, at least in the traditional sense of the position. And this is his case. Herro certainly has more positional versatility, having played significant portions of his career at the point (51% of playing time in 2023-24; 38% in 2024-25) and at small forward (20% last season). Burries and Porter are far more suited to ball-dominant roles too. Trent, however, is purely an off-ball threat, recording a lower average time of possession than every Buck sans Gary Harris, Thanasis Antetokounmpo, Amir Coffey, and Alex Antetokounmpo. It’s a good thing too—have you seen him try to break guys down off the dribble? At his best, Trent is also better than AJ Green and he has come up Klutch clutch in the playoffs, which is why we all ranked him so highly to begin with.

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If you’ve got a firm handshake, choose Trent—just know it might come back to bite you!Otherwise, move on to OPTION 5.

5. The status quo: AJ Green

Some scares are of the jump variety—they catch you off guard (pun intended) and you can’t do anything about them. AJ Green starting at the two for the 2026-27 Milwaukee Bucks would be one of those.

But first the positives. Green is an elite shooter and floor spacer and, somehow, he always seems to find himself in the most effective Bucks lineups—Giannis, Green, Porter, Bobby Portis, and Ryan Rollins five-man lineups recorded a net rating of +30.7 last year, while Giannis, Green, Rollins, Myles Turner, and Kyle Kuzma recorded a +28.3. And before you ask, it’s not all Giannis either; Green, Porter, Portis, Rollins, and Jericho Sims lineups recorded a +20.8. It’s also important to acknowledge that, last season, Green was put in too many disadvantageous situations where he was miscast as a three.

Still, having him start at the two over Herro or Burries or even Porter would be quite the shock to the system and a terrifying sign of things going awry in Milwaukee.

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QUICK! Make a decision, you’re near the end. Choose Green if you’re stuck in the past (and don’t like any of the alternatives). Otherwise, pull a rabbit out of your hat and tell us who it is in the comments.

THE END

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On April 21^st, 2001, the Dallas Mavericks officially broke the seal on the NBA Playoffs after a lengthy hiatus. Dallas had missed the Playoffs for 10-straight seasons, including a near miss in 1999-2000 when they went 40-42. Following that campaign, Dallas improved their win total by 13 games to finish 53-29 in 2000-2001, leaving no doubt they had arrived on the postseason scene.

Not only was the +13 win total impressive in and of itself, but for context, the Western Conference was stacked. All but one of the eight West Playoff teams won 50 games (the 8 Seed Minnesota Timberwolves won 47). The 1 Seed San Antonio Spurs grabbed 58 wins, just five games better than a Mavericks team that was a postseason afterthought for so long.

Dallas’ 53 wins were good enough for the 5 Seed and a matchup against the Utah Jazz. Utah was just a few years removed from back-to-back Finals appearances and still featured NBA legends in John Stockton and Karl Malone, yet the two teams were nearly dead even during the regular season. Each team won two of their four regular season matchups. Both teams went 14-10 against the other (now defunct) Midwest Division teams. Utah however, performed better against the Western Conference at large and therefore got home court advantage in the best-of-five series.

Lucky charms fall short

The Mavericks did something that teams often do when they’ve broken through a wall. In this case, the Mavericks decided they would celebrate their return to the Playoffs with an overt show of unity – they wore nice blue socks to match their blue road uniforms. Meanwhile, the more experienced Jazz team needed no such demonstrations.

In game one, Dallas took a one-point lead into the fourth quarter, which generally spelled doom for the opponent. The Mavericks were 46-2 during the regular season when leading after three quarters, including a 21-1 road record in those situations. Despite that, and despite their lucky socks, Dallas found themselves down by a point in the closing moments. Dirk Nowitzki was stripped on a drive that would have given Dallas the lead with roughly three seconds remaining in the game, had he converted. Utah made a free throw, giving Dallas the chance to win on the final shot, but Michael Finley’s three-point attempt was off target and the Mavs were down 0-1 in the series.

The Mavs were roundly beat in game two, losing 109-98 after being outscored in all but the fourth quarter. As a result, they were on the brink elimination. Upon their return to Dallas, they ditched the socks and found a reversal of fortune.

Evening the series

Home cooking was good for Dallas, as they pulled out a tight game three, 94-91 behind a strong first quarter. Finally, Dallas staved off elimination and got their first Playoff win since 1988. With the best-of-five setup, they were just a single win away from forcing a deciding game back in Utah. Game four ended up doing just that. The Mavericks started slow, trailing 24-17 after the first quarter, then collectively went insane, outscoring the Jazz by 37 points the rest of the way. The 107-77 victory gave the Mavs a chance to close the deal back in Utah in game five.

Calvin Booth plays the hero

Utah showed their veteran savvy in game five, getting off to a strong start, particularly in the second quarter. Carrying a 71-57 lead into the fourth quarter, it appeared as though the upstart Mavericks had met their match and would be going home after a valiant effort to force a deciding game. Dallas had other ideas.

Calvin Booth started the fourth quarter despite coming off the bench to start the game. The decision by Don Nelson proved to be an excellent one. The Mavericks slowly chipped away throughout the fourth quarter, with Booth turning away multiple Jazz shots at the rim.

