Category: MLB

The Chicago White Sox are quickly becoming the road warriors of the MLB playoffs.

After sweeping the Astros in Houston during the American League wild-card round, Chicago opened the ALDS by shutting out the Cleveland Guardians 3-0 on Saturday at Progressive Field.

Now the White Sox have a chance to seize control of the series.

A victory Monday would send them back home with a 2-0 lead and within one win of their first American League championship series appearance since their 2005 World Series-winning season.

The Guardians, meanwhile, are trying to avoid heading to Chicago facing elimination, with MLB strikeout leader Gavin Williams set to take the mound in a crucial Game 2.

Follow along for live updates, lineup news, key moments, analysis and highlights from White Sox vs. Guardians in the ALDS.

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White Sox vs Guardians live box score

What time does White Sox vs Guardians start?

The Guardians host the White Sox on Monday, Oct. 5. First pitch is scheduled for 5 p.m. (ET).

How to watch White Sox vs Guardians

First pitch between the Guardians and White Sox is scheduled for 5 p.m. (ET) on Monday, Oct. 5.

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This article originally appeared on USA TODAY: White Sox vs. Guardians updates: Chicago eyes commanding ALDS lead

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The Wild Card Series came and went this year without much intrigue. The Yankees blew the Red Sox out of the water, the White Sox stuck the final stake into the dying heart of the Astros, and the Padres embarrassed the Cubs. None of those series were competitive, but there was one that at least reached a Game 3: the divisional battle between the Braves and Phillies.

For one side, it was a mental block that had to be erased. The Braves hadn’t won a playoff series since winning the World Series in 2021, and had lost to the Phillies in consecutive NLDS in 2022 and 2023 to springboard their latest contention window. It’s a win-now core, and even though they had a lot of issues, they weren’t a team that can accept a loss this early.

The other side couldn’t really accept that either: the Phillies had been eliminated earlier and earlier since a heartbreaking loss in the 2022 World Series. Their core was much older, with much less young talent to supplement it. They had stumbled into the playoffs with a disastrous final week that messed up their pitching. They had reached the point where most teams are at the end of their contention window. If you don’t show reason to believe in this core, it’s going to be dismantled.

The Braves won that grudge match in Game 3, sending the Phillies home with another disastrous season and ensuring no October baseball in the City of Brotherly Love for the first time in five years. It’s a sobering defeat for a team whose best players are past their prime, which has an interim manager, and which faces an extremely bleak outlook. Such a bleak outlook is solely because of one man and his ideas of roster construction: Dave Dombrowski.

At the same time that the Phillies and their brass were openly wondering what was next for the franchise, the Yankees were preparing to play Game 1 of the ALDS at Tropicana Field, which they lost last night in St. Petersburg. It came in the team’s 34th consecutive winning season and their ninth playoff appearance in the last 10 years.

Despite having a core of older veterans who do have a gradually closing window, like the Phillies, the Yankees found a lifeline in the development of two little-known prospects into the likely AL Cy Young and a slugging first baseman/DH who will get down-ballot MVP votes in his second full season. The much-maligned architect of this entire core, and several before it, is Brian Cashman.

Cashman and Dombrowski have spent a long time as adversaries. While he was no longer in charge, a roster full of players acquired under Dombrowski beat the dynasty Yankees in the 2003 World Series. His next team, the Tigers, beat the Yankees in the postseason in 2006, 2011, and 2012. His Red Sox took out the Yankees in 2018 en route to a World Series. You’d think the guy who has won all these head-to-head battles would be heads and shoulders above, but then you must wonder why he’s had to bounce around so much.

Here, what we really get is two entirely different executives with entirely different philosophies about how to build a contender. Neither has much experience overseeing failure, so the large part of their careers has been defined by their climb toward the top of the mountain.

With Cashman, as we’ve seen for essentially three decades, it’s an approach that is more focused on long-term sustainability. He’s been blessed with the power of working with one of the league’s deepest pockets in the biggest market in baseball, which usually allows him the bandwidth to fill crippling holes. His approach in the offseason is predicated on getting high-end talent on big deals in free agency to flex their financial muscle, but also making shrewd, under-the-radar trades to fill much of the roster.

While he’s willing to shell out for big contracts both via trade and in free agency and absorb the financial risk that he knows ownership can deal with, he’s more measured when it comes to truly taking that next step. You’ll see him balk at an additional year in a free-agent deal or hold onto a top prospect in trade discussions for a top-level talent. There are times this works, but there are also times he’s left at the altar and burned for it. Yoshinobu Yamamoto’s free agency and trade discussions for Gerrit Cole in the winter of 2017 ring a bell for that.

That restraint is based on his belief in long-term sustainability. The Yankees rarely have a great farm system, but if they can produce an era-defining superstar (hello, Aaron Judge), it makes everything drastically different for roster construction. By that note, he’ll always leave holes on the roster to allow for a cheap, homegrown player to fill them. From here, it can go two ways. You can get a Judge and some great complementary pieces on rookie contracts like Gleyber Torres and Gary Sánchez, but you can also get burned by hoarding a prospect in trade talks (Chance Adams, Clint Frazier, Deivi Garcia).

This mentality is completely different than the one you’ll see Dombrowski employ. His approach to roster building, while similarly predicated on a very generous owner with deep pockets, is more based on taking risks in both free agency and the trade market, pursuing as much proven talent as possible. This approach narrows a contention window, but it’s something he’s able to work off of. It’s a lot easier to do your job when you identify a five-year window to win and disregard anything that comes after it.

Looking at how he’s managed this throughout his tenure, he made some gigantic trades and signings to turn Detroit into a perennial AL contender, acquiring Miguel Cabrera from his old stomping grounds in Miami in 2007 and David Price in 2014, while also inking Prince Fielder to a ridiculous nine-year contract. In Boston, he made blockbuster signings in Price and J.D. Martinez while swinging a franchise-altering deal for White Sox ace Chris Sale. In Philly, he’s been more muted, but gave a massive 11-year deal to Trea Turner to solidify the shortstop position. You’re never bored in an offseason under Dombrowski.

This approach is predicated on doing whatever it takes to climb to the mountaintop, looking to increase the team’s chances of raising the Commissioner’s Trophy at least one time by enough that it offsets the losses that will come down the road. It’s risky in a sport that has so much randomness in the postseason, but if it pays off, it’s genius. Just ask the 2018 Red Sox, who proceeded to bottom out in the ensuing two seasons and only make one playoff appearance over the next six seasons, if they’d trade that title for more wins in those lost seasons.

When it doesn’t work? It leads to a lot of resentment. The Tigers won a pair of pennants in 2006 and 2012, but in an extended, decade-long run with the same core of Cabrera and Verlander at the forefront, the Tigers imploded, missing the playoffs in four consecutive years between those pennants and ultimately wound up spending over a billion and burning up the farm system for no World Series. After Dombrowski was dismissed after a terrible 2015 season, the Tigers wouldn’t make the playoffs again until 2024.

The Phillies hired him to be their President of Baseball Operations in 2020, and he did what he does best. He got Turner; he got Kyle Schwarber; he extended Zack Wheeler and Aaron Nola. In lieu of blockbusters, he elected to slowly chip away at the farm depth by making a mountain of smaller moves every winter and summer. It was, honestly, his least all-in job as an executive since he was in Miami, but it’s still leading to the same place as Detroit. He was hailed as a savior in 2022 when the Phils won the pennant, but is now on the verge of being driven out of town as they stare down an unbelievably bleak future without a title to show for it.

The strengths and weaknesses of Cashman and Dombrowski are directly opposite of each other. They show the two ways you can run a perpetual contender. Cashman’s philosophy allows him to keep his job for decades and decades, while Dombrowski often gets canned after the contention window slams shut. You might think Cashman’s job security is a byproduct of organizational complacency, but there’s a reason he’s universally revered for his work in baseball circles.

The two rarely go head-to-head for big signings or trades, but you can imagine how they would go. Dombrowski might give a guy an extra year or two in a deal that Cashman is apprehensive about doing. It could either end up like Yamamoto, where his prime wins you multiple championships, or like Turner, who’s turning into one of the worst contracts in the sport just four years in. In the trade market, Cashman might balk at the asking price for a big-time player, while Dombrowski would go for it. That could lead to a massive success like Sale, or a massive failure like what the Mets did with PCA.

If Dombrowski ran the Yankees over the last 15 years, do we see a World Series? I’m not sure. I’d imagine he’d be much more interested in that mega-deal the Braves proposed in 2014 that would’ve sent Luis Severino, Sanchez, and Judge to Atlanta for a box full of proven talent. He’d also be much more likely to pull the trigger on a Kyle Tucker trade that included Ben Rice in the winter of 2024 or a Eugenio Suarez/Merrill Kelly deal with the D-Backs that would’ve sent Cam Schlittler to the desert.

All in all, as the Phillies enter an offseason where they must consider firmly shutting their contention window, the Yankees not only still have a chance to win this year, but seem to have enough young talent left over to win down the road when Judge and Gerrit Cole hang up their cleats. It’s the latest chapter evolving in the several decades that Dombrowski and Cashman have spent as two of the league’s most famous executives, a chess match to truly decide which is the better style of building a contender.

