Category: Sports News

The Cubs’ 2022 season began much like 2021 ended — with the team losing games, some of them by large scores (though they also had a 21-0 win over the Pirates in that span, go figure).

They had taken two of the first three games of a four-game set against the Reds in Cincinnati, and the last one started out well. The Cubs had a 3-0 lead going into the bottom of the second. Frank Schwindel had doubled in two runs and Nico Hoerner homered, all of that off Hunter Greene. Greene, who had promise, wasn’t quite yet the pitcher he became by 2025.

So that’s all good, right?

Well, not so much. Justin Steele, who wasn’t quite yet the pitcher he became in 2023 and 2024, got hammered for seven runs in two innings (plus five batters into the third). Scott Effross relieved and wasn’t any better, and neither were Brandon Hughes, Chris Martin and Rowan Wick.

The Cubs trailed 15-5 going into the bottom of the eighth and so David Ross summoned infielder Andrelton Simmons to throw that inning.

Simmons, let’s be frank, was not a good signing by Jed Hoyer & Co. He had posted a poor year for the Twins in 2021 (.558 OPS in 131 games) and was coming off a shoulder injury. That hampered his fielding and the man simply could not hit anymore. In 34 games for the Cubs Simmons batted .173/.244/.187 (13-for-75).

And he wasn’t any better as a pitcher. First eight batters he faced: single, single, walk, single, sacrifice fly, single, double, sacrifice fly. If you’ve lost count, that’s five runs before Simmons got Alejo López to pop up to end the inning.

One of those hits was an infield job by former Cub Albert Almora Jr. [VIDEO].

The Cubs lost the game 20-5. It is the only game in which the Cubs have allowed 20 runs since July 3, 1999, the game earlier in this BCB series in which Gary Gaetti pitched.

At least Gaetti did make some positive contributions to the Cubs in his time with the team. Not so much with Simmons, who was released in August 2022. His contract was a complete waste of $4 million.

The Yankees are signing veteran outfielder/ first baseman Seth Brown to a minor league deal, reports Aram Leighton of Just Baseball.

Brown, who'll turn 34 in July, had been with the Athletics the past seven years.

He played in just 38 MLB games during the 2025 season, but had seen action in 111 or more games for the A's over four straight seasons from 2021 to 2024. His best season came in 2022 when he hit .230 with 25 homers, 26 doubles, and 73 RBI over 150 games.

Overall, the left-handed hitter owns a career .226/.292/.419 slash line with 74 home runs, 79 doubles, eight triples, and 233 RBI. He's logged 197 games in RF, 172 games in LF, 159 games at first base, 32 games as the DH, and 28 games in CF.

Brown was released by the A's in June 2025 and signed a minor league deal with the Arizona Diamondbacks in July, before opting out on Aug. 10 and finishing the year unsigned. He hit .291 with six home runs and six doubles over 26 games for Triple-A Reno.

He will likely serve as outfield depth for the Yanks, who are still trying to reunite with Cody Bellinger in free agency and already have Aaron Judge, Trent Grisham, and Jasson Dominguez, plus top prospect Spencer Jones looming.

This story has been corrected in reaction to a mathematical error caught by user Tim B.

In 2024, Logan Gilbert became one of MLB’s apex predators. He led baseball in innings pitched with 208.2 and finished second in the AL in strikeouts with 220. He was rewarded with a trip to the All-Star game and a sixth place finish in Cy Young voting. His 2025 looked just about as good on paper with his ERA, xERA, and FIP about the same or better. And he even improved his strikeout rate from 27.4% to 32.3%, going from 17th in the league to third.

Yet he wasn’t as valuable to the team.

Why? He pitched about an inning fewer per game, averaging 6.1 innings per start in 2024—workhorse numbers in the modern game—but collapsing to a more pedestrian 5.1 in 2025. A bit of this was managing the injury that caused him to hit the IL for the first time in his career in May. But the pattern actually held both before and after the IL stint (and, to frontload this, so does just about everything else in this article). And he only averaged six fewer pitches per start, which only explains about a third of an inning. Rather, the culprit is that Gilbert needed more pitches per plate appearance in 2025: His P/PA spiked from 3.78 to 4.03.

I know a jump of 0.25 P/PA doesn’t seem like much, but it adds up to the other two-thirds of an inning, or about 22 innings over the course of a season. That’s especially damaging because those are the innings that have to be covered by the soft underbelly of middle relief.

So why was he about as good on a rate basis, but less efficient? I thought I knew the answer, but what I found surprised me.

Suspect #1: The strikeout surge

The most obvious explanation is that 4.9% jump in his strikeout rate. Relatively speaking, that’s 17.9% more strikeouts, which is a lot. Strikeouts naturally take more pitches than PAs that end with balls in play since you need at least three pitches for a strikeout. For Gilbert, in 2024, his average strikeout took 4.92 pitches, and his PAs that ended in balls in play (we’ll call these BIPPAs, because it sounds better than PABIP and doesn’t risk confusion with BABIP) was 3.17. That’s a difference of 1.6 additional pitches for a strikeout.