The final two minutes were a roller coaster. Trailing by one, the Mavericks forced a turnover, courtesy of Booth’s quick hands. The ball ended up with Finley, who got it to Nash, who made a great pass from a few steps inside halfcourt to Dirk Nowitzki under the rim. Unbelievably, Nowitzki missed the reverse layup and Malone got the rebound. On the next possession, Dallas played terrific defense, forcing Danny Manning to attempt a shot clock beating jumper with none other than Booth defending him. The shot missed and Nash took it the other way. Finley hoisted a three that didn’t go down, sending Dallas back on defense. Malone missed a turnaround jumper and Nowitzki grabbed the board. Nash got the ball and took off, then slowed it down to set up the offense. Finley got the ball and backed down Stockton. Manning came over to double-team Finley with four seconds left on the shot clock. Booth slipped through on the baseline, Finley (who played every minute of the game) rose up, zipped a pass to him, and Booth turned to hit a layup – his first and only made field goal of the game. In the final 10 seconds, Utah missed a three, got the offense rebound and then missed a buzzer beater. The Mavs had won.

Booth’s entire 2000-2001 season consisted of 15 regular season games with the Mavericks and nine Playoff games. Despite his limited time on the team, he will forever be linked with an amazing Playoff comeback in a deciding game that put the Mavericks in the second round, kicking off a span of 12-straight seasons that Dallas made the Playoffs. Booth returned in 2004-2005 for a second stint. Despite his relatively short tenure with the Mavericks, he left an indelible mark on the franchise. Taking full advantage of Nelson’s intuition, Booth had a major impact across the deciding quarter of the deciding game.

I invite you to follow me @_80MPH on X, and check back often at Mavs Moneyball for all the latest on the Dallas Mavericks.

Next stop in The Annual Statistical Doppelgänger Machine Tour: Switzerland. Well, kinda. No skiing or fancy-schmancy watches or neutrality — just a look at which players in NBA history had seasons that looked the most like what Kyshawn George did last season.

For those who haven’t memorized the birthplaces and childhood homes of every Wizards player, George was born and raised in Switzerland.

To my eye, the broadly favorable view of George’s performance got ahead of his actual performance. He looks good out there, he does many good things, and he does plenty of negative things as well.

To me, the biggest positive is his confidence. It also might be his biggest weakness. There’s good three-point shooting (38.1%) on above average volume, and 7.3 assists per 100 team possessions (well above average). He’s a competent ball handler, he’s tough, and he plays with a relentlessness and physicality that’s at times admirable.

He also commits a ton of turnovers (4.3 per 100 possessions — compare to a league average of 2.8) and fouls (5.8 per 100 possessions). George’s shot selection inside the three-point line was…well…let’s call it “adventurous,” and that sense of adventure contributed to shooting just 48.6% on twos — compared to a league average of 55.0%.

He finished well when he got to the rim (73.1%). The issue: lots of floater range attempts at a 35.7% conversion rate.

The good and bad tallied to an 87 score in my PPA metric. League average in PPA is 100. That’s fine for a second-year player who’s just 22-years-old picked 24th overall. The point here is merely that he still needs to make significant improvements to earn a starting role with the Wizards going forward.

Let’s get to the doppelgängers. And, unlike the comps for Bilal Coulibaly, you won’t need to take safety precautions for these:

1. Justise Winslow | 2018-19 | Miami Heat | Age: 22 — This was one of Winslow’s (rare) healthy seasons. He played 66 games — two fewer than he did the following season. This was his best overall performance, tallying to an 85 PPA. He was a talented player who never stayed healthy long enough to show what he could do. Gotta think (hope?) George will be healthier, though I have to mention George has played in 68 and 48 games respectively in his first two seasons.
2. Cole Anthony | 2022-23 | Orlando Magic | Age: 22 — Anthony is basically the little-guy version of George. Tough as nails, all-out effort, plenty of positives, and bit negatives.
3. Taurean Prince | 2017-18 | Atlanta Hawks | Age: 23 — Prince’s second season. He played all 82 games, though it was not a harbinger of his future health and availability. The 87 PPA he posted that season was also the best mark of his career.
4. Kevin Porter Jr. | 2021-22 | Houston Rockets | Age: 21 — I’m not a big Porter fan, but he’s been reasonably productive, albeit with enough issues that teams seem happy to move on from him. I don’t think that’ll be the case with George. The profile is there, though — talent enough to generate positives, enough judgement issues to produce negatives (hi there, turnovers) that can hurt the team.
5. Reggie Jackson | 2013-14 | Oklahoma City Thunder | Age: 23 — Another maximal effort, maybe a bit nuts, little guy. Jackson spent most of his career as a pain-in-the-neck backup guard who was part of some winning teams.

Some honorable mentions:

• Keldon Johnson, San Antonio Spurs — age 24 season
• Jaden Ivey, Detroit Pistons — age 21
• Kyle Kuzma, Los Angeles Lakers — age 22
• Caris LeVert, Brooklyn Nets — age 23

My eye test comp was Dillon Brooks, but the closest Brooks season ranks around 260th.

My sense is that The Machine’s comps have the right overall type — competitive, hard-nosed, physical reserves who had value to good teams when they could rein in the fouls and turnovers. I think George is reasonably likely to be better than any of those five turned out to be, though it’s worth a reminder that player development is not linear.

I have the same kinds of neat career arc graphs most stat goobers do, but those are averages. There’s a lot of variation, and things get messy with individuals.

Next through the machine: Trae Young.