For the thirteenth time in franchise history, the Giants have ended a regular season with 90+ losses. It’s the tenth time in the San Francisco era where the team has piled up that much losing in a single year and the fourth time in the Oracle Park era. In fact, since 2000, the San Francisco Giants have had fewer winning seasons (13) than winning ones (14). But there were the Bonds years and those three World Championships, so, it’s not like we haven’t been able to enjoy plenty of positives since the turn of the century.

Still, that’s a surprising amount of losing for what’s supposed to be one of baseball’s crown jewel franchises and for a team that touts its desire to remain competitive (while still being financially responsible). The Giants are a money-making business and they’re quite good at making money. Which might explain why the baseball operation doesn’t come off as successful. But maybe that’s all relative?

For one thing, we don’t have to view their two recent 81-81 seasons as bad things. Maybe they’re not technically “winning” seasons, but the Houston Astros just (briefly) made the postseason with that exact record. If that’s now a bar for success, then maybe the Giants have, in some lowered measure approximating respect, managed to have a good amount of success in their waterfront park (15 non-losing seasons to 12).

And for another thing, since this ownership group took control and saved the team from moving to Tampa Bay, they’ve posted the 8th-most wins in MLB with a record of 2,756-2,583 (.516). 9 playoff appearances in 34 seasons. 3 World Championships. Those Bonds year. That beautiful stadium. Jeff Kent is a Hall of Famer. Dusty Baker and Bruce Bochy are headed there, too. Buster Posey, too. Brian Sabean, probably. It has been a really high volume of success. They’re not in the top 3, but they have a good showing on the winning Top 10:

• Yankees: 3,110-2,224
• Atlanta: 2,990-2,346
• Dodgers: 2,987-2,353
• Red Sox: 2,890-2,450
• Cardinals: 2,855-2,480
• Guardians: 2,832-2,502
• Astros: 2,789-2,550
• Giants: 2,756-2,583
• Phillies: 2,710-2,630
• Mariners: 2,681-2,656

The Yankees have stayed The Yankees. The Dodgers are what they are (criminals). Boston broke their curse and basically remade themselves into a topflight organization (though with plenty of behind the scenes drama).

They are the top 3 organizations in the sport. If a fourth team joined them on a Mt. Rushmore, who would be the best fit?

Atlanta raises the question of, “is it better to be in the playoffs every year or is it better to win the World Series a few more times?” because in the span of time when the Giants have been owned by this particular group, Atlanta has won just 2 world championships in 23 trips to the postseason (including the current one). Still, that’s a lot more money each year with postseason revenue…

The Phillies have been chasing their 1 title in 2008 for nearly two decades now. They and Atlanta are also the two losingest franchises (11,457 and 11,096, respectively).

The Guardians sure do win a lot except for when it counts the most. They’ve won just 2 championships and the last one was in 1948.

The Mariners don’t even have the titles under their belt.

There’s nothing genuine about what the Astros did. Lose 100 games for a few years, get some talent, then cheat when the games matter most? Add to that, Jeff Luhnow has been the architect of MLB’s assault on its labor force. Just don’t see how Houston could join those three teams.

This “since 1993” cutoff cuts off the Tampa Bay Rays, who might warrant general consideration.

The Cardinals probably have the strongest claim insofar as they have 11 championships to their name. They have the history and tradition angle. Their stadium’s even a little bit younger than Oracle Park.

But there was a moment in time, alllllll the way back in the 2010s, when the San Francisco Giants had the chance to be one of baseball’s big 4 teams, setup by those 3 titles in 5 seasons along with the ballpark and all the history. That didn’t wind up being the case, because baseball is very hard and the dominant Giants of the past can’t really exist in today’s world, but rather than stumble around for an idea here, let me bring this piece into focus:

Are the Giants losers? Are we rooting for a losing franchise? Have the San Francisco Giants held on to their brief success in the 2010s so hard and so long that they’ve actually become losers? Did they become Al Bundy? It’s entirely possible that Buster Posey stepping into the role of President of Baseball Operations was that particular fever or malaise breaking, but the results haven’t quite followed and really oughtn’t figure to follow — at least in the next couple of years.

They’re still #8 in wins in this Oracle Park era (2,198-2,071, .515) and with three championships, they’re tied with the Dodgers for the moment. Seems impossibly stupid to describe them as losers or even suggest it. I also consider “loser” more of a state of mind or behavioral, and as disappointing (or abhorrent) as the Giants’ behavior has been recently, I’ve got to admit that the winning is strong enough to balance that out to a degree.

But how should we describe this moment in time?

If we chop off the first 10 seasons of Oracle Park history and just look at their record since their dynasty of the 2010s began, they fall to thirteenth in wins (1,343-1,309), in an exact tie with the Chicago Cubs. They’re the last two teams with winning records (.506) in MLB over this span. That’s… remarkable. And shocking. And… not great for a team that won three titles in five seasons.

The Boston Red Sox, who’ve won the most World Series in the 21st century so far, are just #8 in wins (1,401-1,251; .528), but I think that speaks more to the top heaviness that the league has settled into. And that’s not a comment on the league’s financials. Look at the list:

• Dodgers: 1,570-1,082 (.592)
• Yankees: 1,508-1,143 (.569)
• Rays: 1,440-1,213 (.543)
• Atlanta: 1,430-1,220 (.540)
• Cardinals: 1,421-1,229 (.536)
• Brewers: 1,419-1,234 (.535)
• Guardians: 1,403-1,246 (.530)
• Red Sox: 1,401-1,251 (.528)
• Astros: 1,365-1,286 (.515)
• Phillies: 1,353-1,299 (.510)
• Blue Jays: 1,345-1,307 (.507)
• Cubs: 1,343-1,309 (.506)
• Giants: 1,343-1,309 (.506)
• Rangers: 1,233-1331 (.498)
• Mets: 1,318-1,334 (.497)

The list gets even scarier if you just look at their record since the start of 2017. The Giants drop to 18th (736-782, .485). Only two other teams with sub-.500 records are ahead of them: the Mets (758-760) and Dbacks (750-768). The 12 teams with fewer wins since the end of the dynasty: A’s, Reds, Nats, Rangers, O’s, Angels, Pirates, Marlins, Tigers, White Sox, Royals, Rockies. This is a rough group to be a part of and it’s a little surprising that everyone running the team seems perfectly fine with it.

Forget the division. The franchise isn’t even a third Wild Card contender. Baseball keeps lowering the bar and the Giants keep lowering theirs to come up short. And if you think that sounds extreme, since the third Wild Card was introduced for the 2022 season, the Giants are 386-424 (.477) — 21st in wins.

Both John Shea and former site contributor groug have taken a look at the Giants ownership group over the past several years and the two reporters have sort of hit on the same idea: the group is a hybrid of old family money who invested because they’re fans of the team alongside “a sports team is a sensible investment” new money. Has the decision-making of the majority owners become calcified to the point that the demands of the new money sort of even the team out to simply being an extraction business? Are the Giants just in it for the theater and China Basin? Maybe that has always been the case, using the civic pride for the team itself as a wedge issue to get in there and seize valuable Bay Area real estate, greasing the wheels and appeasing any “interest groups” for as long as they’re needed, then discarding when it becomes inconvenient.

So, is this the Extraction Era?

Well, there’s the private financing for the stadium, the $3.37 billion in payroll since 2000 (according to Cot’s MLB Contracts), the Arizona training complex, the improved international facilities… they have invested in the team to a degree. But there’s also Mission Rock. The new money coming in to help with that, even, despite its supposed self-sufficiency. That $3.37 billion in payroll has only amounted to the team being in the top 5 just three times (2015, 2017, 2018).

Again, it just seems odd that a team that has invested so much should come up so short. It has moved beyond disappointment to a real point of frustration. As though it’s just enough money to create the illusion of competitiveness without actually amounting to that. This has truly only been a symptom of the post-championship era, though, which is why I suggested calcification and a de-prioritization of success.

To wit, the pandemic/COVID season really does skew things a bit, but the Giants have never lost so many games (782) in a 1,518-game span… in their history!

Obviously, this stretch isn’t as bad as the 1970s. The Giants traded away Willie Mays in 1972, and from 1972-1985, the team was dreadful, losing 1,165 out of 2,208 games (.472). This is the only span in Giants history where that’s happened. In fact, if you drop the search criteria to a minimum of 1,100 losses out of 2,200 games, this is still the losingest stretch in franchise history. I still need to see the results of 4 more seasons before I can have any room to complain! And I might not even have that “right” in 2031, given that the team won a franchise-record 107 games… and my personal assurance that the team will be competitive again in 2030.

But, also, the team has the #1 rated farm system at the moment. 2030 might be a little conservative. This enterprise could turn around well before then. And I can’t help but note that I can throw in positives no matter how much history I cite. Maybe this agonizing over the team being one of the worst in the sport for most of the last decade and a decent chunk of the century is entitlement.