But here’s the twist: while Gilbert was less efficient overall, he actually got more efficient in his strikeouts, from 4.918 P/K to 4.827 P/K. That’s a confounding factor in using his strikeout surge as the explanation.

The math says the additional strikeouts added 0.087 P/PA, while the better efficiency saved him 0.030 P/PA. Netted out, that’s an increase of +0.057 P/PA caused by the strikeout surge.

So, the new strikeouts explained 23% of Gilbert’s dip in efficiency. That’s sizable, but I’m not prepared to give a guilty verdict here because I’m willing to live with a little less efficiency if it means more strikeouts. I love a Maddux as much as the next guy, but strikeouts are good. The real question is: where are the other three-quarters of the pitches hiding?

Suspect #2: The walk problem

The second obvious culprit is that his walk rate increased from 4.6% to 5.8%. Walks are the worst result for pitch efficiency since they’re a bad result and come at a high pitch cost; a walk costs almost three more P/PA than a BIPPA. The increase in walk rate would be bad on its own, but Gilbert compounded that by using more pitches per walk this year. In 2024, his average walk was 6.0 pitches, which rose to 6.323 pitches in 2025.

The math here says the additional walks accounted for an extra 0.037 P/PA and the fact that his walks were less efficient added another 0.019 P/PA, for a net effect of 0.056 P/PA. That explains 22% more of the overall change. That’s a meaningful contribution, but more of an accomplice than a principal.

Taken together with the strikeouts, we’ve accounted for 45% of the increase in P/PA. But after dealing with the two most obvious suspects, we’ve still got more than half the problem unsolved.

The Red Herrings: What the problem wasn’t

False lead #1: Two-strike struggles. The culprit had to be that Gilbert was struggling to finish guys off. It had to be. The mental image is Gilbert expanding the zone too much with two strikes, getting beat by balls and fouls. Look at his slider location with and without two strikes in 2024 and 2025:

Doesn’t that look like a guy who’s trying to get too cute and chase the chase? As soon as Gilbert’s efficiency started to be a problem last year, I locked in on this. But that led to confirmation bias, as every ball or foul in a two-strike count stood out in my head. I was so sure this was the answer that I signed up for Gilbert’s 40 in 40 with a title in mind (“40 in 40: Logan. Keith. Gilbert. Stop playing with your food, young man”) and assumed I’d bang it out in 45 minutes.

So imagine my surprise when I dug in and learned that Gilbert was actually a bit teensy bit more efficient with two strikes this year, contingent on getting a strikeout. He was only less efficient if the at-bat ended with a walk or a ball in play. That’s not really an issue of playing with his food or it would show up in the strikeout numbers as well. Keep in mind that, after all, his strikeout rate even improved this year.

False lead #2: Worse command. More balls and falling behind more often would explain things. The increase in walk rate even points in this direction. But no. His first-pitch strike rate went up (67.7% to 69.9%); his called strike rate remained flat (15.2%); he was in the zone slightly more(50.9% to 51.3%); and when he went out of the zone, he got more swings on those pitches (chases) (31.6% to 32.3%) and less contact on those swings (44.2% to 40.4%). That’s not a guy with a command problem.

To be sure, he did throw more balls in non-walk PAs (we exclude walks since they always have exactly four balls). But most of them came in his PAs that ended in strikeouts, and we want to strip those out of our analysis here to avoid double-counting since we already looked at P/K. The net effect of the additional balls in BIPPAs is just 0.005 P/PA. That’s not zero, but it’s just 2% of the total spike—more of a guy in the wrong place at the wrong time than a criminal.

The drawing room scene

Having accounted for strikeouts, walks, and balls/BIPPA, there’s really only one place left to look: strikes/BIPPA. (His HBP rate is too small to matter.) To quantify it, Gilbert threw 1.151 strikes/BIPPA in 2024, which spiked to 1.363 in 2025. That’s an 18% jump. Helpfully, this also explains why his walks took more pitches—since walks always take four balls, the additional pitches must be strikes. As we saw when looking at whether he was struggling with the put-away pitch above, Gilbert did see drawn out at-bats when he wasn’t able to get the strikeout.

But what kind of strikes are they? If it’s all called strikes and whiffs, then that’s a problem you’d live with. Those are pure good outcomes. But Gilbert’s called strikes and whiffs per BIPPA only increased by 0.010. Nearly all the additional strikes were coming from foul balls, going from 0.448 fouls/BIPPA in 2024 to 0.650 in 2025.

So at last, we have our culprit: Hitters fouling off 45% more pitches in plate appearances that ended with contact. This single factor explains nearly half of Gilbert’s entire inefficiency spike.

