For most of my life, baseball was simply a game: a glove, a bat, a ball, and a field. I lived for Game 7 home runs and revered Cooperstown. Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa were larger than life, the Yankees were the Evil Empire and the Rockies were still new.
I never thought of baseball as a business until I became a business owner myself. Employing people and making decisions about wages, risk, and resources taught me how incentives shape behavior — and how systems create unintended consequences.
I see baseball differently now.
While each pitch still exists on its own, it is also connected to salaries, service time, bonus pools, revenue sharing, and the rules governing how 30 organizations compete for talent.
Those rules are being renegotiated.
The current collective bargaining agreement expires Dec. 1, and another work stoppage is widely expected. Major League Baseball has proposed its first salary cap since 1994, when owners sought to keep team payrolls between 84% and 110% of the league average.
The MLBPA went on strike that August, the World Series was canceled, and the dispute lasted 232 days. Owners withdrew the cap proposal in February 1995, and the strike ended shortly after.
The Players Association has promised to reject the current proposal.
The disagreement is easy to frame as another baseball civil war: Owners want control, players want money. The reality is that both sides want both. Owners want greater control over labor costs and how organizations compete. Players want control over their careers and a fairer share of the value they create.
The useful question is not which side contains the better people. It is what kind of baseball each side’s self-interest would produce.
Why a cap won’t fix the cost of being wrong
MLB connects a salary cap to hope, fairness, and competitive balance. But the reality is that money affects both the opportunities available to a club and the cost of being wrong, and a cap-and-floor system cannot fully resolve that tension on its own.
As of this writing, the Los Angeles Dodgers and Milwaukee Brewers own the two best records in baseball despite operating with radically different payrolls.
Records and 2026 total payroll allocations through July 22, 2026, via Spotrac:
| Team | 2026 Record | 2026 Payroll Rank | 2026 Total Payroll Allocations |
| Dodgers | 65-38 | 2nd | $302.1 million |
| Brewers | 64-38 | 19th | $137.5 million |
| Rockies | 41-63 | 21st | $118.2 million |
The Dodgers’ spending helps explain why MLB is pushing so aggressively for a cap. Milwaukee’s success does not make an equally strong case for a floor, however. It shows that payroll is only one part of competitive capacity.
On the surface, a cap and floor could increase parity by narrowing the spending range. But until the enforcement mechanisms are public, we cannot know whether those limits would function as hard boundaries or simply as costs teams could price into their decisions.
Clubs would still take calculated risks on both ends. The Dodgers may decide that exceeding a limit — and accepting the resulting penalty — is worth the competitive advantage. Milwaukee or Colorado may remain near the floor because spending substantially beyond it would expose them to risks they have less financial flexibility to absorb.
That difference would remain when contracts go wrong. Los Angeles can carry a failed deal, absorb salary in a trade, or buy another solution. A similar mistake could restrict a lower-revenue club.
Money does not guarantee good decisions. It creates optionality: the ability to recover when a decision fails.
A cap and floor could reduce the largest payroll disparities, but they would not make every organization equally capable of surviving mistakes. The system would still favor financially powerful clubs and organizations that allocate their resources intelligently.
MLB also argues that its proposal would raise compensation for younger and ordinary players who may never reach lucrative free agency. That deserves serious consideration. But improving minimum salaries, pre-arbitration compensation, and early-career security does not inherently require suppressing elite salaries or broadly restricting contract length and market freedom.
A cap and floor may change the outer boundaries. The more important questions concern how money is distributed, where it is reinvested, and how effectively clubs develop talent.
Competitive balance is not primarily a payroll-number problem. It is a resource-allocation, reinvestment, and talent-development problem.
A credible path is not a promised arrival
A fair system should give every club a credible path to contention. It should not guarantee success.
Every organization should have enough resources to build a legitimate roster, invest in development, retain key players, and participate in the market. But shared money should come with meaningful expectations that it will improve the baseball operation. Revenue sharing without accountability can strengthen a business without making the team more competitive.
The MLBPA has publicly proposed increasing support for lower-revenue clubs while requiring that shared money be used to compete. Its proposal includes benefits for clubs that win, penalties for teams that fail to spend revenue-sharing payments on payroll, and other rewards for clubs active in acquiring players.
The enforcement mechanisms have not been made public, and that matters. A requirement is only as meaningful as the spending it recognizes, the accounting it permits, and the consequences for ignoring it.
For a recipient such as the Rockies, the question is not only how much support arrives, but also what the final agreement requires the organization to do with it.
Losing is allowed. Collecting assistance without making a genuine effort to compete should carry consequences.
The standard should be proof of effort, not proof of success: reinvestment in scouting, development, talent retention, organizational depth, and the major-league roster.
The CBA can require investment and accountability. It cannot require competence.
Lower-revenue clubs will still depend on careful commitments and a steady supply of affordable homegrown players.