Sure, we watch sports to be entertained. But if we’re following them every day in a six-month season, aren’t we also doing so to watch peak performance along with the thrill of victory? I’m not sure what the value proposition is with professional competitive live sports beyond that. I guess I’m mentioning this because a criticism of people who wonder about the team’s track record is that it sounds like entitlement.

It just seems to be getting more difficult with each passing year to play the “wait ‘til next year”/“hope springs eternal” card. Year after year, the Giants have managed to tack on as a sort of drag coefficient something to make the disappointment of the season sting a little worse. This year, it’s pretty obvious. That terrible record and all those injuries were made worse by the bigotry. They let down a significant number of fans with that loser behavior. But maybe that’s not the first time something like it has happened. The Giants were probably worse to their fans in the 70s, since everything about the Giants in the 1970s was worse than today, apparently.

But there were plenty of verifiable firsts, things I’d never think would happen: the first time the Giants have gone five consecutive seasons without a plus-.500 record. Or, to put it another way: the first time they’ve lost 80+ games five years in a row. The first time in over 120 years that they’ve ended a season trailing the Dodgers in their now-dead rivalry by 2 games. The first time they blew a 6-run lead in the ninth inning. The first time they offered to pay their fans to attend games in the final month of the season.

It’s unclear what sort of an organization it is that they’re trying to build or maintain. As a money-making enterprise, it’s very clear. Leverage the Giants brand to expand the investments in real estate. Or simply follow as closely as possible the Peter Ueberroth guide to sports business:

“Let’s say I sat each of you down in front of a red button and a black button,” he said at one early meeting. “Push the red button and you’d win the World Series but lose $10 million. Push the black button and you would make $4 million and finish somewhere in the middle.”

He paused to look around. “The problem is, most of you would push the red one.”

Ueberroth chided them for checking their business sense at the door. “You are so damned dumb.”

But what about the baseball operation? It has certainly tested the idea of “somewhere in the middle.”

In the Magowan-Sabean days, the goal was clear: build a competitor that could win a World Series. That’s hadn’t been done before in San Francisco. There doesn’t seem to be that sort of urgency from the organization today and certainly no obvious expertise on which to hitch your hopes. The recycled “Nothing Like It” slogan is pretty telling on that front, I’d say. A lot of half-hearted stabs in the dark at finding the next “thing” that might redefine the team’s identity but otherwise being fine with the decaying state of things.

Under ideal circumstances, teams are able to reinvent themselves by investing in their player development system. With enough time and some luck, a perpetual motion machine provides talent to the major league roster at a low cost. What has happened, though, is that the real estate business jockey that has been riding the horse that is the baseball club has created a perpetual motion machine of real estate investment.

I have often wondered if there’s a situation where the Mission Rock contingent buys up enough of San Francisco that they eventually sell the Giants and rent the stadium back to its new owners, like what Frank McCourt did when he sold the Dodgers but kept the parking lot.

Anyway, call this era what you want, but it’s composed of a lot of losing. A lot of failed attempts at returning to relevance, too, though. Ownership got what it wanted, but we root for the team because we’re interested in seeing them win, not watching their ownership expand their portfolios. But that seems to be the only upside for the business these days. The front office seems out of their depth and none of the public-facing figures are a good quote, a positive presence, or inspiring of confidence. Winning can usually flip perception 180 degrees within just a single season, but we haven’t seen the San Francisco Giants win in a long time.

As we all process our playoff anxiety for the day, let’s look at some keys and prominent storylines for the Guardians-White Sox ALDS Game Two at 5PM ET today.

Top Storylines:

-Anthony Kay and Sean Burke have dominated the Guardians this season (1.35 ERA for Kay, 1.04 ERA for Burke). Can the Guardians get to them?
-Will Gavin Williams be negatively affected by a lengthy layoff?
-Will the afternoon shadows surpress offense at the beginning of the game?
-Will Game Two be a sellout for the Guardians as fans struggle to get time off work and deal with turbulent economic times (plus, perhaps playoff burnout?)?

Keys for a Guardians’ Victory:

–Hit Burke’s fastball/cutter combination. This season, Burke has thrown the Guardians 98 four-seamers allowing a .278 wOBA, 45 cutters allowing a .077 wOBA, 27 sinkers allowing a .787 wOBA, and 59 sliders allowing a .318 wOBA. The Guardians who have hit him decently: Austin Hedges 1.164 wOBA, Petey Halpin .890 wOBA, Steven Kwan .508 wOBA, Patrick Bailey .445 wOBA, Brayan Rocchio .334 wOBA, and Chase DeLauter .318 wOBA. If the Guardians want to win, they need to be ready to hit Burke’s four-seamer which is gonna be their steady diet today. He doesn’t have a changeup, Guardians. Take solace in that.
–Finally get to Anthony Kay. They, somehow, haven’t done it yet this season. Now, Kay is going to be more effective in shorter stints, like most pitchers, but he does have a 4.44 ERA and a 4.75 FIP. Those are not good numbers. The Guardians’ lefty-mashers – Chase DeLauter, Jose Ramirez, Jo Adell, David Fry and Angel Martinez – are going to need to go into this game ready to put up a good at-bat and do damage on pitches to hit. If they don’t make Kay’s life tough in the first or second inning, I don’t like their chances to win this game.
–Gavin Williams Needs to Make Effective Strikeout Pitches. The White Sox managed to bug Williams by spoiling third strike pitches over and over the last time out. Gavin, trust your stuff, maintain a consistent delivery, and go after these dudes because it’s basically now or never.
–Vogt, Don’t be Afraid to Use Foster Griffin. If Williams runs into some trouble in the fourth or fifth, the White Sox will have a lineup with a good amount of lefties. If Griffin can pitch without running into Miguel Vargas right away, today is a good day to let him use his groundball abilities and lefty-neutralizing skills to your advantage. They’ve seen Herrin and Sabrowski a LOT this year. Let Griffin help.

Overall, the Guardians need to remember that this is YOUR homefield and YOUR division. Come out with a consistent approach at the plate, forcing the pitchers to be in the zone and taking advantage of any pitch to hit you see. I’d predict that if they don’t manage to take at least four walks and hit at least one home run, they will not head to Chicago with a win in hand. But, they’ve got the talent and the experience to redeem a disappointing game one loss. Let’s root them on to make it happen!

We’re already through the Wild Card round and halfway through the Division Series in the playoffs and there are plenty of former Twins making the news in the playoffs. Old friend Ty France almost helped the Padres upset the Brewers in Game 1, but hit a moonshot of another old friend, Trevor Megill, that doinked off the American Family Field retractable roof right into the glove of Jackson Chourio. Meanwhile, old friend Sonny Gray was annoyed that manager Chad Tracy pulled him in the 5th, down 1-0, with two outs and two men on base. Some things never change.

Not much has happened in Twins Territory, other than a final press conference from Tom Pohlad, Jeremy Zoll, and Derek Shelton where Pohlad promised that the Twins would raise payroll in 2027. I’ll believe it when I see it.

The Past Week on Twinkie Town:

• Check out The Feed, where you can add your discussions about the Twins!
• Zach Koenig reminisces about his trips to the ballpark this season.
• Matt Monitto is back with our offseason Twinkie Town movie nights, this time with a spooky theme for October!
• Zach Koenig recaps where MLB and players stand after the 2026 season on salary cap and floor negotiations.

Elsewhere in Twins Territory:

• Dan Hayes at The Athletic reads between the lines of the Pohlad year-end press conference.
• Betsy Helfand at the Pioneer Press looks at how the Twins are prepping for a potentially extended offseason.
• Bobby Nightengale at the Star Tribune evaluates Royce Lewis’ season – and whether he will return to the Twins.
• Nick Nelson at Twins Daily analyzes the Twins’ 2027 roster and payroll as it stands currently.

In the World of Baseball:

• It’s been a busy week in baseball, with the Phillies, Cubs, Red Sox, and Astros eliminated from the wild card round and with each Division Series underway.
• Will Leitch at MLB.com looks at the questions facing each ALDS team going into Game 2 of the series.
• AJ Cassavell and Adam McCalvy at MLB.com look at the storylines around Ty France’s flyball and reactions from both players and coaches.
• Kiley McDaniel at ESPN surveys MLB insiders to see what type of contract Tarik Skubal could earn this offseason.

The reflection of the performance by the Dodgers bullpen in Game 2 of the NLDS is entirely skewed by a dismal offensive showing, making it extremely unlikely the home team could secure a 2-0 series lead. A rabbit hole exists for those who favor a pessimistic outlook, with Chris Sale starting the next game fully rested. Before raising major concerns about the future of this National League Division Series, the Dodgers’ bullpen’s work must be addressed as a positive from this last game; even if it may ultimately be attributed to the loss, it was the most blameless of the three units (starter, relievers, hitters).

