I had the great privilege of chatting with Baseball America National Writer Carlos Collazo. We had a very fun discussion about his background, the Nationals’ new regime, the state of the Nats farm system and the 2026 draft. He provided great insights, as you would expect from one of the best prospect evaluators and writers in the space.
How He Got Started:
Ever since he was a kid, Carlos Collazo has been in love with baseball. His dad taught Carlos and his brothers to play the game at a very young age. By the time he was four, a young Carlos Collazo was all-in on baseball. Like most kids, Collazo dreamed of being a big league player.
He played through high school, and even had a D3 offer. However, he had realized that his playing career was not going to progress beyond that. Collazo, who already had a growing passion for writing, decided to go to the University of North Carolina to pursue a career in journalism.
This led him to Baseball America, which was headquartered in that area back then. He landed an internship at BA before turning that into a full-time job. Collazo has been working for BA since 2017.
Along the way, Collazo has met plenty of interesting people in the baseball industry. One of the people he formed a connection with over the years is new Nationals President of Baseball Operations Paul Toboni. He told me that, “Paul Toboni is one of the few POBO’s I have gotten to know prior to him becoming a the top guy”.
Collazo said that he has a lot of respect for what Toboni did in Boston and holds the people he has hired in high regard. As a younger writer who has spent a lot of time in the scouting world, Collazo has a unique insight into Toboni, as well as the baseball world as a whole.
Nationals BA Connection:
There is one hire Toboni made that Collazo has an extra special connection to though. Just over a week ago, the Nationals hired Peter Flaherty to be the Northeast area scouting supervisor. Flaherty worked with Collazo on draft content for Baseball America over the last few years.
The two had a special relationship, with Collazo calling him “my side-kick”. Unlike Collazo, who arrived at BA straight out of college, Flaherty had scouting experience. He worked with the Yankees for a year and spent his summers working in the Cape Cod League. Collazo said that, “Peter has a natural feel for evaluating and scouting players”.
While he is excited for his friend, Collazo told me he was going to miss his pal. He noted that he is “very sad to see him leave from a selfish perspective because he’s done an awesome job helping us elevate our draft coverage”. Collazo’s loss is the Nationals gain, as it seems like the organization is getting a great scout and someone Collazo described as an A+ human.
Thoughts on Washington Nationals Prospects:
Flaherty will help rebuild a Nationals farm system that Collazo sees as solid, but underwhelming. While he is high on some of the prospects, Collazo does not think the system is where it needs to be considering how much the Nats have been losing in recent years.
None of the Nats prospects are going to appear in the top 15 of BA’s next update. For a team that has not had a winning season since 2019, you would like to see more blue chip talent in the system. That is not to say the Nats have a bad system according to Collazo.
One guy he really likes is 2025 first overall pick Eli Willits. The high school shortstop got overshadowed by the more famous Ethan Holliday, but Collazo is very high on Willits. He did not appreciate some of the rhetoric about Willits being the cheap option, saying, “There were a lot of narratives that kind of got out of control that I did not appreciate”.
Collazo did not think that selecting Willits first overall was a reach, and noted that Willits was a top 3 player on their board in a draft without a clear top player. According to him, Willits was the most well rounded offensive player in the class and had less swing and miss questions than Ethan Holliday.
One move that really excited Collazo was the Harry Ford trade. He called it, “the exact kind of deal you want to make if you are a team like the Nationals”. While he sees Jose A. Ferrer as a good reliever, Collazo noted that quality relievers are a luxury rather than a necessity for rebuilding teams like the Nats. If you can move a reliever for a quality prospect like Ford, you should do it, at least according to him.
This logic makes plenty of sense. It is much harder to find a legitimate starting catcher than it is to find a reliever. Bullpen arms emerge all the time, but starting catchers are not something that you can find for cheap.
As a player, Collazo likes Ford’s offensive game. He noted that Ford has been productive for multiple seasons in the minors now. With his success in AAA last year, Collazo noted that Ford is, “ready for a chance to prove what he can do in the big leagues”. Given the presence of Cal Raleigh, he was never going to get that chance in Seattle.
Collazo, and those around the game are more skeptical about Ford’s defense though. He said that there are split opinions around the game as to whether Ford can stick behind the plate. The Nationals are going to give him a shot, but this is something worth monitoring. Fortunately, Ford does have the athleticism to play the outfield.
2026 Draft Deep Dive:
One thing Collazo was excited about is the upcoming 2026 draft. He called it, “one of the deeper, more impactful classes I have covered in a few years”. Unfortunately for the Nats, they are not able to pick at the top of this year’s class due to the lottery rules.
Collazo sees UCLA shortstop Roch Cholowsky as the clear cut number 1 overall pick heading into the season. If he was in the 2025 class, Collazo said the Nats would have had no debates about who to take. He sees Cholowsky as someone who is close to being a generational talent, though he did not fully commit to using the G word.
While it is a bummer that the Nats will not be able to take Cholowsky, Collazo is still very bullish on this class. He mentioned a group of college hitters, including Sawyer Strosnider, Derek Curiel and Chris Hacopian as potential options for the Nats. On the high school hitting side, he shouted out Jacob Lomard, Tyler Spangler and Blake Bowen.
Collazo is also excited by the three best college arms, which he sees as Liam Peterson, Cameron Flukey and Jackson Flora. Even though the Nats are not picking until 11, Collazo is confident that they can come out of this draft with a great haul.
He also seems more confident that these players will get the development they need. Under the old regime, Collazo said that the team “really struggled to make the players they are getting into their system better”. He added that he is curious to see if that can change under this new regime.
Some players he thinks the new regime could help include Alex Clemmey and Seaver King. When it comes to Clemmey, he just needs to throw more strikes. Collazo said he loves Clemmey’s stuff but projects him as a reliever right now due to his control issues.
Collazo really liked King coming out of college due to his athleticism and sneaky power. Despite a rough year, Collazo is still confident in King because of those attributes. He was encouraged by King’s showing in the AFL and is intrigued to see if he can keep that momentum going.
Overall, Collazo appeared cautiously optimistic about the state of the Nats. He loved the hires the new regime has made, but still seems to believe the team is not that close yet. It was really fun to talk to Carlos and our conversation was fascinating. If you want to see his work, subscribe to Baseball America, or watch some of his content on the BA Youtube channel. He is one of the best in the business, and it was a real pleasure to chat with him.
The Blue Jays traded pitchers Conner Greene and Dominic Leone to the Cardinals for Randal Grichuk.
Greene had been a good prospect. He was #100 on Baseball Prospectus’ Top 100 Prospect List in 2016. Then, in 2017, Conner played in New Hampshire and had a 5.29 ERA in 132.2 innings. He had trouble finding the strike zone; he walked 86 batters (with 92 strikeouts). Conner didn’t have a great time with the Cardinals and was DFAed after the season. After that, he went to the Royals, Dodgers, and Orioles and has played in Mexico for the last couple of years.
He had 25.1 innings in the majors, with a 7.11 ERA.
Leone was a waiver pickup for the Jays from the Diamondbacks before the 2017 season. He did an excellent job in our bullpen, putting up a 2.56 ERA in 65 relief appearances, 23 walks, and 81 strikeouts in 70 innings. Dominic wasn’t as good with the Cardinals. He had a 5.15 ERA in 64.2 innings in two seasons, with 30 walks and 72 strikeouts. They released him in November 2019. He pitched for Cleveland in 2020 and the Giants for two years. In 2023, he pitched for the Mets, Angels and Mariners with a 4.67 ERA in 51 games.
Grichuk? He was a Blue Jay for four seasons, hitting .243/.289/.461 with 90 home runs. Hot and cold would be a way to describe him. He had his moments but didn’t become the star we envisioned. His bWAR was 4.4 for those four years.
We won the trade, but the Jays also gave Randal a five-year, $52 million contract. He was traded to the Rockies just before the 2022 season, with the team sending $9.7 million along with him in exchange for Raimel Tapia and prospect Adrian Pinto. Tapia was released. Pinto is still in the Jays system, he played 19 games for Vancouver last year, hitting .284/.376/.608
I thought Denver might be a good spot for Grichuk, but he didn’t hit any better there, with a .275/.321/.448 batting line and 27 home runs in 204 games over two seasons. In July, he was traded to the Angels. Since then, he’s played for the Diamonbacks and the Royals. He is a free agent at the moment.
Five Years Ago
The Jays signed George Springer to a six-year, $150 million contract.
Five years into it, Springer has a .263/.343/.461 with 119 home runs and a 14.4 bWAR. 2025 was his best season with the team, hitting .309/.399/.560 with a 4.8 bWAR. By FanGraphs’ numbers, he’s been worth $118.2 million for the Jays, so a good season will bring his value up to the value of the contract (which is pretty unusual for a player who signs a long-term free agent contract).
The staredown of a lifetime continues, as the Yankees continue to stand behind their line in the sand with Cody Bellinger. In the meantime, however, the rest of the free agent board has been active: Kyle Tucker caused an uproar by signing a four-year, $240 million deal with the Dodgers while Bo Bichette pivoted to a short-term deal of his own with the Mets at three years and $126 million. Bellinger’s now the last of the top-tier free agents waiting on a team for 2026, but with the Yankees not budging the floor is open for one of the teams that missed out on those other guys to outbid them for Bellinger. At this point, it sounds like the team is pretty content with either outcome.