But that development system is also up for grabs.
The amateur doorway
MLB has proposed reducing the amateur draft from 20 rounds to 12 and eliminating eligibility for high school seniors and junior-college players. The union wants to retain 20 rounds, preserve those entry points, and expand eligibility to college sophomores.
| Issue | MLB proposal | MLBPA proposal |
| Draft length | Reduce the draft from 20 rounds to 12 rounds | Retain the current 20 round draft |
| High School players | No longer eligible; players must be at least 20 by September 1st AND two years removed from High School | Preserve current high school eligibility |
| Junior-college players | Younger junior-college players would generally become ineligible under the new age requirements | Preserve current junior-college eligibility |
| Four-year college players | Most players would become eligible after their sophomore year | Make all college sophomores eligible, regardless of age |
| Signing bonuses | Establish a $200 million hard-slotted pool with bonuses fixed by draft position | Increase bonus pools with league revenue and preserve bonus negotiations |
| Bonus-pool flexibility | Eliminate team’s ability to shift money among picks | Retain the current system allowing teams to distribute their pool among picks |
| Over-pool penalties | Hard slots would effectively eliminate over-pool spending | Reduce penalties for exceeding a team’s bonus pool |
| Competitive Balance picks | Eliminate Competitive Balance selections | Retain them for lower-revenue and smaller-market clubs |
| Lower-revenue incentives | No comparable bonus-pool incentive publicly included | Allow qualifying lower-revenue clubs to add up to $2 million to one draft pool, plus $1 million after a postseason appearance |
| Major-league contracts | No comparable provision publicly available | Allow certain lower-revenue clubs to give MLB contracts to as many as two players selected before the third round |
| Trading draft picks | Permit broader trading, with limits on consecutive first-round trades and the number of early picks acquired | Expand pick trading more modestly while retaining greater restrictions |
| Draft timing | Not the central distinction in the public domestic proposal | Move the Draft back to June |
MLB’s reasoning is understandable. Older college players are easier to evaluate, require less development, and may reach the majors sooner, while colleges absorb more of the early cost and uncertainty.
That may be more efficient for clubs, but it also changes where access to professional baseball begins.
The draft has long provided several entry points: high school, junior college, and four-year college programs. Removing two would make college baseball a much larger gatekeeper.
Name, image and likeness compensation complicates the issue, but the high school players capable of commanding major NIL opportunities are probably the same players likely to receive significant draft bonuses. They will be found under either system.
The greater concern is the uncertain 18-year-old: the late bloomer, multi-sport athlete, raw pitcher or undersized shortstop. Under MLB’s proposal, that player would have to remain visible and continue developing elsewhere before a professional organization could select him.
That means more private instruction, showcases, travel, and early specialization. Moving development outside professional baseball does not eliminate its cost. It transfers that cost to families with far less ability to absorb it.
A draft system should find talent. It should not require families to purchase visibility.
A deeper draft and minor-league system also have value beyond the number of players who eventually reach the majors. A late-round pitcher with premium velocity gives hitters experience against an advanced skill. A strong defender or capable catcher can improve the development environment for everyone around him, even if his own major-league future never arrives.
A player can fail as a prospect and still contribute to player development.
Reducing the draft would remove many players who never produce major-league value. It could also narrow the talent pool and thin the competitive environment that helps more promising players develop.
Baseball cannot tell lower-revenue clubs to build through player development while narrowing the doorway through which developmental talent enters the organization.
What it means for Colorado
Milwaukee offers a useful model. The Brewers remain competitive without the margin of the league’s wealthiest clubs because they know which traits they trust, develop around a recognizable philosophy, and take calculated risks before the market reaches the same conclusions.
They recently guaranteed more than $80 million to 21-year-old prospects Cooper Pratt and Luis Lara before either appeared in the majors. The contracts carry risk, but they reflect organizational conviction: Milwaukee identified players it believed in, guaranteed meaningful money, and secured years of cost certainty if those evaluations prove correct.
That is the kind of intelligence a fair system should reward.
The lesson for Colorado is not to copy Milwaukee’s roster. It is to build an organization that knows what it believes.
The Rockies have remained financially viable without becoming consistently functional. The franchise can generate revenue, appreciate in value, and remain stable despite decades of dysfunction.
Colorado does not need to manufacture a market. It already has the ballpark, geographic reach, and fan base. The arrival of Penner Sports Group adds something the franchise has rarely possessed: a deep-pocketed partner with experience building a modern sports organization.
That does not guarantee better baseball. The Monfort family still controls the club, and money cannot substitute for scouting, development, or judgment. But the Rockies are no longer operating with the same ownership structure, capital constraints, or organizational isolation that defined most of their history.
Historically, poor baseball performance in Colorado has rarely become financially painful enough to force meaningful change. A new CBA could alter that calculation by attaching conditions to shared revenue and creating incentives for clubs to turn assistance into competitive growth.