What’s odd is that while there was a 45% increase in BIPPA foul balls overall, only about half of them came before Gilbert got to two strikes. Those aren’t as good as a whiff or a called strike—and they do work to make the at-bat longer since unlike a walk or a strikeout, a BIPPA can happen in an 0-0 count—but it’d still be basically fine. They’re additional strikes that put Gilbert ahead, and the better a count is for a pitcher, the better all his outcomes are, increasing strikeouts, reducing walks, and even softening the contact hitters make when they connect. These pre-two-strike fouls helped explain why more PAs reached two strikes (60% versus 53.4%)—which is a good thing.

But the other half came from two-strike foul balls that extended the at-bat, pure pitch-count killers with no benefit. What makes it odd is that Gilbert’s two-strike efficiency on strikeouts actually improved—he was finishing strikeouts faster than ever. But in the plate appearances that reached two strikes and didn’t end in strikeouts, hitters were fouling off pitch after pitch until they saw something they could put in play. It’s not that he was playing with his food—it’s that he was either on or he wasn’t.

The murder weapon: hitter adjustments?

So we know what happened: hitters fouled off way more pitches in 2025, especially in plate appearances that ended with contact. But why?

I don’t think this was a matter of consistency. While there was more game-to-game variation in his strikeout totals (standard deviation went up by 18%), his overall game scores were actually more consistent (standard deviation went down by 25%).

There’s some evidence that hitters may have adjusted their approach. Gilbert’s overall foul rate jumped from 16.6% to 19.2% of all pitches while league-wide foul rates held steady. Whether this represents a strategic adjustment by opposing hitters—perhaps sitting on certain pitches or protecting the plate more aggressively—or simply Gilbert’s stuff playing differently on different nights is hard to say definitively. His foul rate went up on his fastball, splitter, and curveball. It only went down on his slider, and even then by just a touch; and that’s a natural consequence of his using it in two-strike counts much less since guys will protect more with two strikes.

What’s clear is that in 2025, when Gilbert didn’t have his best command or when hitters were able to spoil his pitches, plate appearances dragged on much longer than they had in 2024.

The aftermath for 2026: How to adjust to the adjustment

The frustrating part is that there’s no obvious fix. Gilbert’s strikeout gains are real and valuable—jumping from 17th to third in the league is elite. His command metrics actually improved. He was more efficient in getting strikeouts. By most measures, he got better in 2025.

And yet: fewer innings, more stress on the bullpen, less overall value to the team.

Can Gilbert find a way to maintain his strikeout gains while reducing the foul-ball problem in 2026? Perhaps. But without a clear explanation for why hitters fouled off so many more pitches, there’s no clear path forward. I’d like to look further at the impact of his splitter becoming his go-to two-strike pitch, and what happened to his slider, which had similar velocity and movement but much worse results.

The price of greatness

But while we figured out how it happened, we still don’t know why. So, until we find answers, we’re left wondering if this is who Gilbert is now: a high-strikeout, low-efficiency pitcher. Maybe that’s okay. Even at 4.03 P/PA, we’re talking about 5-6 innings per start. That’s viable for a modern starter, especially if the Mariners can get more length from George Kirby and Bryce Miller or figure out the middle of their bullpen. But it’s not the workhorse ace of 2024—and it’s hard not to be disappointed by the 2025 version in comparison.

The Pittsburgh Pirates are less than a month away from reporting to Bradenton to get ready for the upcoming 2026 season.

The team looks a little different than it did a year ago, but some changes are still to be made. ESPN contributor Jesse Rogers wrote about what the Pirates have done this off-season and what still needs to be accomplished.

“Pittsburgh set out to improve its offense, and the Pirates have done that via trades and the free agent signing of O’Hearn. It doesn’t mean they’ll be a juggernaut at the plate, but they’ll be better than last season. That’s a start. Lowe and O’Hearn also bring experience playing for playoff-caliber teams, a much-needed benefit for the Pirates,” Rogers wrote.

The Pirates had one of the league’s worst offenses this past season, so their moves so far haven’t been a surprise. However, there is still room for improvement on that front.

“The Pirates aren’t done looking for offense, which could come in the form of an outfield bat or an addition to the left side of the infield. Or both. And after trading from their pitching depth, moving Johan Oviedo and Mike Burrows in separate deals, they would like to refill that part of their roster, too,” Rogers wrote.

“It’s already been a more active offseason for the Pirates than they’ve had in recent memory as they try to build around ace Paul Skenes. Smaller moves might be in order between now and spring training, but Pittsburgh shouldn’t be done adding.”

The Pirates could make another free agency splash by signing someone like Cody Bellinger, or they could ride out their group to see what they have. The offense should be better in 2026, but it remains to be seen how much improvement will be made and if it will be enough to knock on the door in the wild card race in the National League.

BD community, what are your thoughts on this offseason’s moves? Chime off in the comments section below.