We’ve had a lot of time to sit with this scenario, and much like the state of the team the questions haven’t changed much. Are the Yankees making a mistake by not pushing for Bellinger, or is the deal they’ve offered him already an overpay? Is the league in trouble with the Dodgers adding yet another star on a big money deal? If you have questions like these, or anything else on your mind, send ‘em in for a chance to be featured in our Yankees mailbag.
Answers will run on Friday afternoon. All questions received by the night of January 22nd will be considered. You can leave your submissions in the comment section below or by e-mail to pinstripealleyblog [at] gmail [dot] com.
It was a strange feeling walking into the New York Rangers’ locker room after their 6-3 win against the Philadelphia Flyers on Saturday afternoon.
Normally, after any ordinary win, the mood around the team is joyful and light, but that wasn’t the case on Saturday.
To paint the scene, it had been just over 24 hours since Rangers president and general manager Chris Drury issued a letter to fans emphasizing the team’s intentions to retool the roster and essentially punt on the remainder of the season with the Blueshirts sitting in last place in the Eastern Conference.
It felt odd addressing the players after the game, because while there are still over 30 games remaining this season, walking into the locker room almost had the feel of an exit interview, given Drury’s letter and the implications that are shortly to come from it.
It is the beginning of the end for this version of the Rangers’ core, who could see the writing on the wall.
First, it was Mika Zibanejad, who dove deep into his emotions regarding Drury’s message. Zibanejad was there eight years ago when former Rangers president Glen Sather and general manager Jeff Gorton released a letter, revealing the team’s plan to embark on a plan they described as a “reshaping” of the team.
The Letter 2.0 hit closer to home for Zibanejad since he was with the organization for its first retool/rebuild, whatever you want to call it, and now, he’ll potentially be forced to sit through another one at 32 years old.
He spoke with a disappointed tone, sentimental about the fact that this group will inevitably be broken up.
“I think, overwhelmed with a lot of emotions, like I said, and a lot of feelings and thoughts about it,” Zibanejad said, describing his emotions. “If changes are coming, just try to make the most of the time we have as a group.”
The focus then shifted to recently appointed captain J.T. Miller. Coming from a drama-filled situation with the Vancouver Canucks that was falling apart behind the scenes, the Rangers traded for J.T. Miller last season, to help change the team’s identity and salvage its competing window.
It hasn’t quite worked out for both the Rangers and Miller, who finds himself in yet another crumbling situation.
Shortly following the first letter, Miller was traded to the Tampa Bay Lightning, but now as the captain of the Rangers, so it’s his responsibility to put on a strong face during difficult times and help guide the franchise through this retool.
“The emotions have been going on for longer than the last two days,” Miller said. “It's unfortunately part of the game. It's disappointing, for sure. I don't think four or five months ago this is where we thought we'd be, but we’ve got a job to do, and we need to start moving forward towards the next chapter.”
Upon entering the locker room, Artemi Panarin knew what was coming. It was reported on Friday that Drury had an individual meeting with Panarin and informed him that he will not be offered a contract extension, while the team is prepared to work with him and agent Paul Theofanous to trade him anywhere he wishes to go.
Panarin, with his voice as somber as I’ve ever seen in my year and a half on the Rangers beat, accepted the reality that his time with the Blueshirts will be coming to an end in the coming weeks, if not even days.
“It's hard to say how I feel, still confused, but yeah, (the) team decided to go in a different direction,” Panarin said. “I'm ok with that. I'm a Rangers player right now so I gotta play every game 100%.”
The Rangers’ intentions to retool the team’s core are now out in the open, which should make for an awkward and strange end to the season, the same feelings prevalent in the locker room on Saturday afternoon.
He is a member of a very select fraternity. It’s a fraternity that goes beyond the usual small fraternity of former major league baseball players. It’s so small that you can count the members on both hands, if that.
That fraternity is composed of former pitchers who excelled as both starter and relievers.
Think about it. How many pitchers can you name who did well in both roles? A few immediately come to mind: Dennis Eckersley, Jim “Mudcat” Grant, John Smoltz and Hoyt Wilhelm, but many fans don’t know that Wilbur Wood was both aleague-leading relief pitcher AND a league-leading starter in his days with the Sox.
Wood’s White Sox career spanned from 1967-78, and during it he was a key part of three of the most memorable White Sox teams in club history:
1967 Wood was a part of the deep bullpen the Sox had, as the “Near-Miss” White Sox had the World Series squarely in their sights until a disastrous final week.
1972 Wood was the lead starter on the 1972 “Outhouse or Penthouse” White Sox [Note: That phrase was authored by Sox outfielder Rick Reichardt when talking about the surprising season.] Those Sox battled the Oakland A’s down to the final week for the Western Division championship. If not for the back injury to third baseman Bill Melton, the A’s dynasty of the 70’s might never have gotten started.
1977 Wood was also a spot starter on the 1977 “South Side Hit Men” Sox club that smashed all existing team hitting records and has carried on as the baseball version of the 1985 Chicago Bears.
Wilbur was one of the most popular Chicago athletes in the 70’s in part because he wasn’t 6´5´´ with a body by Adonis. Wilbur looked like your Uncle Butch or Cousin George. He was an everyman. And all Sox fans could relate to a guy who didn’t look like a sculpted god yet somehow found a way to consistently get major league hitters out again and again.
Wilbur was a three-time All-Star, a four-time 20-game winner, and recorded 57 saves and 163 wins in his career with the White Sox. He was named the 1968 American League Fireman of the Year, and in 1972 was both the American League Pitcher of the Year and the left-handed starting pitcher on The Sporting News American League All-Star team.
Wood led the American League in 33 different categories during his playing days, most of them in the good column. Among them were leading the league in appearances, games started, games finished, innings pitched (including a mind-blowing 376 innings pitched in 1972!), batters faced, wins and getting hitters to ground into double plays.
He had consecutive scoreless inning streaks of 29 in 1973 and 27 ⅔ in 1972. He tossed three complete-game two-hitters, with two of those taking 11 innings. He also added nine complete-game three-hitters. Wood started both ends of a doubleheader twice [Note: Once, on May 28, 1973, because of rain that allowed an off-day, as Wilbur finished the suspended game against Cleveland that began on May 26, then after a 30-minute break, began the regularly-scheduled game.] and was named to the White Sox All-Century team.
There will never be another pitcher like Wilbur Wood.
When I spoke with Wilbur in 2005 the topics were varied: How and why he learned to throw the knuckleball, becoming a starting pitcher and his initial reluctance to do so, the pennant races of 1967, 1972 and 1977, his relationship with Eddie Stanky and Chuck Tanner, pitching so many innings, and stories of his teammates during those great days.
He was a unique man, with a unique story.
Mark Liptak: Wilbur, you came to the Sox on Oct. 12, 1966. Juan Pizarro was the player eventually sent to the Pirates for you. Why don’t we start about how you found out about the deal and your reaction to it?
Wibur Wood: I actually found out about it from a friend. I was at home and got a call from someone saying they heard it over the radio! I guess it was later in the day that I got a call from the White Sox letting me know about it.
Your career was floundering with both the Red Sox and the Pirates, but then in 1967 (51 games, four wins, four saves and an ERA of 2.45) suddenly it all turned around. How did that happen?
I had spent parts of seven years in the big leagues, and as my record showed things weren’t going that well. I was signed as a fastball/curve ball pitcher and did very well with those in the minor leagues, but they just weren’t good enough for the majors. I’d be fine for three or four innings, but after I went through the batting order once I’d start to get hit. I just decided to junk my curve and everything else and go 100% with the knuckleball. I actually had thrown that pitch a long time; I started using it back in high school and semipro ball. Sometimes I’d still throw a fastball to get the hitter’s timing off, but that was only once in a while.
Hoyt Wilhelm and Eddie Fisher were already on the Sox at that time and they threw the knuckleball a lot. Did they teach you anything about it that you didn’t know?
We’d talk more about the finer points of the pitch. It’s funny, but all knuckleballers tend to throw the pitch the same way. I recently spoke with Tim Wakefield at a charity golf tournament, and he held the pitch the same way I did, which is the same way Hoyt and Eddie did.
How was your knuckleball different from Hoyt’s and Eddie’s?
My pitch had a tendency to break down and away from right-handed hitters. Eddie’s had a tendency to break down and in to them. Hoyt’s was unpredictable: When he threw it, it could go all over the strike zone.
The wind could change how the pitch was moving as well. The area around home plate in most of the stadiums that I pitched was where the wind would blow after it bounced off the stands, or in some parks like the old Metropolitan Stadium in Minnesota, just come right in and bounce the pitch around. A knuckleball acts by having the wind push against the seams.
I always used to feel sorry for White Sox catchers, guys like J.C. Martin, Gerry McNertney, Ed Herrmann. It had to be rough trying to catch not one, not two, but three different knuckleball pitchers.
Well, remember that the guys who caught us on the Sox — and I’d mention Pete Varney as well — they came up through the Sox system and in Spring Training they’d catch us. In the spring, because you have so many pitchers in camp, you’d bring in just about every catcher in the organization. So these guys had a chance to see [knuckleballs] for three years or so. Then when they made the Sox, they were used to it. Now if guys came in from somewhere else like in a trade, and never saw that pitch before, it would be tough.