Exactly how those conditions and incentives would work remains unsettled.
But shared revenue should function as a bridge:
Receive support>Reinvest it competitively>Grow local revenue>Become less dependent on support.
A competitive Rockies team could increase attendance, sponsorship value, media interest, and regional attachment. But short-term improvement is not organizational health. Colorado must first build the infrastructure to sustain it: scouting, development, organizational depth, disciplined extensions, and flexibility when choices fail.
The timing may work in Colorado’s favor. The major-league roster is young, payroll commitments are relatively limited, and the next competitive window is likely to open under a new economic structure.
A new agreement could give the Rockies better resources, stronger incentives, and a more credible path to contention. It cannot scout for Colorado, solve pitching at elevation, or decide which players are worth building around. Those responsibilities still belong to the organization.
That is the balance baseball should pursue: give every franchise the means and reason to compete, then leave enough room for judgment, development and imagination to separate them.
On the farm
Triple-A: Albuquerque Isotopes vs. Round Rock Express — postponed
Friday’s game between the Albuquerque Isotopes and Round Rock Express was postponed because of inclement weather and unplayable field conditions. The game will be made up Saturday as part of a doubleheader beginning at 4:30 p.m. MDT.
Double-A: Richmond Flying Squirrels 7, Hartford Yard Goats 0
Jean Carlos Sio’s three-run homer in the second inning ultimately provided all the offense Richmond needed. Hartford did not generate much at the plate, but the few openings it created were wasted. Cole Messina led off the third with the Yard Goats’ first hit, Dyan Jorge, Roc Riggio and Aidan Longwell collected three straight singles in the fourth, and Mike Antico opened the fifth with another single. None of it produced a run.
Hartford finished with five singles, went 0-for-6 with runners in scoring position and stranded eight. Konner Eaton allowed three runs, two earned, across three-plus innings. Richmond added three runs against Davison Palermo in the fifth and one against Sam Weatherly in the eighth as the Yard Goats fell to 49-44.
High-A: Tri-City Dust Devils 9, Spokane Indians 5
Everett Catlett gave Spokane six strong innings, allowing two runs on three hits with six strikeouts and four walks. The Indians trailed only 2-1 before the game unraveled in the seventh. Kevin Bruggeman’s first home run of the season started a seven-run Tri-City inning against Justin Loer, and the Dust Devils kept piling on with an RBI triple, three walks, two singles and help from a Spokane error.
Spokane answered in the eighth. Tommy Hopfe doubled and scored on an Ethan Hedges single before Tanner Thach hit his third High-A home run of the season (14th overall), a three-run shot that cut the deficit to 9-5. The first five Indians reached in the inning, but the rally stopped there. Hopfe finished 2-for-5 with his 12th homer and 17th double, while Roynier Hernandez reached four times. Spokane fell to 45-49.
Single-A: Fresno Grizzlies 6, Rancho Cucamonga Quakes 3
Fresno trailed 3-1 entering the bottom of the sixth before the offense flipped the game with five runs. Clayton Gray opened the inning with a single and Carlos Renzullo followed with his second home run of the season to tie it. Wilder Dalis doubled later in the inning before Kyle Fossum, Cam Hassert and Jeremy Ciriaco delivered three consecutive RBI singles to put the Grizzlies ahead 6-3.
Brady Parker allowed three runs on two hits and three walks over 5.1 innings. Dylan Crooks stranded an inherited runner and worked two scoreless innings for the win, lowering his ERA to 2.06, before Seth Clausen retired all five batters he faced with three strikeouts for his 10th save and a 1.38 ERA. Fresno improved to 52-42.
When Will the Rockies Get Former Gold Glove Winner Brenton Doyle Back From Injury? | SI.com
Now healthy enough to resume playing, Brenton Doyle has begun a rehab assignment with Triple-A Albuquerque and is hoping to return to Denver as quickly as possible. With the Rockies’ outfield suddenly crowded, the two-time Gold Glove winner says he is prepared to help in whatever role is available.
Here are the biggest movers on each club’s refreshed Top 30 list | MLB.com
MLB Pipeline examined the prospects making the biggest moves on each organization’s updated Top 30 list. For the Rockies, Cristian Arguelles has surged to No. 6 after carrying his dominance from the Dominican Summer League into the Arizona Complex League, while Jackson Cox has climbed into the top 10 after returning from Tommy John surgery to lead all minor leaguers in strikeouts.
In this article from 247Sports.com, Ben Davis looks back on the emotion of being selected by the Rockies in the fourth round and ahead to the start of his professional career. The hard-throwing right-hander also reflects on his decision to return to Mississippi State for his final college season and thanks the coaches and fans who helped prepare him for pro ball — and who will continue cheering him on as he takes his first steps into it.
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