The 19-year-old Venezuelan switch-hitting third baseman and shortstop was signed as an older 16-year-old in May 2023 (most of the highly touted prospects sign in January) to a small enough bonus that it wasn’t reported, indicating that Dalis wasn’t highly sought after as a prospect. No matter — Dalis went straight to the Dominican Summer League and though he struggled in 2023 there (69 wRC+), he was much improved when he repeated the DSL in 2024 (144 wRC+, 21 SB, more walks than strikeouts).
Mid-season 2025 Rank: NR
High Ballot: 14
Mode Ballot: 14, 27
Future Value: 35+, infield depth
Contract Status: 2023 International Free Agent, Venezuela, Rule 5 Eligible After 2027, three options remaining
MLB ETA: 2029
Dalis impressed again in fall instructs, then was a key player for a very good Rockies ACL team in 2025, where he was 1.6 years younger than league average. In 219 plate appearances, Dalis hit .352/.440/.525 with three homers, five triples, and 12 doubles along with 10 steals while walking in 13% of PA — good for a 149 wRC+ and a top 10 ranking in many offensive categories. He was even named the organizational player of the month for July.
After the ACL season ended, Dalis got a nice birthday present with a late July promotion to full-season ball with Low-A Fresno, where he was 3.2 years younger than league average. He got off to a hot start in Fresno with two multi-hit games off the bat, but he cooled off down the stretch. In 31 games at the level, Dalis hit .241/.333/.379 (100 wRC+) in 137 plate appearances, including three homers and seven doubles. On the year, Dalis was more effective hitting lefty (.890 OPS) than in a 46 plate appearance sample hitting right-handed (.733 OPS).
In the field, Dalis played mostly third base for the complex team but saw nearly half of his action in Fresno at shortstop with some second base sprinkled in. He committed 10 errors in 58 games at third, four in 22 games at shortstop, and another two in six games at second base.
Here’s some video of Dalis in Fresno this past season, including some slo-mo looks at his swing:
Dalis is a medium-framed 18-year-old Venezuelan infielder who had a good second year in the DSL, where he was among the team’s leaders in hard-hit rate.
Dalis has clearly become a prospect to watch with his strong stateside debut, though the national scouts haven’t quite caught up yet. He’ll likely begin 2026 back with Fresno, where he’ll still be one of the younger players in the league. Dalis is at least a 35+ FV player for me pending updated scouting reports and continued good performance in full season ball, ranking just off my top 30 list.
If you’ve been paying any attention over the last few years, you’ll have noticed thata smaller and smaller percentage of movies to make it to the theaters. These days, many if not most are being released directly to streaming. This used to be the sort of thing movie production companies only did when they had absolutely no faith that a movie would be well-received, now it’s the norm.
Thing is, movie companies own the streaming services, much like they used to own the theaters before the US Government forced them to divest in an anti-trust case. And the movie companies prefer the steady income of a subscription model to the boom-or-bust of the theater, so they release their movies directly to streaming – much to the frustration of the artists creating the films – because that’s all they really care about. It removes a lot of the risk from the equation for them – as long as they continue to create content and host old content that people still enjoy, they’ll get their $5-$20 bucks a month. A movie might be a critical bomb, but in this set up it can’t really be a commercial bomb – assuming they budget correctly for how many subscribers they have. On the other hand, without that risk, there’s no reward for a movie that does incredibly well, either. K-Pop Demon Hunters was a surprise smash hit for Netflix, but because it’s on their streaming service instead of in movie theaters, it couldn’t add hundreds of thousands in ticket sales; it simply maintained their subscriber numbers or maybe bumped them a little.*
*This has nothing to do with the point I’m trying to make, but spelling things out like this really gives you insight into why Netflix views “content” the way it does. Why would you give the creatives a little more time or money when it won’t benefit you in potential additional profits?
“What does this all have to do with baseball?“ I can hear you shouting, and, well, that’s easy. Baseball, with its focus on being a business, has adopted a very similar low-risk, low-reward plan. With a handful of exceptions.