Blake Snell’s inability to get a rhythm at any point cost him in length if not in actual runs—the left-hander couldn’t even get out of the fourth, leaving the Dodgers bullpen to cover 19 outs as they trailed 1-0. Snell’s line could’ve been worse, but he had the bullpen to thank for keeping Atlanta at just one, as Brock Stewart was effective in a pivotal spot, retiring Ronald Acuña Jr. with two men on. Given where Snell was, having walked two in his final inning, it’d be no stretch to contemplate Acuña doing damage off him in that spot.

Unlike the Braves, who nearly rode the Didier Fuentes train all the way to a four-inning save, the Dodgers distributed their bullpen innings quite evenly. Roki Sasaki was the one of six relievers to cover more than just a single frame.

Through those 6.1 innings, Dodger relievers allowed a pair of runs, first on an unfortunate wild pitch by Kris Bubic with a runner on third, enough to score a run that would not have come in without it—a few innings later, with a two-out double from Michael Harris II off Edgardo Henríquez to drive in Matt Olson. It wasn’t perfection, far from it, but Stewart, Evan Phillips, Edwin Díaz, and company were effective. If they deliver an outing such as this one whenever they’re called upon earlier than usual and the team doesn’t win, it is entirely down to the offense’s shortcomings.

Acuña stranding a pair in the fourth after Snell left the game was just the first wasted moment for the Braves offense—there were a few more in which Dodger relievers came through to keep this a close game until the end. Even without allowing a hit, Roki Sasaki created quite a mess for himself with walks and hit-by-pitches; his effectiveness and a bit of luck saw him through two scoreless innings, including a bases-loaded double play to end the inning against Acuña. And that’s probably the best way to emphasize how strong of a bullpen performance this was: in three at-bats against the Dodgers’ bullpen, Acuña had a combined total of five players on base, and he didn’t drive in a single run—play these numbers again, and the result is probably different.

The way in which the Dodgers create bullpen depth by maximizing their resources might not be as obvious as with the rotation or lineup, but it doesn’t mean it is any less effective. Lower and lower on the leverage ladder, you’re still getting quality innings from imposing relievers.

The baseball world was captivated by left-handed pitching prospect Jim Abbott ahead of the 1988 major league draft mostly because he didn’t have a right hand. Seven teams passed on him before the Angels picked him.

Why? Largely because Angels scouting director Bob Fontaine Jr. ignored the potential limitations that others fixated on when evaluating Abbott. Rather than dwelling on the absence of a right hand, Fontaine saw something wondrous coming out of Abbott’s left hand — a cut fastball.

“He’s actually more suited to the pro game than the amateurs with the aluminum bats,” Fontaine told The Times after the draft. “He’s going to be breaking off a lot of these wood bats with that cut fastball.”

As usual, Fontaine, who died Saturday at age 73, was prophetic in his assessment. Abbott became the rare pitcher to go straight from college — he’d starred at Michigan — to the major leagues, skipping the minors entirely and enjoying a 10-year MLB career while inspiring numerous fans in disabled communities.

“I think every scout, if they scout for any length of time, is going to have one player that just is special to you. Jimmy Abbott was that,” Fontaine told JapanBall in 2022. “There were people that were even kind of saying, ‘Oh, they did it for a publicity stunt.’ I remember saying, ‘Yeah, we took the eighth player in the country for a publicity stunt? Give us some credit!

Fontaine was showered with plenty of posthumous credit over the weekend. He scouted for six teams, and a highlight of his resume was drafting the nucleus of the Angels roster that won the 2002 World Series.

“What a character ... what a storyteller ... and what a talent evaluator ... there is no 2002 World Series title for the #Angels without Bob Fontaine Jr. ... RIP,” wrote former longtime Times baseball writer Mike Digiovanna on X.

What a character ... what a storyteller ... and what a talent evaluator ... there is no 2002 World Series title for the #Angels without Bob Fontaine Jr. ... RIP https://t.co/1eHIStuWWY

— Mike DiGiovanna (@MikeDiGiovanna) October 5, 2026

“Crushed regarding Bob Fontaine Jr.’s passing, as he was a special man who I was lucky to work closely with three times @WhiteSox @Mariners, and @BlueJays. Fun as hell, elite evaluator, and phenomenal people skills. RIP, Robert,” added former Dodgers general manager Dan Evans.

“A gifted talent evaluator and mentor, Bob helped shape generations of Angels by overseeing the signing and development of numerous Halos, including Jim Abbott, Jim Edmonds, Garret Anderson, Tim Salmon and Darin Erstad,” the Angels said in a statement. “Bob left a lasting mark on baseball by devoting over five decades to the game. Our thoughts are with his family and loved ones.”

The Angels frustrated Fontaine at times by declining to spend big on players from talent-rich Latin America. Rather than sulk, however, he scoured the globe, in 1992 signing three players from Russia and a fast-pitch softball player from New Zealand named Gus Leger.

Asked by The Times’ Bill Shaikin if he had ever played baseball, Leger responded, “I haven’t. Would it help?”

The experiment failed — none of the quartet advanced beyond Class-A — yet Fontaine maintained the sunny outlook he inherited from his father. Bob Fontaine Sr. was a scout who worked under the legendary Branch Rickey with the Brooklyn Dodgers before becoming scouting director of the Pittsburgh Pirates for 18 years and the first scouting director of the expansion franchise San Diego Padres. He also served as general manager of the Padres from 1977-1980.

Read more:Plaschke: Dodgers need to drop the entitlement and learn to fear the Atlanta Braves

“[My father] told me when I got started, ‘Don’t you ever, ever not appreciate where you are and what you’re doing, because you’re lucky. You’re going to a ballpark to make a living, so your bad days aren’t that bad,’” Fontaine Jr. said. “I never forgot that, I never forgot how lucky I am.

“Hey, you’re looking at a guy that barely squeaked through high school, who doesn’t have any ability, and I lasted almost 50 years. It’s because in baseball, if you listen, and you’re not afraid to take a chance once in a while, even somebody with my lack of ability can stay around for a while,” he said.

Fontaine got his foot in the door through his father. His first job as a teenager was as a minor league bat boy with the Pirates. Next he became a peanut vendor at Forbes Field. By age 19, he caught on with the Padres as an area scout.

Both Fontaines were scouts well ahead of the deep empirical and objective analysis of baseball data — sabermetrics is the catch-all term — that some believe has made scouts obsolete. Fontaine maintained the best evaluations come when scouting is utilized along with numbers.

“What the traditional scout gives you is personal reference, like with things I learned on players that I missed on,” he said. “Analytics didn’t do that. I’m a firm believer that the best video camera is your eyes, the best model is your brain, and the best way to make a tough decision is with your heart.”

Fontaine’s methods produced results. Under his guidance in 1977, the Padres drafted future Hall of Fame shortstop Ozzie Smith in the fourth round. Four years later Fontaine plucked another future Hall of Famer, taking outfielder Tony Gwynn in the third round.

And when Fontaine moved to the Montreal Expos in 1985, he took a 6-foot-11 left-handed pitcher out of USC named Randy Johnson in the second round — another Hall of Famer.

Fontaine co-authored a memoir in 2021, “In Search of Millionaires (The Life of a Baseball Gypsy): The Accounts of Bob Fontaine Jr.”

“Baseball has provided me with a fabulous opportunity to see the world and work in an industry that most people envy,” he wrote in the book. “I didn’t get rich, except in experiences. To meet and work against so many fine people, as well as some great general managers and owners, has been a privilege.”

Times sports columnist Bill Shaikin contributed to this story.

Get the best, most interesting and strangest stories of the day from the L.A. sports scene and beyond from our newsletter The Sports Report.

This story originally appeared in Los Angeles Times.

1908
White Sox pitcher Ed Walsh won his 40th game of the season, as he beat Detroit, 6-1. It was a crucial win for the team, staving off pennant elimination and drawing the South Siders to within a half-game of the first-place Tigers. With the Naps splitting their final games of the season in a doubleheader with St. Louis, Cleveland was eliminated from the fierce, three-way battle for first place. Walsh’s win set up a winner-take-all game for the pennant vs. Detroit on the final day of the season.

Walsh himself completed one of the most extraordinary seasons in major league history. His 40 wins led the majors, and is a milestone no one has matched in 114 seasons since (the closest to 40 wins has been Walter Johnson, with 36 in 1913). The 40 wins tied for 30th all-time in major league history and made him just one of two pitchers to attain the mark in the 20th Century.

Walsh led the AL in winning percentage (40-15, .727), FIP (1.42) and K/W (4.80). In addition to wins, Walsh led all of MLB in games (66), starts (49), complete games (42), shutouts (11), innings (464) and strikeouts (269). Oh, and he led the majors in saves as well, with six.

And yet Walsh clocked “just” 10.3 WAR, which doesn’t even represent the best season of his career — he topped 11 WAR in both 1910 and 1912.

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1959
The Go-Go White Sox found their backs against the wall, as the Dodgers won their third straight to take Game 4 of the World Series, 5-4. L.A. struck for four runs in the third, knocking starter Early Wynn out of the box. But in the seventh inning, the White Sox fought back to tie, courtesy of a Ted Kluszewski RBI single and three-run homer from Sherm Lollar. But in the bottom of the eighth, Gil Hodges led off with a solo shot off of Gerry Staley to end all scoring and put the Dodgers up, 3-1, in the Series.