Hawk Harrelson has commented on the fact that he didn’t understand why more pitchers don’t try learning that pitch. He mentioned it might really help guys who are struggling, or coming off an arm injury. In your era many others threw the knuckler, including Wilhelm, Fisher, Phil and Joe Niekro and Jim Bouton. Any thoughts on why the knuckleball has become a lost art?
See, if you are trying to learn the pitch because you’ve had an injury, it’s too late. I used to get a lot of calls when I was playing from pitchers who got hurt, and they’d ask about throwing it. The knuckleball isn’t something that’s learned overnight. I threw it for years, from when I was in high school. It takes that long to get used to it. What major league organization is going to give a pitcher three or four years to master the pitch?
That 1967 season was the season the Sox almost won the pennant. It’s been a long time, but I imagine the disappointment of that final week (where the Sox lost all five games to the lowly A’s and Senators) still remains.
That was my first good year in the major leagues, and I remember getting caught up in all of it. We were right there until the last week.
[The Sox closed the 1967 season with two games in Kansas City and three at home to Washington — the two worst teams in the league. After sweeping Cleveland that weekend, the Sox flew to Kansas City where they were off Monday. Tuesday’s game was rained out, and they played a doubleheader Wednesday night. The Sox were actually off for three days, because they last played Sunday afternoon — unheard of in a pennant race. Chicago lost both games, and then were off again Thursday before hosting the Senators. The White Sox were beat 1-0, eliminated from the four-team pennant race, then played flat and lost both weekend games to finish the season.]
One thing I particularly remember from 1967 was after manager Eddie Stanky made those comments about Carl Yastrzemski. [On June 5 before a series in Chicago, Stanky commented that Yastrzemski “may be an All-Star from the neck down, but in my book he’s a moody ballplayer. And I don’t like moody ballplayers.”] We went into Boston and played them in a big series. Every tomato in the city of Boston was in Fenway Park, and when Eddie went out to change pitchers the fans let him have it … and he couldn’t dodge them all! I was sitting in the bullpen laughing my ass off watching it.
You were a quick study with the knuckleball, because by 1970 you were one of the top relief pitchers in all of baseball, including your stellar season in 1968. [In 1968, Wood led the league with 88 appearances, with 13 wins, 16 saves and an ERA of 1.87 for a team that won just 67 games. Wood also saved 15 games in 1969 and 21 games in 1970, both for terrible teams.] Why do you think you were able to pick up the nuances of that pitch the way you did where others couldn’t?
I was fortunate because I was always able to throw strikes with the knuckleball. That was my biggest asset. I was always around the plate. Eddie [Herrmann] never even had to put down a sign, he knew what I was going to throw, I knew what I was going to throw, and the fans knew what I was going to throw.
In the 1970s when Carlton Fisk was with the Red Sox and we’d play them, I’d scream at him from the mound because he’d waste so much time. I’d yell, “Get in the box; I’m throwing a god damn knuckleball, not a fastball. You know it!” I mean why prolong the agony, right? [laughing]
The White Sox fell on miserable times in the late 1960s and 1970, losing more games in that three-year period than at any other time in franchise history. The Sox lost 106 games in 1970 alone. It had to be agony going to the park every day. I don’t know how you guys kept your sanity!
It was awful. I’ll tell you how bad it was. The only games that I ever wanted to come into were games where I could pick up a save. I never wanted to go into games where the score was tied, because I knew, and everybody on the team knew, that we’d find some way to lose the game. We had no chance. The pitchers knew it and the position players knew it.
Joe Horlen told me about his 1971 Spring Training injury, which caused him to miss most of the season. But that’s only half of the story, because as a direct result of his injury Chuck Tanner began considering the option of making you a starting pitcher. I have heard you were against the move, but for the sake of the team decided to give it a try. Why the initial opposition?
That was a strange situation, because even before the injury I was almost traded. It’s true; the Sox had a deal in place with Washington. I was going to be traded for Darold Knowles. But I was holding out that year. I was fighting for more money, and I never signed a contract. So the trade was null and void. It was pretty apparent that Chuck didn’t want me in the bullpen. He wanted hard-throwing guys. We had players like Terry Forster and Goose Gossage coming up, so I became a starter. Roland Hemond said this one time, and it’s true: “Sometimes the best trades are the ones you don’t make.”
As a pitcher, can you talk a little about the differences in preparation between starting and coming in to finish games?
I enjoyed pitching in relief, because I knew when I went to the park that there was a chance I’d get in the game. When you are a starting pitcher, you pitch — then sit for three or four days. I used to take ground balls in the infield on days when I wasn’t pitching just to keep busy, and I’d run a little bit, but sitting around just wasn’t for me.
The 1971 season was the start of an incredible run of success for you. (42 starts, seven shutouts, a save, 334 innings pitched, 210 strikeouts, 22 wins and an amazing ERA of 1.91.) A lot of folks felt that you should have won the Cy Young because you threw a very unpredictable pitch, a knuckleball, whereas Cy Young winner Vida Blue had a conventional arsenal of pitches. Did you think you had a chance to win, and how did you feel about that season? (Wood never faced Blue head-to-head that season. Wood finished third in the voting, behind Blue and Mickey Lolich.)
Honestly, I didn’t think about the Cy Young back in those days. At the time, it wasn’t that important to me. Looking back, would I have liked to have won it? Sure.
I’d imagine that by the end of the year, you were comfortable starting games.
I was a little apprehensive at first, it was just like before any game you’re always a little nervous. But when you start having success you get comfortable, and I had success starting right away. I was tickled pink that things turned out the way they did.
The Sox made great strides from the disaster of 1970 to 1971, but heading into the 1972 season did you expect the team to be as good as it was, even with Dick Allen on board?
I thought in the spring that we’d have a pretty good team because the guys weren’t selfish. They did what they had to do to win games. I knew that we’d win games, but I didn’t know how many. As far as Dick, he made all the difference in the world. He was a tremendous hitter. [Strike-shortened 1972 saw the Sox win 87 games and finish 5 ½ games behind the eventual World Champion A’s. Allen would win the AL MVP and narrowly miss winning the Triple Crown. He finished with a .308 batting average, 37 home runs and 113 RBIs.]
By June 4, 1972, the date of the famous “Dick Allen Chili-Dog Game” against the Yankees (in a doubleheader nightcap with New York the White Sox trailed 4-2 with two on and two out in the ninth. Tanner wanted Allen to pinch-hit, but the slugger was eating a chili dog. Allen wolfed down his snack, getting chili all over his jersey. On the third pitch from Sparky Lyle, Allen blasted a three-run, game-winning home run.), the Sox were an amazing 18-2 at home. As a guy who occasionally gave up some long fly balls, I’d imagine you enjoyed playing in a pitcher’s park.
Oh, absolutely. I loved pitching in Comiskey Park. It had a big outfield, and gave you room for a mistake. I’d spin one and a guy would hit it, yet most of the time our outfielders were able to run it down because they had the room to get to balls in the gaps.
You were selected for your second All-Star Game, and in this one you actually pitched. How was that experience for you? (In the 1971 game at Detroit, neither Wood nor teammate Melton appeared. In the 1972 game in Atlanta, Wilbur pitched two innings, allowing one run on two hits with a strikeout, as the National League won, 4-3, in 10 innings.)
It was a great experience for me. Just a lot of fun. I’d gone the year before, but it was a great thrill to actually be able to participate.
Wilbur, you pitched a lot of great games, but to me this was your best with the Sox. On Sunday, Aug. 12, 1972 in Oakland, the Sox had cut a seemingly safe A’s lead of 8 ½ games down to one. The White Sox had split the first two games of this huge series, and you took the mound against Blue Moon Odom. Two hours and forty five minutes later, you walked off the mound a 3-1 winner in 11 innings, having fired a two-hitter. The Sox were now tied for first place in the division. What do you remember from that afternoon? (The complete game was Wilbur’s 20th win of the year.)
I don’t remember any more details [besides] when Ed Spiezio hit the [game-winning] home run. To me, even though it meant going into a tie for first place, it was just another day. Like I said, I’d get a little nervous before the game, but once you go to the bullpen and start throwing you get into the flow of the day and forget about everything else.
When I spoke with your catcher and teammate Ed Herrmann, he told me that he felt whoever won that series would win the division, but that it took so much out of you guys just to get that split that it drained you and Oakland was able to pull away.
Ed’s right. It was draining, especially on the position players. In a big series like we had with Oakland, a lot is expected of players. Plus, we had kept knocking on the door that season trying to catch those guys [and] that becomes draining, too. Because we were in a pennant race, we had to play our guys every day. That race was so close, you just couldn’t give guys time off.
If Bill Melton wasn’t lost for the season with the herniated disc on June 28 of that year, do the Sox win the West? (Melton, the 1971 American League home run champion, fell off his garage roof the previous November getting down his son who somehow wandered up on it. He fell on his back, which damaged a disc. Bill went to Spring Training and played through it the first few months of the year, but the condition got worse, with pain shooting down his legs because of pressure on a nerve.)
I don’t know if we would have won, but I know our chances would have been a hell of a lot better.
You pitched almost 377 innings in 1972, an astonishing total, with eight shutouts, 24 wins, and an ERA of 2.51. Even though the knuckleball was your primary pitch, were you ever concerned about throwing that many innings?