The big-spending baseball teams buck the trend
People complain about the Dodgers and the Mets spending. But they don’t complain about the Yankees – except out of remembrance for what they did in the late ‘90s and early 2000s. I haven’t heard anyone complain about the Blue Jays, White Sox, Cubs, or even Red Sox despite those teams also residing in super-sized markets. Why is that? Well, because the Dodgers and Mets are doing what precious few other teams have been willing to do in recent years. They’re taking “risks.”
The Mets have an owner who has thrown the team’s maximization of profits out the window in an effort to chase wins because he’s a fan of the team first, and a business owner in his other endeavors – as I have often advocated MLB owners should be. The Dodgers are buoyed by not only a TV contract significantly better than most of the rest of the league, but one that they are not responsible for sharing with anyone else due to loopholes added to the team when MLB needed to find a buyer.
But the reasons these two teams are willing to outspend everyone are less important than the reality that they are willing to do it. The Yankees and Blue Jays didn’t get Kyle Tucker because they were simply unwilling to take the risks that the Dodgers were. And this is the thing that sets these two teams apart.
Some teams could have been doing much better
But it’s not just the Yankees who have been playing things safe. This brings us to the Milwaukee Brewers, a team held up as the modern ideal of a middle-market club in MLB. Last week, the Brewers traded away their ace, Freddy Peralta, for prospects – high-level prospects, to be sure, but prospects. They explicitly made their team worse in 2026, a year after reaching the National League Championship Series. Why did they do this? Was it because they couldn’t afford Peralta’s $8M salary? No. It was because they decided that they weren’t going to try to offer him an extension to keep him around for the rest of their young core after this season and they could improve the franchise’s total talent over the next few years by trading him. They traded known talent now for future potential talent. This is the kind of move that used to be reserved only for teams approaching the trade deadline who realized they had very slim odds of reaching the playoffs, but which are now common among the “smart” mid-to-small market teams such as the Brewers, Guardians, Rays, and even Mariners.
The Brewers, as I said earlier are held up as the best franchise going that doesn’t spend a ton of money. Royals owner John Sherman even pointed to them as the franchise he hoped to mold the Royals into. And, on the surface, that sounds like a good thing. They’ve made the playoffs seven of the last eight seasons. They’ve won their division five times in that span, including in each of the last three years. What Royals fan wouldn’t salivate over that kind of success?
But they’ve also only made it to the Championship Series twice, getting swept out of it last season, and they’ve gotten knocked out in the Wild Card round four times in those seven playoff appearances. They haven’t made the World Series even once. And after taking the Dodgers to a CS Game 7 in 2018, they haven’t gotten close.
The Cleveland Guardians have made the playoffs in seven of the last ten seasons. They have made it to the Championship Series twice, the World Series once – in 2016. They haven’t won it all. The Rays have made the postseason five of the last seven seasons, but neither of the last two. They’ve made the Championship Series and World series once each, in the same season. The Mariners have won more games than they’ve lost in each of the last five seasons, but made the playoffs only twice and the Championship Series in 2025 was the limit of their reach. It was also, notably, the first time in years that they approached the deadline by adding some of the best available talent in Josh Naylor and Eugenio Suárez at the deadline instead of trading away some of their players for more prospects.
How different might things be if these teams took a few more risks? Sure, there’s a chance they’d make a dud move like signing Albert Pujols, Anthony Rendon, or Jason Heyward. But if one of these teams had been the ones to add a Teoscar Hernández or Brandon Nimmo or Cody Bellinger, how much more success might they have had? But risk-aversion means they play it safe, consistently win games, but never end having a real shot at glory. They do just enough to keep their fans invested, but never enough to get over that hump because they’re more terrified that they’ll miss than motivated to try to win.
The Royals are different – but only a little
The Royals have set themselves apart from these other small market clubs with their willingness to spend in recent years. Two offseasons ago they went out and gave real dollars – though not a ton of them – to pitchers Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha to stabilize their rotation. Then, over the past two seasons, they’ve given those guys extensions to keep them around while their farm system catches up. At the trade deadlines, while other teams with similar records like the Guardians and Diamondbacks were selling, the Royals were buying. This off-season, it’s easy to be frustrated with how little the Royals have done, but look around the league at what other teams are doing.