A Series-record (and overall baseball record) 92,650 fans showed up to see the Dodgers win, breaking the record set in Game 3, one day earlier.

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1980
Minnie Miñoso pinch-hit for Chet Lemon to lead off the bottom of the seventh inning during a triumphant season finale for the White Sox, grounding out to third in what would stand as the final at-bat of his career. The White Sox improved to 70-90 on the season with a 5-3 win over the California Angels.

Miñoso went 0-for-2 in two appearances as a pinch-hitter in 1980, marking his fifth decade playing pro baseball, stretching back to the 1940s. “Mr. White Sox” was slated to appear in the 1990s to mark a sixth decade, but in 1990 commissioner Fay Vincent blocked the move, and in 1993 commissioner Bud Selig and AL president Bobby Brown gave the approval, but White Sox players balked.

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1983
Cy Young winner LaMarr Hoyt pitched a complete game, five-hitter in beating the Orioles, 2-1, in Game 1 of the ALCS. It was the first time since divisional playoffs started in 1969 that Baltimore lost the first game of a postseason series. Unfortunately, it would be the high-water mark for the Sox in the series.

Hoyt struck out four, and lost his shutout in the ninth inning on a bloop hit by Cal Ripken Jr.  With Ripken on base, Hoytgot slugger Eddie Murray to hit a ground ball up the middle and got a glove on the ball just enough to slow it down for Scott Fletcher to field it, step on second base, record the force out and end the contest played at Memorial Stadium.

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1993
Game 1 of the ALCS was an unmitigated disaster — both on and off the field for the White Sox — in front of what remains the biggest baseball crowd ever in new Sox Park (46,246).

On the field, Toronto turned Jack McDowell tipping his pitches in to 17 hits and a 7-3 rout in the first White Sox playoff game at their new park, with the Blue Jays pitching around AL MVP Frank Thomas (one single, four walks). But by the middle of the game, not one fan cared. Reports were confirmed that the Bulls were holding a press conference the next morning so that Michael Jordan (who threw out the ceremonial first pitch for Game 1) could announce his retirement from basketball. Fans at the game and around the city were in shock. 

Adding insult to injury, future Hall of Fame catcher Carlton Fisk and Chicago native and former White Sox pitcher Donn Pall (both of whom had played for the White Sox that season) were turned away by security guards when they attempted to wish their former teammates good luck in the locker room before the game started. The White Sox claimed the rules were set by Major League Baseball, but no fan or media member was fooled by that comment. Most media members felt Fisk was turned away on explicit orders from owner Jerry Reinsdorf; it was an insult Fisk never forgot. 

Reinsdorf would then take an unprecedented step of apologizing to the team in the clubhouse before the start of Game 2, saying he had no wish to take away their spotlight because of the Jordan situation.

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2005
The White Sox took a commanding lead in the the best-of-five ALDS, beating Boston, 5-4. The Red Sox had jumped to a 4-0 lead on Mark Buehrle, but Chicago put a crooked 5 up on the board in the bottom of the fifth. Aaron Rowand doubled in a run off of former White Sox villain David Wells, and one out later Joe Crede singled in Rowand to cut the Boston lead in half. Another ex-White Sox, Tony Graffanino, then flubbed a double-play grounder, turning escape from the inning for Wells into a ground ball through the legs that put runners on the corners. Wells still almost escaped, inducing Scott Podsednik into a pop foul out. But with the count even at 1-1, Tadahito Iguchi did this:

Iguchi’s blast provided a margin that held up, with Bobby Jenks pitching the final two innings for his first postseason save and just the seventh of his young career.

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2008
In the postseason for the third time of the 2000s, the White Sox were on the brink of elimination in the 2008 ALDS. But behind a strong starting pitching effort from John Danks they beat Tampa Bay, 5-3, to survive another day. Danks pitched into the seventh inning, with seven strikeouts. A three-run fourth inning set the tone for the Sox in the game. Dewayne Wise continued an outstanding playoffs, with two RBIs for the Sox. 

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2022
It was the end to one of the most disappointing seasons in White Sox history.

Six years earlier, GM Rick Hahn started the rebuild by saying that the franchise was “mired in mediocrity.” After the Twins pounded the Sox, 10-1, to end the 2022 campaign, the team finished … at 81-81 — the very definition of mediocrity.  

It was only the fifth time in team history the club ended a year exactly at .500.

The season was supposed to see the Sox make the postseason for a third straight year and potentially play in the World Series. Instead, the team was listless, seemed to have little sense of urgency, couldn’t stay healthy and was saddled with bizarre in-game decisions by manager Tony La Russa (who resigned before the season even ended because of serious health issues).

The year marked Year 10 under Hahn, whose track record was less than stellar: seven losing years, two winning ones and a .500 year. Under his watch, the Sox had two playoff appearances — but also two quick first round playoff exits. Not coincidentally, this would mark Hahn’s final full season in charge of the team.

 

The general rule of thumb I have always heard when it comes to evaluating MLB general managers is that you should give them five years before you make any firm decisions. Picollo is now entering his fifth offseason, and his team has reached the playoffs once, finished over .500 twice, and finished with 90+ losses twice. If we were to evaluate only on record, this fifth season would seem to be a tipping point for a GM who has had one season where the team greatly outperformed expectations, another where they pretty badly underperformed expectations, and a pair of seasons where they were pretty close to expectations. Can he get one more overperformance? Or will he be searching for a new job this time next year?

While perhaps it makes little sense to spend a lot of time evaluating the four drafts the team has overseen since Picollo took charge – those also take a long time to truly shake out – it does seem worth noting that the Royals at least got Jac Caglianone from the 2024 draft, with David Shields and L.P. Langevin making waves and earning organizational awards. The 2025 draft also has an award winner in Josh Hammond, while Nolan Sailors and Kamden Edge have flashed. Justin Lamkin was looking really good before an injury shortened his AA season, and now he will pitch in the AFL against some of the best prospects in baseball. This year’s first-overall draftee, Zion Rose, has already debuted in A+. He and this year’s big international signing, Angeibel Gomez, will join Lamkin in the AFL.

That leaves the 2023 draft as a real dud. Blake Mitchell had a decent minor league season, but no one else from that draft has shown much to get excited about. I’m willing to forgive Picollo for that, because it might have just taken that long to get his preferred people and systems into place. Regardless, the drafting and international signings appear to have been overall positives for KC since Picollo took the reins.

With that shallow evaluation completed, I wanted to dig a fair bit deeper into his major league free agent signings and trades. You could argue that the players he has allowed to leave, non-tendered, or signed to minor league deals are nearly as important, but I think the thought processes that go into those kinds of decisions can be quite a bit more nebulous. Whereas, with MLB FA signings, it comes down to definitely wanting that guy to be on your team for sure, and trades show a desire to improve one area and a willingness to sacrifice another.

I have listed out all the MLB signings since Picollo took over, as well as all of the trades, plus extensions that added time to a player’s contract. The idea is to go through and evaluate each trade as a win, loss, or wash.

My methodology for trades will be thus: If the Royals have gotten good play from the player(s) they acquired, that’s a win regardless of what they gave up. If the Royals have not gotten good play, but the guy they traded hasn’t been particularly good either, that’s a neutral result. And if the Royals traded away someone they wish they had now and got someone who hasn’t really helped, that’s a loss.

I will be evaluating signings based on whether the player was a reasonable value for the money spent, with a starting point (though not an ending point) of 1 WAR being roughly equivalent to $8 million.

The goal is to get to the end, count the wins, losses, and ties, and hopefully have a better idea of whether Picollo is more often successful for the value given up when acquiring players or more often unsuccessful. This will then, ideally, allow us to state with some level of certainty whether Picollo has been hampered by an inability to acquire good players or if he simply hasn’t had the resources (money and inherited prospects) to put together a better team. This should give us some idea of whether to have much hope for next season.

If the results of this exercise do not appear particularly clear-cut, I may do this exercise again with another GM (or, baseball gods help me, two) who is generally considered to have been good at his job over the last 3+ years. Off the top of my head, I’m thinking Chris Getz’s White Sox could be a good example. Matt Arnold’s Brewers might be even better. I’m open to suggestions here, so feel free to drop your thoughts in the comments below.

We are very specifically not evaluating whether any of these deals made sense when they were done. Nor whether Matt Quatraro used them as best he could. Those are mostly irrelevant to whether Picollo actually got the job done. It’s a bit like the distinction between a barrelled ball that was an out, except in reverse because when evaluating on this scale, the results matter as much or more than the process. If you have a perfect process for four years but no results, you still gotta change something.

Without further ado, let’s begin the evaluation.

2023

Signed Aroldis Chapman

Setting aside the moral issues, Chapman was worth 1.3 fWAR in 29.1 innings even before the Royals traded him, so I don’t even have to cheese my gimmick to make this one an absolute win for the $3.9 million the Royals paid him.