I didn’t think about it that much. I was throwing the ball well; I had been in a groove the entire season. I wanted to give it a shot, I enjoyed it. I also didn’t like down time, just sitting around. So when they said, “Do you want to pitch every second day or third day?” I said “sure.”
People said I didn’t get sore because all I threw was the knuckleball, but that’s not true. I’d get stiff and sore, and in those days pitchers never used ice. I didn’t get as sore as if I was throwing, say, a slider, because I wasn’t putting the pressure on my elbow and shoulder, but I did get sore.
Hopes were never higher than in 1973. The Sox were the favorites according to the press, Melton was back and the team got off to a roaring start. By late May, the Sox were 26-14, with a 3 ½-game lead over the Angels. But even before injuries tore up the team (the team used the disabled list 38 times), the Sox weren’t very happy. GM Stu Holcomb’s hard line salary policy alienated many guys. Players like Richardt, Mike Andrews, Jay Johnstone and Spiezio were released when they couldn’t come to terms, and that decimated the depth of the club. What was the mood in the locker room that season?
I don’t remember exact instances in the locker room where players got mad, but I’m shocked about the number of times we used the disabled list. I didn’t realize we used it that often.
As for you personally, an oddity took place on May 28, 1973, when you started the completion of a suspended game against Cleveland and then after you won that one, went out and beat them again in the regularly-slated game. What was that experience like? (Wood’s line for the night: 14 innings, one run, seven hits, nine strikeouts, for a 13-3 record — and it wasn’t even June yet!)
When a game goes that long, everybody figures that basically it would be over in an inning or two. It was my night to start anyway, so I figured I can give them an inning or two. It turned out the [suspended] game went five innings. I felt fine [and] knew I could throw a few more innings at least, so I started the second game. Everything was going well, so I just kept going and was able to finish it off.
I don’t know if both of these are related or not, perhaps you can shed some light on it. The 1973 Sox were ruined by injuries. It seemed everybody from Brian Downing to Allen to Ken Henderson to Carlos May were hurt. On July 20, 1973 in New York you started both ends of a doubleheader against the Yankees. Was that because of the injuries to the team, perhaps the pitching staff, or did you and Tanner have something else in mind? (Wood wasn’t sharp that day, losing 12-2 and 7-0. He became the first pitcher to start both ends of a regularly-scheduled doubleheader since Cincinnati’s Fred Toney on June 23, 1918.)
No, that wasn’t planned. Chuck was going to start someone else in game two, but I got knocked out early in the first game. I told Chuck I didn’t pitch much; I can go back out if you need me. Maybe I shouldn’t have, because they beat me up in the second game too! [laughing] That was strange, because I always had good success against the Yankees. (Wilbur failed to record an out in the opener, giving up four hits and five earned runs. In the nightcap he lasted 4 ⅓ innings, again allowing five earned runs.)
Despite the Sox being mediocre in 1973 and 1974 you still won 20 games, running that 20-win streak to four straight seasons. You made the All-Star Game again in 1973, but there was something missing from the Sox in those years. It wasn’t like in 1971 and 1972. Any idea what went wrong?
Well the injuries played a big part, and overall we were getting older. The team wasn’t as young as in 1971 and 1972.
When Bill Veeck took control of the Sox again in December 1975, he let Tanner go as manager. What was it like to play for Chuck? He seemed to be the exact opposite of your first Sox manager, Eddie Stanky.
Chuck was a player’s manager. I enjoyed playing for Chuck, we all did. Chuck was the most positive guy I’ve ever been around. No matter how bad things were going Chuck would always find something to be positive about, something to try to keep you going.
In fact, Chuck spent more time with guys who were having trouble or in a slump then with guys who were going well. I thought that was really smart. Remember in baseball you only have 25 guys. If two or three guys are down or having a hard time suddenly your roster is really short. Chuck tried to keep everybody ready to play because that gave us a better chance of winning.
In 1976, the Sox arguably weren’t any better than the versions from 1974 and 1975 but you personally were off to a great start. Opening Day for example, you shut out the Royals, 4-0. By early May of that year you were pitching brilliantly again: five complete games in seven starts, ERA less than 2.50 and a winning record. It all came apart in Detroit, courtesy of a line drive off the bat of Ron LeFlore. What do you remember about the play?
Ron hit me in the kneecap with a line drive, and it just blew it apart. He swung at a ball using an inside-out swing. That’s always the toughest for a pitcher to pick up, because it looks like he’s pulling the ball. Instead, he hit it right back up the middle. I never saw it. I wasn’t trying to catch it, I was just trying to get out of the way.
Originally, the kneecap was wired together to hold it in place, without a cast. The doctors felt this way it would heal quicker, and maybe I could be out there in September. That September, I was working out at home trying to get ready to come back when I slipped on the grass and the kneecap went out again. This time, they had to put some pins in it to hold it together and I had a cast on, so I was done for the season.
My father had the same type of injury, a broken kneecap, and I saw how tough it was for him. He was older then you when he got hurt, but given that you were 35 at the time, was there any question about coming back for the next season?
No, because I had another year on my contract. I had signed a two-year deal with the Sox in 1976, so I was going to come back.
The 1977 season turned out to be magical for the Sox, one that is still cherished by Sox fans. Was there any indication in the spring that this club would be as good as it turned out to be?
No, not in Spring Training, but looking back we did have a lot of guys who wanted to play. We had guys like Eric Soderholm coming back from injury, and we had a lot of fighters.
You started 18 games that season and pitched some good ones, including what I call the Lamar Johnson game on June 19, 1977. (The Sox played the A’s in a doubleheader, winning 2-1 and 5-1 behind Wood and Francisco Barrios. Wood started the first game, going eight innings on six hits. It’s called the Lamar Johnson game, though, because the first baseman/DH sang the National Anthem, then went out and got the only three White Sox hits, two of them solo home runs.) You still had that magic.
Well, maybe, but to tell you the truth, I was gun shy. I’ll admit it. LeFlore’s shot got to me. I pitched everybody inside, I wasn’t going to let them get out on the ball and maybe hit another one back up the middle. It’s hard to pitch that way.
This team electrified Sox fans because of their ability to pound the baseball and win games in dramatic fashion. Sox fans demanded something that wasn’t seen in baseball until then, the curtain call. Adding to it was Nancy Faust’s rendition of “Na Na Hey Hey (Kiss Him Goodbye)” that would send the crowd into a frenzy. Some of your teammates have told me that wasn’t a big deal; others have said they were uncomfortable with it because they felt opponents were being shown up. What were your feelings on all this?
You would have to put me in with the group that was uncomfortable with all that. I always had a saying, “Don’t wake up sleeping dogs.” Let ’em stay quiet, and leave town with a 5-4 loss. They’d say, “Well we played a good game, and if we made one play, we would have won it.” Don’t wake them up; let them go home happy. Of course you see [curtain calls] more now, but back then it was a different story.
The season ended too quickly for Sox fans, as the team couldn’t keep up with an unbelievable Kansas City surge (the Royals went 35-4 from August 17 and September 25). When the Sox lost both Richie Zisk and Oscar Gamble to free agency after the season, everyone knew the magic was gone. The team was pretty bad in 1978, but you still had a respectable season going 10-10 for a team that only won 71 games. When did you decide it was time to retire?
In September 1978, the Sox traded me to Milwaukee, but I didn’t want to go. I’m sure that bothered the folks in Milwaukee, but I figured that I’d try the free-agent market that offseason and see what happened. Well, I wasn’t offered a uniform by anybody! That was the end of it. It was time. I wasn’t myself. I was gun-shy since the LeFlore hit.
You were named by the fans as a member of the White Sox All-Century Team. How did you get the news, and what was your reaction?
Roland Hemond gave me a call to let me know about it. Then that summer, we made the trip to Chicago. It was a great honor. Thanks be to the knuckleball that made it all possible! [laughing]
You spent 12 years in a Sox uniform. This is going to be hard, but how about summing up your time for me on the South Side and those fantastic years?
I was fortunate. I spent 12 very pleasurable years in Chicago. We had some decent years. Granted, we never won a championship, but more often than not we were in the hunt for it. Those are the seasons where you start playing in April and you look around and realize it’s September already. You ask yourself, ‘Where did it all go?’ Those are the years that I had the most fun and that I’ll remember.
Okay, that line is slightly tongue-in-cheek. But only slightly. To be fair, it’s not particularly the Dodgers that broke baseball. Jesse Friedman made a salient post on Twitter, which I largely agree with.
All of these statements can be true at once: 1) Dodgers are doing precisely what they should be doing. 2) They probably won’t win the 2026 World Series. 3) Some owners need to spend more. 4) MLB’s competitive balance mechanisms are flawed and in need of fixing.
My major disagreement with the above is point #2. I think the Dodgers probably will win the 2026 World Series, and if they don’t, it will only be due to the randomness of the playoffs. Perhaps the Yankees or the Blue Jays might be able to edge them over the relative sprint of seven games. But my concern is more to do with the 2026 regular season, which occupies the great bulk of the year, even if MLB probably makes most of its money over the month of the postseason. After the arrival of Kyle Tucker on the Los Angeles Dodgers, the over/under on their win tally is the best by eleven games.
Not the best in the NL West. Or even the best in the NL. It’s eleven games better than any other team in the major leagues. They are projected to win the NL West by seventeen games over the Padres. The division is shaping up to be an absolute procession, of the same kind seen in 2019. Remember that year? No, you don’t. Because the Dodgers’ divisional lead hit double-digits by the first week in June, and fans of every other team tuned out on the race the rest of the way. The projection for 2026 isn’t too much of a surprise, considering the current projected payrolls in the NL West.