The Guardians have added no one, though at least they’ve also not lost anyone of note. The Rays have traded away Kam Misner, Shane Baz, Brandone Lowe, Jake Mangum, and Josh Lowe. They refused to tender Pete Fairbanks despite him being one of the better relievers in baseball last season. They’ve added only Gavin Lux, Cedric Mullins, and Steven Matz – once-good players nearing the ends of their respective careers. The Mariners kept Josh Naylor and added Rob Refsnyder, but let Jorge Polanco and Eugenio Suárez go.
The Brewers, the so-called model franchise, let Rhys Hoskins go before dealing away Nick Mears, Isaac Collins, Tobias Myers, and Freddy Peralta. They’ve added no one projected to be worth even a single fWAR to their major league team.
This isn’t a defense of the Royals. They’d be easy favorites for the division if they’d been willing to take the risk of signing Cody Bellinger or Bo Bichette. But they’re still trying harder than their peers, and that means something. At least for now. As I said earlier, John Sherman wants to ultimately become a Brewers clone. If he ever gets there, we might be in for the same frustration that I am sure Brewers fans feel right now of watching their team sit right on the edge of greatness but unwilling to ever take a step forward toward the ultimate prize for fear of tripping over their own feet.
Jonathan India is the prime example of the Royals sitting in the middle-ground
If Jonathan India hadn’t played for the Royals last year, and KC had given him the deal they did, many Royals fans would be celebrating the choice to bring a bounce-back candidate in to give Michael Massey some competition for his roster spot. Especially because at one year and $8 million, it’s an extremely reasonable contract to give a guy who is still only entering his age-29 season, who still showed elite chase rates in 2025, and was a productive major leaguer for the previous four seasons. It would be a risk, sure, but a reasonably smart one.
Instead, because he did play for the Royals last year it reads as an extremely safe play, a choice to preserve the floor he represents to the team rather than go out and take a real risk by signing someone like Jorge Polanco or Bo Bichette. And that, I think, is the lens through which to view their move in keeping India.
The problem with keeping India isn’t that his contract is a little risky, it’s that the upside of such a risk is so low as to feel pointless. Let’s be clear, the Royals could have cut him and “played it safer”; certainly other teams made those choices such as when the Rays moved on from Christopher Morel or the Brewers dealt Isaac Collins. But it’s one of the “safest” risks the Royals could have made. And that’s why it disappoints so many of us. Go big or go home, as the saying goes.
The Royals are trying to straddle a line that pretty much no other team is even willing to approach. We’ll have to see both if it pays off in 2026 and if they’re willing to continue being even this aggressive into the future.
After six months of intermittent rumors, the Mets finally completed a trade for Luis Robert. The 28-year-old center fielder heads to Queens in exchange for Luisangel Acuña and Truman Pauley, the Mets’ 12th-round pick in last year’s draft. Robert is under contract for $20M in 2026 with an additional club option for $20M in 2027.
If you’re a Robert skeptic, I hear you. He batted only .223/.297/.364 for the White Sox last year, posting a pitiful 84 wRC+ equivalent to his 2024 mark. A history of hamstring, hip flexor, and other injuries (groin, calf, and wrist among them) has prevented Robert from ever topping 145 games in a season; he’s only topped 100 games twice in his six-year career. We’re now three years removed from Robert’s last above average offensive season, his career-best 2023 in which he hit 38 HR, posted a 129 wRC+, and accrued 4.9 fWAR.
Let’s lay out the positives, though. Even as his offense has fallen off the last two seasons, Robert has remained a high-quality defender in center field (1 OAA in 2024, 7 OAA in 2025). The physical skills—chiefly his bat speed and sprint speed—are both pretty clearly intact given the better-than 90th percentile marks he posted last season. Even his strikeout rate, which increased in 2023 and peaked over 30% in 2024, improved markedly in 2025, driven by both a higher contact rate and better swing decisions. In fact, Robert ran a 95th percentile SEAGER last season, the highest mark of his career.
That paints the picture of a player with a pretty solid floor, a high-quality center fielder with speed and power. There’s real upside here beyond that, though, as Robert was one of the unluckiest hitters in baseball last season by xwOBA. It’s not because his spray angles suck either, as he manages above average pulled fly ball rates. If you’re a fan of arbitrary endpoint analysis, we might’ve already gotten a glimpse at a more accurate representation of Robert’s output from June to August last season; .262/.326/.431, with a 109 wRC+.