1-0-0

Signed Ryan Yarbrough

The Royals gave Ryan $3 million. He was worth 0.7 fWAR before he was traded. Which means he was worth double his contract, the Royals didn’t even pay it all, and they got trade him later.

2-0-0

Signed Jordan Lyles

Lyles was given $17 million for two years. He was bad the first year and barely pitched the second year. This was a deal that always looked questionable, and it didn’t age well.

2-1-0

Signed Zack Greinke

Greinke got $8.5 million when Picollo signed him back. Unfortunately, he was significantly worse in his final season. He earned 1.1 fWAR, so I guess that means the Royals broke even on the deal, but boy, it didn’t feel like it. Still, someone had to pitch the innings and he didn’t otherwise hurt the team or preclude other pitchers from developing.

3-1-0

Traded Michael A Taylor for Evan Sisk and Steven Cruz

I’ll warn you now, it’s nearly impossible to lose a trade when the team is in a non-competitive year. Even so, while Sisk likewise didn’t contribute to the club, Cruz has proven to be at least a useful middle relief piece. So that’s a win.

4-1-0

Traded Adalberto Mondesi for Josh Taylor

Taylor was replacement level for the Royals and Mondesi never played in the bigs again. This one is a wash.

4-1-1

Traded Junior Marin for James McArthur

Marin never made it out of the Complex Leagues. McArthur has been worth 0.6 fWAR for the Royals and might yet provide more value if he sticks around. Still, I’ll try to play things a bit conservatively, and we’ll call it a wash leaning towards a win.

4-1-2

Traded Aroldis Chapman for Cole Ragans and Roni Cabrera

It doesn’t matter if Ragans never throws another pitch for KC and Cabrera doesn’t get to the big leagues; this was a win for the Royals all day based on what Ragans did in 2024 alone.

5-1-2

Traded Jose Cuas for Nelson Velázquez

Cuas was bad for everyone he pitched for in between Royals stints. Velázquez was very good for half a season and quite bad for half a season. It’s a wash.

5-1-3

Traded Ryan Yarbrough for Derlin Figueroa and Devin Mann

The Royals didn’t miss Yarbrough for the rest of the season. Unfortunately, Mann is out of affiliated ball, and while Derlin Figueroa had a hot start as a 22-year-old in A+ this season, it didn’t end well. So we’ll call it a wash – but it could still be a win someday.

5-1-4

Traded Scott Barlow for Henry Williams and Jesus Rios

Rios is out of the org; Henry Williams has pitched poorly. Barlow pitched better for the Padres, but he couldn’t have helped the Royals anyway.

2023 Total: 5-1-5

2024

Signed Garrett Hampson

The Royals gave Garrett Hampson $2 million and got half a win from him. We wanted more from him, especially as he ended up involved in 113 games throughout the course of the season. By pure WAR per dollar, it would be a win, but the Royals needed him to be an elite runner and adequate defensive replacement. He wasn’t really those things.

0-0-1

Signed Will Smith

Will Smith was worth -0.3 fWAR. That makes this a loss no matter how much they paid him, but they gave him $5 million. Ouch.

0-1-1

Signed Chris Stratton

Same as above, but Stratton got $8 million. And a second year. Double ouch.

0-2-1

Signed Seth Lugo

We’ll get into the extension later, but the initial deal worked out amazingly well for the Royals. There is no one on earth who can claim to have believed he could finish second in Cy Young voting in 2024 after the Royals signed him.

1-2-1

Signed Michael Wacha

Wacha might not have gotten Cy Young votes, but he was still worth every penny the Royals paid him in 2024.

2-2-1

Signed Hunter Renfroe

The Royals gave Renfroe $12 million for two seasons, a pretty reasonable salary if he’d been a positive contributor at all. He was worth a total of -0.8 fWAR, so he wasn’t. It’s worth noting that he didn’t hurt the team in his first season, but that player option really hurt the team.

2-3-1

Signed Adam Frazier

-0.5 fWAR in 2024. Nope.

2-4-1

Traded Taylor Clarke for Ryan Brady and Cam Devanney

Clarke didn’t pitch in the big leagues in 2024, so the Royals didn’t lose anything on this trade. Brady is a minor league free agent; Devanney went to Japan and was awful. It’s good that Clarke didn’t contribute because…woof.

2-4-2

Traded David Sandlin for John Schreiber

If you evaluate this just by 2024, this is a clear-cut win. It gets a bit murkier if you add in the final two years of Schreiber’s time with Kansas City, but Sandlin hasn’t been much and there’s no guarantee he’ll ever be more. Schreiber was a key reliever for one season and an almost-competent one for two others. Sandlin may end up providing more value during his rookie contract than Schreiber did in his time playing for KC, but the criteria wasn’t that the player(s) acquired be worth more than the one(s) given up, but that they were successful in Kansas City. Schreiber was successful enough.

3-4-2

Traded Cayden Wallace for Hunter Harvey

Wallace was tearing up AA for Washington this season and did well enough in AAA that he is looking like a potentially good player. Harvey barely pitched for Kansas City. I’m afraid I have to count this as a loss.

3-5-2

Traded Walter Pennington for Michael Lorenzen

Pennington hasn’t pitched in the bigs since 2024. Michael Lorenzen was a key piece of the 2024 team down the stretch.

4-5-2

Traded Will Klein, Mason Barnett, and Jared Dickey for Lucas Erceg

This one is rough. On the one hand, Erceg was lights out in 2024, successful with flaws in 2025, and a tire fire in 2026. Dickey stopped hitting after he left the Royals organization; Will Klein didn’t stick in Oakland but has found a home as a useful middle reliever in Los Angeles; and Mason Barnett has a 6.97 ERA as a big league pitcher. The Royals probably miss Klein right now, but they needed Erceg in 2024. He looked good enough at the end of this year that I’m willing to believe he’ll be at least as good as Klein next year. I’m going to call it a controversial win for the Royals.

5-5-2

Traded Jarold Rosado for Paul DeJong

Rosado struggled badly after getting promoted to AA this year at age 23. DeJong wasn’t worth much to the Royals, but I can’t say they really miss Rosado. We’ll call it a draw.

2024 total: 5-5-3

Two-year total: 10-6-8

2025

Signed Michael Wacha again

Wacha has been worth 6.3 fWAR since signing back with KC. The WAR value of $51 million is 6.4. I think we can give J.J. the win on this one.

1-0-0

Signed Michael Lorenzenagain

The Royals gave him $7 million, including the buyout, for 1.4 fWAR. Another win.

2-0-0

Signed Carlos Estévez

The Royals gave him $22.2 million, and he provided 0.9 fWAR. He was a win after the first year of the deal, but he accrued -0.3 fWAR this season in a single appearance. I’m afraid we have to call this a loss. That’s the third time J. J. would have done OK if he hadn’t given an extra year.

2-1-0

Traded Brady Singer for Jonathan India and Joey Wiemer

The Royals didn’t miss Singer this year, but they missed him a lot last year. Meanwhile, India was below replacement level. We can argue all day about whether the process of the trade made sense (I think it did). But the results weren’t there.

2-2-0

Traded Cam Devanney for Adam Frazier

We already discussed how Devanney has been doing; Frazier was really good in his second tour with KC.

3-2-0

TradedAndrew Hoffmann for Randal Grichuk

Grichuk didn’t add anything to the Royals. Fortunately for Picollo, Hoffmann has an ERA over 7.00 since being traded to the Diamondbacks.

3-2-1

Traded Evan Sisk and Callan Moss for Bailey Falter

Sisk hasn’t been great, but he’s been pitchable – something that couldn’t be said for either Falter or the Royals’ 2026 bullpen. Callan Moss doesn’t look like he’s going to develop, but it doesn’t matter.

3-3-1

Traded Freddy Fermin for Stephen Kolek and Ryan Bergert

This trade was so good for the Royals that I almost want to give it two wins. Getting either of those pitchers for Fermin would have been a steal. Getting both is one of the most lopsided trades any team has consummated over the past few seasons.

4-3-1

Traded Yunior Marte for Mike Yastrzemski

Yaz was great for KC; Yunior has been nothing useful in the bigs.

5-3-1

Extended Seth Lugo

Rather than trade the veteran, the Royals doubled down with him. Up until that point, Lugo had a 2.95 ERA in 2025 and had, as noted earlier, been runner-up for the Cy Young Award in 2024. Since this extension was inked, he has a 5.69 ERA. You could try to argue that the process made sense, though I’m not sure I’d join you on that. Regardless, it didn’t work out.

Given the way Lugo finished the 2025 campaign, he very possibly could have opted into his player option after all. The Royals could have paid him less this season and been able to walk away after the repeat performance. Instead, they paid the premium, they’re on the hook for 2027, and they need to navigate around his innings totals to prevent his club option from vesting and forcing them to pay him in 2028, too.

For those of you keeping score at home, that’s the fourth time Picollo hung on to a vet too long.