Yes, the Dodgers this year, between salary and luxury tax, will be spending more than twice as much as any other team in the NL West. There’s no other division which will have such a dramatic imbalance. Sure, the Mets are spending, but the Phillies are right there with them. The same goes in the AL East, where the Yankees, Blue Jays and Red Sox are within $62 million of each other. The next most top-heavy would be the NL Central, but there, the Cubs’ spending difference over the next team, the Brewers, is only about $104 million: barely a third of the almost $300 million advantage enjoyed by the Dodgers in the West.
“Your team could do this too.”
Ah, the frequent bleat of the Dodgers fan, to which I succinctly reply: bullshit. I refer you to Forbes’ Business of Baseball report, which is as good a resource as we have in regard to the finances of the thirty MLB franchises. Looking at the revenue column in the most recent report, there are precisely two other teams whose entire income would allow them to match the Dodgers’ salary bill for their major-league roster in 2026. The Dodgers’ TV deal alone ($334 million per year) is more than every penny the Diamondbacks make. Yes: if nobody at all ever went to Dodger Stadium or bought an Ohtani jersey, they’d still be richer than Arizona.
So the “Doing this too” approach would be a speed-run to insolvency, or require some benevolent billionaire owner to treat the franchise as a money pit, and hurl their own personal fortune into the coffers. Neither solutions are credible in the slightest. Even if we could, I’m severely unconvinced Kyle Tucker should be the recipient of such largesse. While the Dodgers were racking up most of the $2.11 billion they now have on the books in guaranteed salaries, most of the moves made sense.
But in what universe is Kyle Tucker worth $60 million a year? I mean, he is certainly a good player. But his 4.6 bWAR last year ranked him 33rd-best among position players. He did miss time with a calf injury, but had Tucker matched his career high, 5.5 bWAR would still have barely crept into the top twenty. Even using the increased $11 million per WAR figure, he’ll need that career high every year to justify the contract. In isolation, this would seem like a significant overpay for Tucker. If the D-backs has paid that much for Tucker, I’d not have been happy.
But this is the way the Dodgers now operate, with eight contracts on the books in excess of a hundred million dollars. The Diamondbacks have…. one. To steal a quote from Heathers: Veronica Sawyer: Why do you have to be such a mega-bitch? Heather Duke: Because I can be. Make no mistake: this is all perfectly legal under the current rules. But Manfred has sat on his hands and watched as the only tool they can apply against luxury tax has been proven completely useless. It has become part of the cost of the Los Angeles Dodgers doing business, and MLB rakes in its share. The other teams and fans? Fuck ‘em.
Bring on the lockout
The game needs a hard salary cap, and I certainly agree, a salary floor. Though it’s probably going to be too late: there will likely be some kind of grandfather clause going on, allowing the Dodgers to keep running out a $400 million team until their current deferred salaries expire. That will be 2047, when Edwin Diaz – then in his mid-fifties – is scheduled to receive his final check from LA. But it’ll be better than nothing, which is in effect the restriction currently in place on spending. Looking at my current complete lack of interest in the 2026 regular season as a competitive endeavor, the sooner the better.
Because right now, the best hope the D-backs have of ever winning the division is probably… realignment. Unfortunately, most of the proposals I’ve seen involve Arizona remaining in the same division as Los Angeles. More games with Dodgers’ fans invading Chase Field is clearly sub-optimal. There ain’t enough Raid available for that. But there was this one, in which we end up with the Angels, Padres and Athletics. That would work. Of course, the ideal scenario would be to put the Dodgers in their own division, by themselves, so nobody has to play them until the post-season.
But while we’re thinking radically, why not realign things by payroll? These days, with jet travel the norm, geography is far less significant than it was. So why not get each club to submit their total payroll budget at the start of the year, rank them, and organize divisions that way? For example, the Super-Platinum Division right now would be the Dodgers, Mets, Phillies and Blue Jays; the Balsa Division would be the Marlins, Rays, Indians and White Sox. That way, teams would compete against others with similar payrolls and it would be a much more equitable test of skill. Or do it fantasy baseball style: every team gets exactly the same budget.
There are options, for sure. Though getting the player’s union to agree might be a different matter. But it is worth noting that, while the average baseball salary passed five million dollars this season for the first time, the median salary – the point where half the players earn more and half earn less – dropped to $1.35 million. It’s $300K lower than it was a decade ago, and that’s not including inflation. Just as with team totals, individual salaries are become increasingly more top-heavy, and indicates the record-setting level of money in the game is not floating all boats equally.
We’re less than a month away from pitchers and catchers reporting, which means that in about 10 weeks, we’ll have real baseball to cover. Until such time, we’ll be covering something called hypothetical baseball, where the headlines feature player-team combinations that may never come to fruition, proposed storylines that bear absolutely no fruit, and rumors so sensationalized they could have been offered up by a dimly-lit Jonathan Frakes. Aren’t you excited? Then get reading, bubba! (New catchphrase.)
There haven’t been many strong acquisition-based rumors around the Central this offseason; by and large, transactions have been sudden and low-profile, and the gossip has largely centered on which Central stars might be off their current teams by Opening Day. This weekend, however, Jon Heyman reported that the White Sox are kicking the tires on Michael Conforto, who is coming off a very poor year with the Los Angeles Dodgers, but carries with him a track record and some name recognition.
Remember everything that I was just saying, one bullet point ago? Well, I bring tidings on that front, too. Jon Heyman — no relation — also reported that the New York Yankees have expressed interest in a pair of Chicagoan acquisitions; one is Nico Hoerner, who bears absolutely no relevance to a linkdump about the American League Central. The other is Luis Robert, Jr., who bears grizzly-level relevance.
The Cleveland Guardians picked up Carter Kieboom on a minor-league deal. The former top prospect will receive a non-roster invite to spring training and could find himself working an infield/depth role for the big-league club.
Most of our rivals this offseason have been focused on on-field moves. The Kansas City Royals appear to have been focused on field moves. And I don’t mean their proposed migration into a stadium downtown, or elsewhere, either. No, this meandering, poorly-constructed sentence is referring specifically to a change in dimensions at Kauffman Stadium. This week, the Royals announced a plan to bring in most of their outfield by 10 feet, as well as lowering the height of the fences. The size of the outfield has historically made Kauffman a good hitters’ park in general, but has restricted home run totals as a result.
There were a number of lessons to take away from the Phillies’ failure to haul in Bo Bichette to a seven-year, $200 million contract last week.
Like with most teams, the luxury tax remains a self-imposed impediment to the Phils’ willingness to spend. The Dodgers and Mets are the two teams who will hold their noses to overpay players obscenely large average annual values in order to land them, eating tens of millions of luxury tax dollars in the process. They are willing to give away opt-outs throughout these short-term contracts, ceding much of the leverage to the player.
It’s clear if the Phillies want to play in the same free agency pool as Los Angeles and New York, they must re-evaluate their belief that young free agents prefer long-term security and big money deals. And if they continue to use the luxury tax as a soft salary cap, as most teams do, they will lose out on free agents to those two teams.
Maybe that’s a price they’re willing not to pay, but in the wake of the Bichette decision, it feels antiquated.
The price a team pays for needing to build out a roster through big-money free agent deals is sometimes unpalatable, but that is the bed Dave Dombrowski and the Phillies had to sleep in following the collapse of the 2007-2011 Phillies mini-dynasty that left the team with a roster of aging players and a farm system that offered little in terms of ready-to-play, impact talent.
Hopes were high that as the team traded away Cole Hamels, Chase Utley, Jimmy Rollins and others for prospects that the rebuild of 2013-2017 would be quick and fill the roster with young stars. Instead, the Phils’ return to respectability did not come because Scotty Jetpax, Dom Brown, Nick Martinez or Vince Velasquez took the team to the next level. It came because of free agent contracts to Bryce Harper, Nick Castellanos, Kyle Schwarber and others.
Some of those deals are showing their age. They will likely be paying Castellanos $20 million to play somewhere else in 2026. Taijuan Walker’s $18 million salary is a tad pricey for a No. 6 starter/swing man. One wonders if the Phillies would think twice about Trea Turner’s 11-year, $300 million contract if they could do it again, and one can assume most would love a do-over of Aaron Nola’s seven-year, $172 million contract that still has another six years left on it. Add to that Kyle Schwarber’s five year, $150 million deal, J.T. Realmuto’s three-year, $45 million and, of course, Bryce Harper’s 13-year, $330 million contract, and you’ve got an inflexible roster with a high price tag.
To be fair, some of those guys are still playing at a very high level. Whether Harper remains “elite” or not, one cannot argue his contract hasn’t been outstanding for the organization. After a rocky first season, Turner has given the Phillies what they hoped for at shortstop, and Schwarber is an elite power hitter. But all those deals helped butt Dombrowski up against the fourth luxury tax, and outside of re-signing Schwarber and Realmuto, the Phillies’ biggest expenditure on a position player in free agency this off-season was outfielder Adolis Garcia. Contract extensions may also come soon for Jesus Luzardo and Jhoan Duran at some point. More money will be spent.