We’ve not addressed the injuries of course, and indeed the date window above ends in August because Robert pulled his hamstring and missed the rest of the season. The Mets are particularly well positioned to accommodate this sort of injury prone upside play because of Carson Benge.
Benge is the #2 prospect in the system and is going to be a consensus top-20 or higher name by the end of the offseason (BA had him 19th, BP will have him higher). The Mets are pretty clearly giving Benge runway to win a job out of spring training and run with it, something they’re incentivized to do under the PPI system. With Robert around, Benge now projects as the starting left fielder, but he’s completely capable of sliding over to center if/when Robert misses time. If things really go south for whatever reason, Benge can stay in center with Brett Baty in left. Or maybe A.J. Ewing is ready. Or maybe the Mets make a trade for a corner bat (something that is usually pretty cheap at the deadline). The point is that the Mets have the optimal roster construction to roll the dice on a high-upside, injury prone center field option like Robert
In a vacuum, the return here is not strictly nothing. Luisangel Acuña has enough defensive utility to be an interesting bench bat and could maybe get the offense to passable given enough runway to figure it out. Truman Pauley is a fun prospect, a Harvard sophomore who never posted impressive stats but popped on stuff models. Both of those profiles have some level of value.
For the Mets, though, the cost is fairly inconsequential. Acuña’s bat is a weakness (no, you shouldn’t care about his Winter League home run barrage) and his ability to play shortstop doesn’t matter with the Mets’ current roster. Critically, he’s also out of options, meaning the Mets would have had to either carry a sub-optimal player on the bench and give him no development runway or lose him through waivers. Trading him is a far better outcome, both for the Mets and Acuña, who should get an extended run to see if things click in Chicago.
As for Pauley, you’d love to keep all of these guys, but the Mets drafted literally four other arms that fit this broad description with higher picks in the same draft, and have shown a penchant for improving most any arm they bring into the system. Moving this kind of player is an option afforded to you by having the best pitching development apparatus in baseball.
So in total, the Mets got a high-upside center field option with a clear floor independent of his top-line offensive output. They have the right roster construction to appropriately hedge the associated injury risk. If things work out, they can keep Robert for another season at only $20M; if not, they can decline the option and move on. And to add this player, they paid a cost that is inconsequential to the organization. Every part of this is a slam dunk win, making this move a clear A+.
One of the things the Cubs lacked in their 92-win team in 2025 was a good, traditional backup outfielder.
They had Vidal Bruján backing up Pete Crow-Armstrong in center field, and that, as you know, was hardly optimal. Willi Castro and Jon Berti also played outfield for the Cubs last year. Apart from Ian Happ, PCA, Kyle Tucker and Seiya Suzuki, the only true outfielder who played for the 2025 Cubs was Owen Caissie.
The Cubs are attempting to address this by adding some outfield depth. Last week they signed Chas McCormick, formerly of the Astros, to a minor-league deal with a NRI to Spring Training (Bluesky link):
McCormick had a really good year for Houston in 2023, batting .273/.353/.489 with 22 home runs in 115 games, good for 3.4 bWAR. Injuries ruined McCormick’s last two years; he played in just 64 games in 2025 and didn’t crack a .600 OPS either of the last two seasons.
I don’t think the Cubs are looking for miracles here, though McCormick has been a useful outfielder at times in his career. He turns 31 in April. Most likely, he gets stashed at Triple-A Iowa as outfield insurance. He does have 33 games of postseason experience.
Oh, and his actual given name is… Chas. It’s not short for “Charles.”
There’s been no official announcement by the team regarding another signing, but there’s a clue from this social media post:
There was some ambiguity about whether the Cubs would sign Dylan Carlson with Chas McCormick and Justin Dean in the organization, but it’s my understanding Cubs are signing Carlson to an MiLB deal with a ST invite. He’s battled health issues, but could be a nice add if healthy. https://t.co/bAQZqJNieJ
So, if Dylan Carlson is working out with Cubs players at the Sloan Park complex, I’d think that’s a pretty good sign that he’s also, as noted, been signed to a minor-league deal with a Spring Training NRI.