2025 Total: 5-4-1

Three-Year Total: 15-10-9

2026

Extended Maikel Garcia

Maikel was hurt this year, so he didn’t play much or particularly well. But FanGraphs still has him at 1.8 fWAR, and he was paid $4.2 million for this one. I expect him to rebound next year. It’s a win.

1-0-0

Extended Salvador Perez

This one is kind of interesting because the extension basically took his existing team option and spread it over two years in terms of true value because of all the deferrals. (See, teams other than the Dodgers can do that, too!) That means it’s tempting to say the extension is a win because, depending on how you look at it, they either paid him less for this season or got a second season for free. But Salvy was -1.1 fWAR and could easily make that number go further down next year, which means the Royals would have been better off paying him the full amount this year and moving on. Or just declining the player option. I know that would have upset a lot of people who wanted to see Salvy break the franchise home run record, so maybe Picollo was trapped here. But the raw numbers say this was a poor choice.

You could argue this was the fifth time Picollo hung on to someone past the expiration date of their career.

1-1-0

Signed Alex Lange

At a lower cost, he had the same value as Salvy; since that value was negative, it’s still bad.

1-2-0

Signed Lane Thomas

0.8 fWAR for something less than $5.25 million and accomplished what the team needed from him (hitting lefties) at a level commensurate with what could have reasonably been expected. That’s a win.

2-2-0

Signed Starling Marte

Even $1 million is too much to pay for -0.5 fWAR.

2-3-0

Signed Craig Kimbrel

The Royals paid him the prorated amount of the major league minimum for his time in KC, he gave them 0.1 fWAR, and he helped stabilize a bullpen that was in freefall. It’s the tiniest of wins, but a win.

3-3-0

Traded Matthew Hoskins for Kam Misner

Hoskins put up a mediocre ERA in the ACL as a 22-year-old. Misner contributed nothing to the Royals. It’s a wash.

3-3-1

Traded Logan Martin for Mason Black

Martin lost his ability to control his pitches this year; Black was worth -0.5 fWAR. No value gained for either side.

3-3-2

Traded Angel Zerpa for Nick Mears and Isaac Collins

Zerpa was terrible for the Brewers before he got hurt; Mears and Collins combined for 0.1 fWAR.

3-3-3

Traded Jonathan Bowlan for Matt Strahm

This one still hurts because I still think it made all the sense in the world. Also, Strahm was a perfectly adequate pitcher before he got hurt, and I don’t think he ever got healthy. But Picollo was in charge of the training staff that oversaw that disaster, too.

3-4-3

Traded A.J. Causey for Mitch Spence

Spence was bad, but Causey does not appear to be progressing.

3-4-4

Traded Denis Samudio for Connor Seabold

Seabold was bad; Samudio gets strikeouts but lacks control in A-Ball.

3-4-5

Traded cash for Randy Dobnak

Dobnak was better than he had any right to be. Dobnak Time may or may not be completely finished, but this was a stellar trade result, regardless.

4-4-5

Traded Max Martin for Nate Pearson

I’ve said basically the same thing so many times. You give up nothing, you get nothing. Still, Pearson was slightly more than nothing, and I’d rather have him for 2027 than Martin.

5-4-5

Traded Lane Thomas and Bailey Falter for Lucas Braun and Carter Holton

This can only be a wash at worst because Lane Thomas couldn’t do anything positive for the Royals by the time they traded him. Picollo is lucky we aren’t grading the processes here because tacking Falter onto this deal almost certainly lowered the value he got in return. Braun started getting strikeouts when he got to Omaha, but also started giving up line drives and runs. Holton does not appear to have pitched in affiliated ball after being acquired by KC. Sure seems like Moore should have been able to get more for someone who was one of the most coveted types of player available at the deadline.

5-4-6

Traded Kris Bubic for Carlos Duran

Would I rather have Bubic than Duran for 2027? Yes. But the Royals can still have Bubic in 2027 if they want; he’s a free agent.

5-4-7

Traded Manuel Colon for Nolan Hoffman

Hoffman actually showed a little something for the Royals.

6-4-7

Claimed Matthew Lugo

I don’t see it for this Lugo, either.

6-4-8

Claimed Connor Thomas

Thomas showed as much or more than Hoffman at a lower cost

7-4-8

Claimed Spencer Bivens

The Royals might have something in Bivens, but they don’t yet.

7-4-9

Claimed Luke Little

The not-so-little Little spends very little time in the strike zone.

2026 total: 7-4-10

Picollo’s total: 22-14-19

Well, that total isn’t as definitive as I would have liked, but it seems to me that Picollo has actually done pretty well with the deals he’s made, even within the moderately strict analysis I performed. In a total of 55 transactions, he screwed up something less than a third of the time. I am leaning towards believing that this shows his limitations are not his own abilities or the abilities of the front office he has assembled, but rather the resources he has had available to him.

I did see a concerning pattern develop as I went through the exercise, unfortunately, where Picollo has given players an extra year or signed them to extensions to keep them in Kansas City longer than they’re good to keep around. You could argue in the case of Stratton and Renfroe that the team was paying a premium for having been so bad just to get the guys in the door. But that’s not the case with re-signing Lugo or adding an extra year to Salvy. It’s hard to know if the Royals would have been able to get Estévez without the second year; it’s easy to believe they were actually bidding against someone for his services. And I’d be happy to cut him some slack on that if it wasn’t part of the pattern. India’s final arbitration year getting picked up wasn’t evaluated above because, as I said earlier, the reasons for doing that can be a bit nebulous. But it would seem to go into this pattern as well, even if we disregarded how poorly India played before that.

Still, signing Lane Thomas for $5 million is smart baseball. Sure, it would be better for the team to sign a Kyle Schwarber or Cody Bellinger, but Sherman can’t or won’t give him the money to do that. You’d like to see more trades that worked out for the Royals, but they also have only three times in four years given up a player who has contributed positively at the big league level at a time when the Royals could have benefited from it in a trade. And two of those trades still seem to have favored the Royals.

Picollo inherited a farm system bereft of talent and an owner who was unable or unwilling to outlay for a truly impactful free agent after the team added Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha (at mid-low tier SP prices, no less). I’m not going to stand here and tell you he’s the Stephen Hawking of MLB front offices, but it looks to me like he’s doing at least as much as could be expected from a GM in his position. No GM is going to get every move right, and every GM must work within the constraints of his team’s ownership.

That said, I think I’m willing to do this one more time (it’s hugely time-consuming; I don’t think I have it in me to do it more than that without getting paid a lot more than I currently get). So let me know in the comments which GM you’d like me to compare him to, and we’ll see what there is to see.

The Rockies are done. The postseason is rolling, and until the World Series is over, the hot stove remains pretty cold.

It is the kind of baseball lull that lets the mind of a Rockies fan start to wander.

Mine has landed on one incredibly important question: If you could have one Rockies shortstop at his peak for one game, who are you taking?

There are really only two choices:

Troy Tulowitzki or Trevor Story.

And it is harder to answer than it should be.

Maybe part of the reason is how high they set the bar — and how little daylight there was between them. Tulo was traded in July 2015, José Reyes finished out the year at shortstop, and by Opening Day 2016, Story had taken over.

One star shortstop essentially gave way to another.

After watching Tulowitzki and Story for so long, I started to expect elite shortstop play in Colorado. There were stretches in 2024 when Ezequiel Tovar made me wonder whether the Rockies might have another special one.

The past two seasons have been a reminder of just how rare Tulo and Story were.

Since I am simply an objective observer and am in no way emotionally attached, this should be easy.

Tulo felt inevitable

What I remember most about Tulowitzki is the way he moved.

He was long through the arms and legs, sturdy through the middle, but fluid enough to make it work. On a backhand deep in the hole, he could stretch nearly sideways to the ground, gather and uncork that side-sling howitzer across the diamond.

You noticed Tulo playing shortstop.

There were other versions of it — a ball up the middle, the spin, the pirouette, the throw. His body could get into strange positions and somehow everything still finished under control.

At the plate, it was much the same.

He stood tall, his head tucked behind his shoulder and the bat twitching up and down off his shoulder. Then his hips and hands fired, the bat screaming through the zone with both hands staying on the handle as the barrel finished against the No. 2 on his back.

When Tulowitzki came to the plate in a big spot, I expected something to happen.

He felt inevitable.

His 5-for-5 cycle against the Cubs felt like a perfect Tulo game: a great player imposing himself on everything around him.

And in 2010, he somehow got even better.

Tulowitzki hit .315/.381/.568 with 27 home runs and a 138 OPS+, producing 6.7 rWAR despite playing only 122 games.

September of that year was otherworldly.

Tulo hit .322 with 15 home runs and 40 RBI that month, setting Rockies single-month records in both categories.

That is probably the purest statistical version of peak Tulo.

Story was different

Trevor Story has always looked different from Tulowitzki.

More compact, thicker through the shoulders and chest, with strong arms and football-player quads.

A calm ball of force.

His defensive brilliance was less obvious than Tulo’s, and more uneven from year to year. Story was sturdy. The ball did not seem to get by him. The plays got finished. And over time, you realized how good he could be over at short.

Story is quieter in the batter’s box, too.