The front office cannot un-spend all the cash they are committed to spending, so in order to keep the window of contention open, the Phillies must do what they were unable to do in 2012 when the 2008 championship core began to age and it all fall apart.
They need to actually produce impact talent from their minor league system. They need to produce the next generation of stars.
Even after all the investments the Phils have made since Dombrowski took over, Philadelphia’s farm system is not considered among the top half of the league. Fangraphs ranks it 20th, and ESPN and MLB Pipeline had it 21st in August of last year. There are few highly touted prospects in the minors with the exception of their Big 3: Andrew Painter, Justin Crawford and Aidan Miller.
Can they hit on all three?
They will certainly get their chances. This time a year ago, Phils fans were salivating at the notion of Painter and his electric stuff in the starting rotation, even coming off of Tommy John surgery. A disappointing season in AAA has taken some of the shine off his arrival, and no one is sure if he will be able to adequately replace Ranger Suarez’ absence in the rotation (it would be great if Nola could step up into the Ranger role and save Painter the need to do it.) If Painter doesn’t turn out to be a top-of-the-rotation starter sooner rather than later, it will be a profound disappointment.
Sorry, kid. You were presented to us as an ace in the making. Those are the expectations, if not right away, then soon.
Crawford’s numbers in the minors have always been good. It makes sense that the Phillies are handing him the everyday job in center field. He’ll hit No. 9 in the lineup, and hopefully won’t be needed to do more than get his feet wet and contribute from time to time in ‘26. He has his detractors, but with an outfield that projects to be one of the weakest in MLB this season, Crawford turning into a quality big league player would go a long way to solidifying what appears to be a real weakness, both in 2026 and beyond.
Then, there’s Miller. He’s the top prospect in the organization right now, a power-hitting shortstop who got off to a very rough start in AA Reading but came on over the final six weeks of the season, finishing with a flourish in AAA Lehigh in the final week. He’ll start there in 2026, and all eyes will be on whether he stays at shortstop or transitions to another spot on the diamond in an effort to get him to the big leagues quicker.
Like Painter, they need Miller to turn into a star. He needs to be better than Rhys Hoskins, Alec Bohm or Bryson Stott became. He needs to be a Harper/Schwarber/Turner type player. Will that happen right away? Of course not, but at some point in the next 2-3 years.
If you think that’s unreasonable, it’s not. The Phillies drafted and developed three superstar position players in Utley, Howard and Rollins that became the backbone of a championship team. There are prospects playing for other teams who made a major impact in the Majors right away. First round draft picks are supposed to be great. It’s why they were drafted first. As the existing core ages, these younger players need to make up for what will certainly be a dip in production.
The Phillies need the farm system to hit because, even if they wanted to spend the money, there are no high impact free agents hitting the market in the next two years, as noted by ESPN’s Jeff Passan last week.
Sure, Bichette could opt-out of his Mets deal after the first year, but do you really see the Phillies re-engaging with him and his agent after what transpired last week? Given the paltry list of position players above, any help supplementing the roster, at least from an offensive standpoint, must come from within.
Outside of the Big 3, the player development side of the organization needs to do a better job getting players to be ready to play at a high level in the big leagues. Some organizations do a phenomenal job of churning out high-quality players year after year. The Dodgers almost never draft in the first round and always pick at the end of every round, and yet they have a top-five farm system in baseball. It’s not luck.
Last year’s first round pick for the Phils, pitcher Gage Wood, will start in high-A ball, although there are thoughts he could be a quick riser and potentially pitch in the bullpen this season. Aroon Escobar and Dante Nori are 21-year-olds in AA Reading this season. Neither projects as an All Star caliber player in the Majors, but much development remains. Gabriel Rincones Jr. is the likeliest to see time in the big leagues this season, with a powerful left-handed swing that murders right-handers and crumbles against southpaws. And then there is their big international signing, 17-year-old Francisco Renteria, the No. 3 international prospect this year, who has drawn comparisons to Hall of Fame candidate Bobby Abreu.
No one is putting that kind of pressure on the kid, but Renteria is as good a raw talent that has come into the Phillies farm system in a long time.
The Phillies also need to continue to develop pitching. Cristopher Sanchez wasn’t drafted by the Phils, but he was developed by the team and has turned into one of the five best starters in the game. Ranger Suarez, who just signed with Red Sox, was born and raised in the Phils’ system. Aaron Nola, despite his faults a year ago, is a future Wall of Famer and, if he has another few productive seasons, could warrant Cooperstown conversation. There are success stories there, but after Painter and Gage, there is a lack of young starting pitching prospects in the system, with Moises Chace’s lost 2025 season putting a dent in his prospects.
If the only way the Phils are going to be able to put a playoff caliber team on the field is through free agency, they’re going to have to run their payroll north of $350 million in the coming years. That doesn’t seem sustainable. Dombrowski spent his first year in Philadelphia diagnosing the problems and coming up with solutions to fixing them.
The Milwaukee Brewers recently announced their 2026 international free agent class, consisting of 22 prospects from Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Notable international free agents signed by the Brewers over the years have included Jackson Chourio, Jesus Made, Luis Peña, and — this name brings back memories —Alcides Escobar.
Almost all these guys are extremely young, so it will most likely be years before any of them make an impact with the big league club. Still, for those of you who follow the Brewers farm system, here’s a full list of this year’s prospects — including everything I could find about them.
No. 24 Diego Frontado (SS, Venezuela)
Frontado is the second-highest-ranked prospect in the Brewers’ international free agent class but commanded the largest bonus ($1.6M). Per MLB Pipeline, the 17-year-old infielder is “an impactful hitter with a smooth glove that can quickly move through a club’s system.” While he’s still growing into his frame, Frontado has a nearly-perfect swing, makes loud contact, and can hit the ball to all fields. He’s also really, really fast for his age, already clocking 60-yard-dash times as low as 6.6.
No. 49 José Rodríguez (SS, Venezuela)
Rodriguez, another 17-year-old shortstop prospect, features quick hands and a compact, efficient swing at the plate. However, his best trait — by far — is his glove. Rodriguez has an above-average arm and the range (and hands) to make difficult plays look easy. Many scouts consider him one of the top defenders in this year’s class. If he develops power with age, he very well might look like a steal in a couple of years.
No. 20 Ricki Moneys (SS, Dominican Republic)
I didn’t think the Brewers could top “Jesus Made,” but Ricki Moneys just might be an even cooler name. I’m a believer in the idea that prospects with cool names always succeed, so if you ask me, this kid is going to be a superstar. Scouts agree, too. Per Pipeline:
“There’s a direct up arrow next to Moneys’ all-around stock. He plays the game with a high intensity and has a record of in-game production that backs up scouts’ belief he’ll hit for even more power as he continues to get more reps. A right-handed hitter with lots of bat speed, he puts together competitive at-bats consistently and can produce moonshots when he runs into them, something of a rarity for teenagers on the international scene.”
As Pipeline puts it, the “draw” in Moneys’ profile is his hit tool and outstanding production in the Dominican Republic. His defense isn’t too shabby, either — Moneys has great hands and an accurate (although not especially powerful) arm. He’s probably not getting to some of the balls that some (Rodriguez, for example) might be able to get to, so he might not stick at shortstop. Still, Moneys makes all the routine plays and doesn’t make many mistakes, traits that hint at long-term defensive viability at whatever position he ends up at.
The Cubs’ 2022 season began much like 2021 ended — with the team losing games, some of them by large scores (though they also had a 21-0 win over the Pirates in that span, go figure).
They had taken two of the first three games of a four-game set against the Reds in Cincinnati, and the last one started out well. The Cubs had a 3-0 lead going into the bottom of the second. Frank Schwindel had doubled in two runs and Nico Hoerner homered, all of that off Hunter Greene. Greene, who had promise, wasn’t quite yet the pitcher he became by 2025.
So that’s all good, right?
Well, not so much. Justin Steele, who wasn’t quite yet the pitcher he became in 2023 and 2024, got hammered for seven runs in two innings (plus five batters into the third). Scott Effross relieved and wasn’t any better, and neither were Brandon Hughes, Chris Martin and Rowan Wick.
The Cubs trailed 15-5 going into the bottom of the eighth and so David Ross summoned infielder Andrelton Simmons to throw that inning.
Simmons, let’s be frank, was not a good signing by Jed Hoyer & Co. He had posted a poor year for the Twins in 2021 (.558 OPS in 131 games) and was coming off a shoulder injury. That hampered his fielding and the man simply could not hit anymore. In 34 games for the Cubs Simmons batted .173/.244/.187 (13-for-75).
And he wasn’t any better as a pitcher. First eight batters he faced: single, single, walk, single, sacrifice fly, single, double, sacrifice fly. If you’ve lost count, that’s five runs before Simmons got Alejo López to pop up to end the inning.
At least Gaetti did make some positive contributions to the Cubs in his time with the team. Not so much with Simmons, who was released in August 2022. His contract was a complete waste of $4 million.
Brown, who'll turn 34 in July, had been with the Athletics the past seven years.
He played in just 38 MLB games during the 2025 season, but had seen action in 111 or more games for the A's over four straight seasons from 2021 to 2024. His best season came in 2022 when he hit .230 with 25 homers, 26 doubles, and 73 RBI over 150 games.
Overall, the left-handed hitter owns a career .226/.292/.419 slash line with 74 home runs, 79 doubles, eight triples, and 233 RBI. He's logged 197 games in RF, 172 games in LF, 159 games at first base, 32 games as the DH, and 28 games in CF.