Just five years ago, Carlson was a Top 20 prospect in all of baseball. Indeed, he had a really good year with the Cardinals in 2021, batting .266/.343/.437 with 31 doubles and 18 home runs. That got him a third-place finish in Rookie of the Year voting.
His numbers declined in 2022 and by 2023 he was a backup outfielder with the Cardinals. As was the case with McCormick, injuries appear to have been a lot of the issue here, including a hamstring strain, oblique strain, shoulder strain. Lastly, there was an ankle sprain that eventually required surgery.
In 2025, Carlson rode the Orioles’ Triple-A shuttle, recalled and optioned the maximum allowed five times, and batted just .203/.278/.336 in 83 games with Baltimore. He did hit well in 28 games at Triple-A Norfolk, .294/.421/.451.
Fun fact: At the trade deadline in 2024, Carlson was traded to the Rays from the Cardinals for Shawn Armstrong. Exactly a month later the Cardinals waived Armstrong and the Cubs claimed him. Armstrong posted a 4.91 ERA and 1.909 WHIP in eight games for the Cubs in September 2024. He’s played for eight teams, which makes him a great Immaculate Grid answer.
Carlson is only 27. If he’s healthy, perhaps he can recover some of that ability that made him a top prospect. At this point, on a NRI he’s certainly worth it. If he can’t play, he just gets released. If he can? Maybe he makes the team and Kevin Alcántara goes back to Iowa. Carlson’s a switch-hitter, so there’s that.
Just thought this would be a useful topic of discussion on a January day when there’s not much news.
When Brewers fans talk about the bullpen, names like Trevor Megill or Abner Uribe usually dominate the conversation. That makes sense. Closers and flamethrowers tend to get the attention. But one of the most important arms in Milwaukee’s bullpen is not the one finishing games or lighting up the radar gun. It is Jared Koenig, a pitcher whose value lies in how often he keeps games from getting away in the first place.
Koenig is not flashy, and he does not fit the archetype of the modern reliever who racks up saves or piles up strikeouts in highlight clips. His stat line — 2.67 ERA, 3.31 FIP, 131 Ks, 128 IP over 127 appearances in 2024 & 2025 — doesn’t blow you away either.
What he does instead is quietly stabilize games. Over the course of the last two seasons with Milwaukee, he has taken on a steady diet of meaningful innings and turned them into outs with remarkable consistency. That kind of contribution rarely drives headlines, but it often determines whether a team survives the grind of 162 games.
His path to this role makes his emergence even more notable. Koenig was drafted in the 35th round in 2014 and spent years bouncing around independent leagues, including stops overseas, simply trying to keep his career alive. There was no fast track, no top-prospect pedigree, and no guarantee he would ever see sustained major league time. That background usually leads to a brief appearance in the majors, not a dependable role on a contending roster. Yet Koenig has carved out exactly that.
The Brewers have built much of their recent success on finding value where others do not, particularly with pitching. Koenig fits neatly into that organizational identity. He commands the strike zone, limits free passes, and misses enough bats to escape trouble. As a left-hander, he provides matchup flexibility, but he is far more than a situational specialist. Milwaukee has shown a willingness to deploy him against a wide range of hitters and in a variety of leverage spots, which signals genuine trust rather than simple necessity.
What makes Koenig especially important is the role he plays in the middle innings. Not every game is decided in the ninth, and many are won or lost in the sixth or seventh, when a starter exits and the opposing lineup turns over again. Koenig has been one of the Brewers’ most reliable options in those moments. He does not just bridge innings. He prevents momentum from swinging. When he enters with runners on base or a slim lead, the game often slows down.
That reliability matters even more for a roster built on depth and flexibility. Milwaukee rarely leans on a single dominant bullpen arm for long stretches. Instead, responsibility is spread across multiple relievers, with roles shifting as performance ebbs and flows. Koenig’s ability to absorb innings without drama allows the Brewers to protect their higher-octane arms and avoid overexposing younger or less consistent relievers. Over a long season, that kind of workload management can be the difference between a bullpen holding together in September and October or unraveling.
There is also reason to believe Koenig’s performance is not a fluke. He showed signs of breaking out last season, and rather than regressing, he has built on that success. That kind of year-to-year stability is rare for relievers, whose results are often driven by small-sample volatility. Koenig’s continued effectiveness points to a skill set that is more repeatable than random.