Upright like Tulo, but more open. His hands sit high near his ears, the bat angled sharply downward behind him. As the pitcher delivers, Story coils while his front foot seems to float until the ball comes out.

Then — BAM.

Explosive. Damaging. Powerful.

The three home runs were initially measured at a combined 1,380 feet, and each seemed more ridiculous than the last. The second one was originally measured at 505 feet, as if Story were trying to eighty-six the baseball from Coors Field altogether. Unfortunately, Statcast recalculated it down to a mere 487 feet.

Of course, the power announced itself almost immediately.

Story introduced himself to the majors by homering twice off Zack Greinke on Opening Day.

Subtle.

By 2019, all of it had come together. Story played 145 games, hit 35 home runs, stole 23 bases, scored 111 runs and produced 6.9 rWAR.

The power was obvious, but the speed was part of what made him different. Story stole 100 bases in six Rockies seasons and, at his peak, could pressure a defense with his legs in a way Tulo rarely did.

That 2019 version of Story is what makes this question considerably harder than it has any right to be.

It is too close to make the call on memory alone. So, let’s check the numbers.

The numbers

Raw career totals favor Tulo partly because he spent four more seasons in Colorado.

Rockies career	Seasons	G	rWAR	AVG/OBP/SLG	HR	SB	OPS+
Troy Tulowitzki	10	1,048	39.6	.299/.371/.513	188	55	123
Trevor Story	6	745	27.0	.272/.340/.523	158	100	112

On a per-season basis, though, the comparison gets a little more interesting.

Per Rockies season	G	R	HR	RBI	SB	rWAR
Troy Tulowitzki	105	66	19	66	5	4.0
Trevor Story	124	77	26	75	17	4.5

Those numbers need some context.

Story’s six seasons include the 60-game 2020 season, so this is not a perfect apples-to-apples measure of availability. But injuries were an undeniable part of Tulowitzki’s time in Colorado. He played 150 games just twice and topped 140 only three times.

Story had his own injury trouble. His rookie season ended after 97 games because of a torn ligament in his left thumb. But over the rest of his Rockies tenure, he was generally the more available player.

Tulo was the better overall hitter by rate. Story brought more speed, more raw power and more consistent availability.

At their peaks, it gets even tighter.

Story’s 2019 season edged Tulo’s abbreviated 2010 in total rWAR, while Tulo produced value at a faster rate and showed in 2009 that he could sustain superstar production across a full schedule.

The hardware followed.

Tulowitzki was a five-time All-Star with Colorado, won two Gold Gloves and two Silver Sluggers, and finished fifth in MVP voting twice. Story made two All-Star teams and won two Silver Sluggers as a Rockie.

Both also got Colorado to October twice.

Tulo in 2007 and 2009. Story in 2017 and 2018.

The rest of the picture

The numbers make the choice close. The way they occupied the position — and the franchise — is where they start to separate.

Tulowitzki felt like the face of the franchise. He seemed cut from the same baseball cloth as Derek Jeter and Nomar Garciaparra.

Outside of his rookie season, when Matt Holliday was clearly Batman, Tulo was never Robin.

Story always was.

That was hardly Story’s fault. Nolan Arenado occupied the center of the Rockies universe during Story’s prime, and Story never quite received the national attention that followed Tulowitzki.

Their exits were different, too.

When Tulowitzki was traded in 2015, I was at work when I saw the update.

I just stood there.

Shock, then anger, sadness, and that miserable feeling that follows a breakup.

Story leaving felt completely different.

By then I was older, the Rockies had become a dumpster fire, and when he reached free agency, part of me was happy for him.

He got out.

I have rooted for him ever since, even as things in Boston have not gone the way I hoped they would for him.

Filling out the lineup card

At this point, I know the answer.

The numbers lean Tulo. If you give me the peak version of either player and tell me I need to win one baseball game, I am taking Troy Tulowitzki.

And I have a Tulo jersey hanging in my closet. It was a wedding present from my best man.

So, really, this should be easy.

Except it doesn’t feel quite right.

My five-year-old son’s name is Trevor.

And I know there is no way I could look Trevor Story in the eyes and tell him he is riding the bench.

Fortunately, this question exists only in my head, which means I am allowed to create a technicality.

Neifi Pérez has seniority.

He was the first shortstop who made me love the position, hit the second cycle in Rockies history and won a Gold Glove in 2000.

He gets the nod.

Tulo and Story can both take a seat on a technicality, I can abandon the whole “pick the best player and win at all costs” thing, and maybe — finally — this question will stop keeping me up at night.

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The Pittsburgh Pirates are sitting at home for the playoffs, but their 82-80 record from the season suggests that they are close to playing in October.

It might only take one or two more moves to get there in 2027, especially if they make a big splash. Bleacher Report contributor Kerry Miller suggests the Pirates should acquire relief pitcher Trevor Megill from the NL Central rival Milwaukee Brewers for Double-A catcher Easton Carmichael and outfielder Lonnie White Jr.

“Pittsburgh finally had a winning season in 2026, but fell a few games shy of the much bigger goal of making it back to the postseason. Maybe Megill is the missing piece that gets them there,” Miller wrote.

Megill has recorded 81 saves over the last three seasons with the Brewers, which is one of the highest marks in the league over that span of time. Megill was an All-Star last season with Milwaukee and maintained an ERA of 2.63 throughout the 2026 campaign, which was close to where he was last year with the Brewers.

Mason Montgomery and Gregory Soto combined for 34 saves in 2026, but neither of them became a truly dominant closer. Out of the two, Montgomery had the better season with a 2.88 ERA, but it might make more sense to have him in the eighth inning setup role behind a player like Megill.

BD community, what do you make of this possible trade with the Brewers? Should the Pirates make a run for Megill? Let us know in the comments section below.

One of the things we have always loved about baseball is how the players can come in all shapes, sizes, and corners of the map. Aaron Guiel was born north of the United States border in Vancouver, BC, Canada. So far north of the border, his high school did not have a formal team. It took a long and grinding road, but Guiel eventually broke through to the big leagues and finished his big league journey in the Bronx.

Aaron Colin Guiel

Born: October 5, 1972 (Vancouver, BC, Canada)

Yankees Tenure: 2006

Growing up playing as many club ball games as he could, Guiel eventually found himself playing organized baseball at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in British Columbia, Canada. In June 1992, the California Angels drafted Guiel in the 21st round of the amateur draft. Guiel did not sign until May 1993, a move that added more waiting to a career that would experience its fair share.

Guiel made his professional debut in 1993, playing second base and the outfield for the Boise Hawks in Low-A, and impressed by putting up strong numbers, batting .298 with a .455 on-base percentage across 35 games. This kicked off a three-year streak of him impressing enough to move up a level each season before he finally hit a stalled period. During the 1997 season, the Angels traded Guiel to the San Diego Padres for Angelo Encarnación.

The following season, in 1998, at 25, Guiel finally reached Triple-A. He stayed parked at that level in 1999 and was released by the Padres following the season. Guiel signed and spent a brief amount of time in spring training with the Athletics in 2000. After being cut, it seemed his career might be over, but Guiel found an opportunity playing for the Guerreros de Oaxaca in the Mexican League. South of the border, Guiel batted .365 with 22 home runs in 56 games, which caught the attention of the Kansas City Royals.

The Royals bought his contract, and Guiel found himself back in Triple-A for the rest of the 2000 and 2001 seasons. Guiel returned to Triple-A at the start of the 2002 season, but that would be the year he finally broke through and reached the big leagues. It took almost a decade from when he was drafted and over 900 minor league games, but on June 22, 2002, Guiel finally became a Major Leaguer. Across 70 games at the major league level in 2002, Guiel slashed .233/.296/.338 with four home runs.

Guiel then bounced up and down over the next several seasons. His best season was in 2003 when he slashed .277/.346/.489 with 15 home runs while platooning in right field and getting run batting from the leadoff spot. Following that performance, Guiel’s career momentum was then derailed in 2004 by blurred vision in his left eye that required multiple surgeries, the first coming in May. Guiel battled back and kept shuffling between different levels in the Royals organization in both 2004 and 2005.

In 2006, Guiel was waived by the Royals, and the Yankees claimed him. These Yankees were desperate for outfield help as Hideki Matsui had broken his wrist and Gary Sheffield was also battling his own wrist injury. The Yankees used the lefty-swinging outfielder in a platoon role.

Guiel ended up appearing in 44 games for the Bombers, splitting time between right field and first base. He hit .256 with four home runs and 11 RBI. Guiel played his final Major League game on October 1, 2006, against the Toronto Blue Jays as he was left off the postseason roster, and with that, his MLB story ended for the time being.

Seeking a larger role and hoping to play more, Guiel moved overseas to play in Japan. He played for five more seasons with the Tokyo Yakult Swallows. Guiel enjoyed a successful few years in Japan, even earning the nickname The Angel from fans, until injuries eventually shut him down in 2011. Following his playing days, Guiel quickly transitioned into coaching and scouting roles back with the Royals.

Happy birthday, Aaron!