Brown was released by the A's in June 2025 and signed a minor league deal with the Arizona Diamondbacks in July, before opting out on Aug. 10 and finishing the year unsigned. He hit .291 with six home runs and six doubles over 26 games for Triple-A Reno.
He will likely serve as outfield depth for the Yanks, who are still trying to reunite with Cody Bellinger in free agency and already have Aaron Judge, Trent Grisham, and Jasson Dominguez, plus top prospect Spencer Jones looming.
This story has been corrected in reaction to a mathematical error caught by user Tim B.
In 2024, Logan Gilbert became one of MLB’s apex predators. He led baseball in innings pitched with 208.2 and finished second in the AL in strikeouts with 220. He was rewarded with a trip to the All-Star game and a sixth place finish in Cy Young voting. His 2025 looked just about as good on paper with his ERA, xERA, and FIP about the same or better. And he even improved his strikeout rate from 27.4% to 32.3%, going from 17th in the league to third.
Yet he wasn’t as valuable to the team.
Why? He pitched about an inning fewer per game, averaging 6.1 innings per start in 2024—workhorse numbers in the modern game—but collapsing to a more pedestrian 5.1 in 2025. A bit of this was managing the injury that caused him to hit the IL for the first time in his career in May. But the pattern actually held both before and after the IL stint (and, to frontload this, so does just about everything else in this article). And he only averaged six fewer pitches per start, which only explains about a third of an inning. Rather, the culprit is that Gilbert needed more pitches per plate appearance in 2025: His P/PA spiked from 3.78 to 4.03.
I know a jump of 0.25 P/PA doesn’t seem like much, but it adds up to the other two-thirds of an inning, or about 22 innings over the course of a season. That’s especially damaging because those are the innings that have to be covered by the soft underbelly of middle relief.
So why was he about as good on a rate basis, but less efficient? I thought I knew the answer, but what I found surprised me.
Suspect #1: The strikeout surge
The most obvious explanation is that 4.9% jump in his strikeout rate. Relatively speaking, that’s 17.9% more strikeouts, which is a lot. Strikeouts naturally take more pitches than PAs that end with balls in play since you need at least three pitches for a strikeout. For Gilbert, in 2024, his average strikeout took 4.92 pitches, and his PAs that ended in balls in play (we’ll call these BIPPAs, because it sounds better than PABIP and doesn’t risk confusion with BABIP) was 3.17. That’s a difference of 1.6 additional pitches for a strikeout.
But here’s the twist: while Gilbert was less efficient overall, he actually got more efficient in his strikeouts, from 4.918 P/K to 4.827 P/K. That’s a confounding factor in using his strikeout surge as the explanation.
The math says the additional strikeouts added 0.087 P/PA, while the better efficiency saved him 0.030 P/PA. Netted out, that’s an increase of +0.057 P/PA caused by the strikeout surge.
So, the new strikeouts explained 23% of Gilbert’s dip in efficiency. That’s sizable, but I’m not prepared to give a guilty verdict here because I’m willing to live with a little less efficiency if it means more strikeouts. I love a Maddux as much as the next guy, but strikeouts are good. The real question is: where are the other three-quarters of the pitches hiding?
Suspect #2: The walk problem
The second obvious culprit is that his walk rate increased from 4.6% to 5.8%. Walks are the worst result for pitch efficiency since they’re a bad result and come at a high pitch cost; a walk costs almost three more P/PA than a BIPPA. The increase in walk rate would be bad on its own, but Gilbert compounded that by using more pitches per walk this year. In 2024, his average walk was 6.0 pitches, which rose to 6.323 pitches in 2025.
The math here says the additional walks accounted for an extra 0.037 P/PA and the fact that his walks were less efficient added another 0.019 P/PA, for a net effect of 0.056 P/PA. That explains 22% more of the overall change. That’s a meaningful contribution, but more of an accomplice than a principal.
Taken together with the strikeouts, we’ve accounted for 45% of the increase in P/PA. But after dealing with the two most obvious suspects, we’ve still got more than half the problem unsolved.
The Red Herrings: What the problem wasn’t
False lead #1: Two-strike struggles. The culprit had to be that Gilbert was struggling to finish guys off. It had to be. The mental image is Gilbert expanding the zone too much with two strikes, getting beat by balls and fouls. Look at his slider location with and without two strikes in 2024 and 2025:
Doesn’t that look like a guy who’s trying to get too cute and chase the chase? As soon as Gilbert’s efficiency started to be a problem last year, I locked in on this. But that led to confirmation bias, as every ball or foul in a two-strike count stood out in my head. I was so sure this was the answer that I signed up for Gilbert’s 40 in 40 with a title in mind (“40 in 40: Logan. Keith. Gilbert. Stop playing with your food, young man”) and assumed I’d bang it out in 45 minutes.
So imagine my surprise when I dug in and learned that Gilbert was actually a bit teensy bit more efficient with two strikes this year, contingent on getting a strikeout. He was only less efficient if the at-bat ended with a walk or a ball in play. That’s not really an issue of playing with his food or it would show up in the strikeout numbers as well. Keep in mind that, after all, his strikeout rate even improved this year.
False lead #2: Worse command. More balls and falling behind more often would explain things. The increase in walk rate even points in this direction. But no. His first-pitch strike rate went up (67.7% to 69.9%); his called strike rate remained flat (15.2%); he was in the zone slightly more(50.9% to 51.3%); and when he went out of the zone, he got more swings on those pitches (chases) (31.6% to 32.3%) and less contact on those swings (44.2% to 40.4%). That’s not a guy with a command problem.
To be sure, he did throw more balls in non-walk PAs (we exclude walks since they always have exactly four balls). But most of them came in his PAs that ended in strikeouts, and we want to strip those out of our analysis here to avoid double-counting since we already looked at P/K. The net effect of the additional balls in BIPPAs is just 0.005 P/PA. That’s not zero, but it’s just 2% of the total spike—more of a guy in the wrong place at the wrong time than a criminal.
The drawing room scene
Having accounted for strikeouts, walks, and balls/BIPPA, there’s really only one place left to look: strikes/BIPPA. (His HBP rate is too small to matter.) To quantify it, Gilbert threw 1.151 strikes/BIPPA in 2024, which spiked to 1.363 in 2025. That’s an 18% jump. Helpfully, this also explains why his walks took more pitches—since walks always take four balls, the additional pitches must be strikes. As we saw when looking at whether he was struggling with the put-away pitch above, Gilbert did see drawn out at-bats when he wasn’t able to get the strikeout.
But what kind of strikes are they? If it’s all called strikes and whiffs, then that’s a problem you’d live with. Those are pure good outcomes. But Gilbert’s called strikes and whiffs per BIPPA only increased by 0.010. Nearly all the additional strikes were coming from foul balls, going from 0.448 fouls/BIPPA in 2024 to 0.650 in 2025.
So at last, we have our culprit: Hitters fouling off 45% more pitches in plate appearances that ended with contact. This single factor explains nearly half of Gilbert’s entire inefficiency spike.
What’s odd is that while there was a 45% increase in BIPPA foul balls overall, only about half of them came before Gilbert got to two strikes. Those aren’t as good as a whiff or a called strike—and they do work to make the at-bat longer since unlike a walk or a strikeout, a BIPPA can happen in an 0-0 count—but it’d still be basically fine. They’re additional strikes that put Gilbert ahead, and the better a count is for a pitcher, the better all his outcomes are, increasing strikeouts, reducing walks, and even softening the contact hitters make when they connect. These pre-two-strike fouls helped explain why more PAs reached two strikes (60% versus 53.4%)—which is a good thing.
But the other half came from two-strike foul balls that extended the at-bat, pure pitch-count killers with no benefit. What makes it odd is that Gilbert’s two-strike efficiency on strikeouts actually improved—he was finishing strikeouts faster than ever. But in the plate appearances that reached two strikes and didn’t end in strikeouts, hitters were fouling off pitch after pitch until they saw something they could put in play. It’s not that he was playing with his food—it’s that he was either on or he wasn’t.
The murder weapon: hitter adjustments?
So we know what happened: hitters fouled off way more pitches in 2025, especially in plate appearances that ended with contact. But why?
I don’t think this was a matter of consistency. While there was more game-to-game variation in his strikeout totals (standard deviation went up by 18%), his overall game scores were actually more consistent (standard deviation went down by 25%).
There’s some evidence that hitters may have adjusted their approach. Gilbert’s overall foul rate jumped from 16.6% to 19.2% of all pitches while league-wide foul rates held steady. Whether this represents a strategic adjustment by opposing hitters—perhaps sitting on certain pitches or protecting the plate more aggressively—or simply Gilbert’s stuff playing differently on different nights is hard to say definitively. His foul rate went up on his fastball, splitter, and curveball. It only went down on his slider, and even then by just a touch; and that’s a natural consequence of his using it in two-strike counts much less since guys will protect more with two strikes.
What’s clear is that in 2025, when Gilbert didn’t have his best command or when hitters were able to spoil his pitches, plate appearances dragged on much longer than they had in 2024.
The aftermath for 2026: How to adjust to the adjustment
The frustrating part is that there’s no obvious fix. Gilbert’s strikeout gains are real and valuable—jumping from 17th to third in the league is elite. His command metrics actually improved. He was more efficient in getting strikeouts. By most measures, he got better in 2025.