Pitchers like Koenig are easy to overlook because they do not fit neatly into traditional narratives. They do not close games, do not collect awards, and do not dominate trade deadline discourse. But teams that consistently reach October almost always have several players like him. They are not stars, but they are indispensable. They turn close games into wins and prevent losing streaks from spiraling.
If the Brewers are going to sustain success and push deeper into the postseason, they will need contributions beyond the obvious names. Koenig represents the kind of hidden value that has defined Milwaukee’s approach for years. He is not the most exciting Brewer, but he may be one of the most important.
We have hit the lull in between the hot stove league and Spring Training. There will be more deals made between now and then, but your Houston Astros are probably winding down their additions and changes. This affords us time to dive into some side conversations that could prove interesting. Last week, the BBWAA elected former Astro Carlos Beltran into the Baseball Hall of Fame along with Andruw Jones. This year’s induction ceremony will feature two former Astros.
The Hall of Fame index is a systemic way to look at Hall of Fame fitness, but like most methods it needs context and counterbalances to be meaningful. The index combines baseball-reference WAR and Fangraphs WAR into one number. It is similar to JAWS in that it combines career value and peak value for one tidy number. The number itself is only relevant if we compare it to other players at the same position. Since Beltran spent much of his career as a center fielder, we will compare him with the four players closest to him in the index.
We will look at the index itself, but we will also look at offensive metrics, fielding metrics, overall metrics, and a deeper dive into WAR to see how those wins were parceled out. We do that because some people are not big on WAR and WAR itself has its own secret sauce which is difficult to understand for many fans. We want to look at its components so that it makes more sense. We will start with the index itself.
The Hall of Fame Index
BWAR
FWAR
BWAR10
FWAR10
Index
Billy Hamilton
63.2
70.3
55.8
61.0
250.3
Carlos Beltran
70.1
67.8
54.8
56.2
248.9
Andruw Jones
62.7
67.0
57.9
61.0
248.6
Duke Snider
65.9
63.5
60.0
56.1
245.5
Jim Edmonds
61.4
64.5
55.0
58.4
239.3
There are two important parts of the index that make it different from JAWS. The first thing is the addition of FWAR. is the first major difference. Different WAR formulas look at performance slightly differently and including both of those gives us a richer view of the player. Fielding seems to be most significant difference, but there are some differences on the offensive end as well. The second major difference is a ten year peak versus a seven year peak. The additional three seasons adds key data, but the biggest reason is that it takes ten seasons to be eligible for the Hall of Fame, so it felt appropriate to make the peak ten seasons.
The key is how we interpret the index. It is not meant to rank order players. It is meant to measure fitness. Beltran is not necessarily better than Jones. They are virtually similar in terms of value. Furthermore, all of these players are similar in value. It is more accurately used like Bill James’ similarity scores. If a player is similar to others that are universally seen as Hall of Famers then they are probably a Hall of Famer. If they are similar to players that are not seen as Hall of Famers then their case is a little more shaky.
We look at the other numbers (offense, fielding, and durability numbers) to provide more context and determine how WAR was arrived at. On the offensive end, we are using OPS+ which compares players with the league at the time. 100 is considered to be average with most of these players coming above that. We also include offensive winning percentage which assumes a regular lineup of nine players identical to him with average pitching. We will also use real offensive value and bases per out that I have used in previous articles. Real offensive value combines batting average and secondary average. Bases per out combines total bases, walks, stolen bases, and hit by pitches and divides that by total outs.
Offensive Numbers
OPS+
ROV
OW%
BPO
Billy Hamilton
141
.384
.731
1.178
Carlos Beltran
119
.312
.612
.835
Andruw Jones
111
.308
.554
.806
Duke Snider
140
.339
.707
.923
Jim Edmonds
132
.337
.659
.917
Offensive winning percentage is one of my favorite metrics. Imagine a team that has a .731 winning percentage. it is staggering. Hamilton’s numbers are just stupid. A part of the problem with 19th century players is that some of the data is unavailable. So, his numbers are relevant in comparison with his contemporaries, but not as relevant in comparison with these guys. However, that BPO is ridiculously good. He combined high average, on base skills, and speed to enormous value.