And yet: fewer innings, more stress on the bullpen, less overall value to the team.
Can Gilbert find a way to maintain his strikeout gains while reducing the foul-ball problem in 2026? Perhaps. But without a clear explanation for why hitters fouled off so many more pitches, there’s no clear path forward. I’d like to look further at the impact of his splitter becoming his go-to two-strike pitch, and what happened to his slider, which had similar velocity and movement but much worse results.
The price of greatness
But while we figured out how it happened, we still don’t know why. So, until we find answers, we’re left wondering if this is who Gilbert is now: a high-strikeout, low-efficiency pitcher. Maybe that’s okay. Even at 4.03 P/PA, we’re talking about 5-6 innings per start. That’s viable for a modern starter, especially if the Mariners can get more length from George Kirby and Bryce Miller or figure out the middle of their bullpen. But it’s not the workhorse ace of 2024—and it’s hard not to be disappointed by the 2025 version in comparison.
The Pittsburgh Pirates are less than a month away from reporting to Bradenton to get ready for the upcoming 2026 season.
The team looks a little different than it did a year ago, but some changes are still to be made. ESPN contributor Jesse Rogers wrote about what the Pirates have done this off-season and what still needs to be accomplished.
“Pittsburgh set out to improve its offense, and the Pirates have done that via trades and the free agent signing of O’Hearn. It doesn’t mean they’ll be a juggernaut at the plate, but they’ll be better than last season. That’s a start. Lowe and O’Hearn also bring experience playing for playoff-caliber teams, a much-needed benefit for the Pirates,” Rogers wrote.
The Pirates had one of the league’s worst offenses this past season, so their moves so far haven’t been a surprise. However, there is still room for improvement on that front.
“The Pirates aren’t done looking for offense, which could come in the form of an outfield bat or an addition to the left side of the infield. Or both. And after trading from their pitching depth, moving Johan Oviedo and Mike Burrows in separate deals, they would like to refill that part of their roster, too,” Rogers wrote.
“It’s already been a more active offseason for the Pirates than they’ve had in recent memory as they try to build around ace Paul Skenes. Smaller moves might be in order between now and spring training, but Pittsburgh shouldn’t be done adding.”
The Pirates could make another free agency splash by signing someone like Cody Bellinger, or they could ride out their group to see what they have. The offense should be better in 2026, but it remains to be seen how much improvement will be made and if it will be enough to knock on the door in the wild card race in the National League.
BD community, what are your thoughts on this offseason’s moves? Chime off in the comments section below.
Bo Bichette has been a Blue Jay since we drafted him in the second round of the 2016 draft, so ten years now, seven of them with the major league team.
He was a top prospect, reaching number eight on Baseball America’s top 100 prospect list. In 2017 he was number on nine our top 40 list (mistakes were made, TJ Zeuch and Conner Greene were in the two spots ahead of him), moving up to number two in 2018 (you can guess who was number one).
In 2018 I wrote:
Bo’s second pro season went as well as his first. He hit .362/.423/.564 splitting time between Lansing and Dunedin with 14 home runs.
Bo is on everyone’s list of Top 100 MLB prospects, 8th on Baseball America’s, 14th on MLB’s and 19th on Baseball Prospectus.
About the only question is can he stay at short. Some think he’ll have to move to second, but if he continues to hit as well as he has, we’ll be ok with a little less than terrific range. He has been working at his defense. It might come down to which position is open when it is time to call him up.
He was called up at the end of July in 2019, and started his MLB career with an 11 game hitting streak and finished the season with a .311/.358/.571 line with 11 home runs in 46 games. 2021 was COVID shortened, but he hit .301/.328/.512 in 29 games, and the Jays made it to the Wild Card round of the playoffs.
In 2021, he finally got to play a full season, and he showed us what he could do, leading the league in hits with 191, slugging 29 home runs and made the All-Star team for the first time
And he would do, pretty much, the same for the just of his time with the Jays (excepting the 2024 season), putting up OPS numbers in the lower .800s. Being at or near the top of the league in hits, getting his 20ish home runs a year.
It was strange, he was consistently about the same in OPS, but he would get there in different ways, sometimes he would start out slow and save his season in the last month. Sometimes he would start hot and slump near the end, finishing in that same area. Last year, he had a .738 OPS at the end of June, but then had a terrific second half, getting it up to .840 before the injury that ended his regular season.
2024 was the outlier, he had a .225/.277/.322 after 81 games. I was sure he’d have a terrific second half to bring his numbers back to his career norms, but then an injury took away his chance.
In a way, it is too bad that he came up at the same time as Vlad. Vlad has charisma, an obvious sense of humour, and a sense of fun. Bo didn’t always show those things, or at least not to the point where they weren’t overshadowed by Vlad.
Bo seemed more guarded, I guess more business-like. He didn’t have the interview answers with Hazel that made you smile or made you like him more. Maybe if Vlad wasn’t so…..Vlad like we’d feel more connected to Bo.
But then Bo seemed great with his teammates. He always seemed to be chatting with someone on the bench and there were moments when he’d allow himself a little smile or something that showed us there was a personality in there.
If they had come up together 40 years ago (well, maybe 60 years ago), everyone would say that Bo was serious about the game, that he was a student of the game and was always looking to get better, and Vlad would be written off (at least a bit) for being a clown, for not being serious about the game.
I put in ‘Bo Bichette personality’ in Google and the AI summery said
…a mix of fiery competitiveness, perfectionism, infectious energy, and surprising sincerity, known for his aggressive play style, leadership by example (always early, working hard), and growing willingness to discuss mental health, contrasting a seemingly carefree exterior with a deep internal drive for success. He’s charismatic, connects with fans, and leads with an intense desire to win, viewing baseball as a mental battle, yet remains grounded and focused on his craft.
That seems very fair. Everything seems ‘on field’ with him. You don’t see Bichette commercials between innings. When there is an interview with him, he keeps it focused on baseball, there is very little personal stuff involved.
Among the bullet points:
Authentic & Vulnerable (Increasingly): He’s opening up about the pressures of the game, viewing it as true strength, a shift from stoicism.
He did talk about the pressures, some last year, when he was struggling.
I think the Mets were smart to offer a shorter-term contract (though $42 million a year seems a lot of money). I’ve often thought he was unlikely to age well, since he doesn’t control the strike zone, but then he is smart and driven, perhaps he’ll figure out how to continue to be great as his reflexes slow a bit.
I’m not sure that third base is the right spot for him. I think he’d be much better at second base, but again, he’s a hard worker and smart, so he’ll figure out how to play it to the best of his abilities.
As much as I have worries that he won’t age well, I’m sorry to see him go. I’m not tired of watching him play. I’d like to see how he deals with playing into his 30s. See if he can remake himself. See if he can gain some control over the strike zone. And I’d like to watch him learn a new position.
I’m not too worried about the loss of his leadership skills. We seem to have a number of good leaders on the team. And I think we’ll be ok with the loss of his bat. But we’ve been following him up close for seven seasons (and following his rise through the minors before that). I’m going to miss watching him play (as much as I’m not going to miss Buck praising his two-strike approach when the stats don’t show that he is great with two strikes).
Best of luck with the Mets, Bo. Thanks for all the great memories. Thanks, especially, for the home run in the World Series.
It’s the dream of all baseball players to have a singular, meteoric rise from the moment they turn professional until their on top of the baseball world. It’s surely the dream of the teams that select them, too.
More often than not, it’s a rockier road, and certainly not a linear one. That’s been the case with Cam Collier so far in his still nascent professional career, though through the right lens even some of his bumps in the road still come out looking pretty optimistic.
Take, for instance, his 2025 season. He busted his thumb in spring camp, and it set him back for months. He began the year back in Arizona playing in Rookie Ball to get reps, not starting a game there until May 19th. He eventually returned to High-A Dayton the first week of June and didn’t sock his first homer there until June 14th, after which he’d go all the way until August 26th before hitting another.
All that from the guy whose 20 homers with Dayton the previous season led the entire Midwest League.
Clearly, the thumb issue impacted his swing, his bat speed, his overall power. Yet as Collier advanced up to AA Chattanooga in the Southern League, he still found a way to post a .377 OBP that tied for 11th best in the league with two others, one of whom being top Reds prospect Sal Stewart (who obviously moved right on up after doing that). This, all in Collier’s age-2o season.
So, we’ve got a guy who has a) shown enough in-game power to lead a league in homers, b) overcome a serious injury mid-season to get back on the field, and c) shown burgeoning excellence in commanding the strike zone and getting on-base, all while being one of the youngest guys at each level.
Yeah, he might be just a 1B-only guy defensively, but that’s the makings of an offense powerhouse of a prospect, one who is surely aching to put it all on display in a healthy 2026 season that should see him rise to AAA Louisville. And as we all know, if you’re at AAA Louisville, you’re just a sniff away from being a big leaguer, something he’s very much on the cusp of becoming despite a big speed-bump in 2025.
(Man, look at that potential 1B/DH logjam the Reds have looming…)
Collier’s your #6 prospect in this year’s Community Prospect Rankings, running away with the voting over the weekend over a talented field. If I were a gamblin’ man, I’d wager that Cam’s about to have the kind of breakout 2026 that shoots him right back in Top 100 overall prospect conversations, as that bat is simply going to continue to play.