The biggest takeaway here is that Edmonds looks a lot better than we thought he would and I imagine better than most of the voters thought. In comparison, Jones and Beltran look a little more ordinary. Of course, hitting is not the only part of value. No single test qualifies or disqualifies a player. We take them all in concert to get an overall look at a player. This is why numerous statisticians like stats like WAR. It aims to include everything a player does into one tidy number. I include all of the components because WAR is not universally recognized as a valuable tool.
In terms of fielding we are looking at Rfield from baseball-reference.com. It is closely correlated to defensive runs saved, but obviously predates that for most of these players. DWAR and FG are similar numbers that measure a player against the replacement level fielder. In this case, it is an overall look at the baseball universe, so certain positions are assumed to be more valuable than others. Some of these players played other positions than center field, so their DWAR and FG will be affected. However, the differences between DWAR and FG can help explain the differences between BWAR and FWAR. In the last category we simply look at the Rfield for just center field.
Fielding
Rfield
DWAR
FG
CF
Billy Hamilton
30
-5.2
-5.0
30
Carlos Beltran
39
2.0
0.4
33
Andruw Jones
235
24.4
27.9
253
Duke Snider
-22
-5.9
-4.6
-21
Jim Edmonds
37
6.4
7.3
48
I don’t think it is hypebole to say that Jones is the most valuable defensive center fielder in the game’s history. He surpasses Willie Mays in Rfield and DWAR. Obviously, all rating systems include some level of subjectivity. However, Jones performance here helps explain where his value comes from. When you include off the charts defensive value with good offensive value you get a compelling case for the Hall of Fame.
When we remove Snider, we see that the other three are pretty similar in value. Hamilton’s DWAR and FG lag behind largely because of the era. Other positions were considerably more valuable and most of those came on the infield. It was likely the nature of the game itself which was what historians would call “inside baseball”. If homers are depressed then players will focus on line drives and ground balls. That puts more of a premium on infield defense.
In Beltran’s case, we see overall good defensive value and offensive value. When you are good at both then you are very good overall. The last leg of the value puzzle is longevity. We use Bill James’ total runs formula to calculate that. We add runs created, fielding runs, base running runs, and a positional adjustment to come up with total runs.
Total Runs
RC
Rfield
Rbaser
Rpos
TR
Billy Hamilton
1225
30
53
-86
1222
Carlos Beltran
1731
39
55
-15
1810
Andruw Jones
1255
235
9
16
1515
Duke Snider
1475
-22
13
-26
1440
Jim Edmonds
1408
37
-11
31
1465
This is the missing piece. Beltran doesn’t look overwhelming when we look at the offensive and fielding value numbers, but these numbers are staggering. If a good player adds 100 total runs a season then he has three seasons worth of production over all of these players. It helps explain how Hamilton could be so good in the value numbers, but similar in overall value to the other four.
When we combine these three tests we get a pretty clear picture of these five players. However, we have one more test to go. In this case, we are looking at BWAR seasons to determine how often they were among the league’s best. It isn’t always universal, but five WAR seasons make you among the league’s best. Four win seasons are usually all-star campaigns. Solid regulars get three WAR. Additionally, we will note how often each player led the league in BWAR.
BWAR Seasons
5 WAR
4 WAR
3 WAR
MVP
Billy Hamilton
6
4
0
2
Carlos Beltran
6
3
2
0
Andruw Jones
6
2
2
0
Duke Snider
7
1
1
2
Jim Edmonds
7
2
1
0
A lack of leading the league does not make someone unfit for the Hall of Fame. Obviously, the reverse is also true. However, it does add needed context to a career. Players can accumulate WAR over 20 seasons or 12. This table helps illustrate that. Most baseball fans are captivated by greatness. In many ways, that is the deciding factor when looking at a borderline Hall of Famer. How often were they great?
Each of these players end up being pretty close in that regard. I’d say the biggest takeaway is that Beltran overwhelmed through longevity, Jones overwhelmed with defense, and Jim Edmonds has gotten the shaft to date. He should be next in line.
The Mets have one of the best farm systems in baseball -- even after trading two of their top prospects in the Freddy Peralta deal -- and they're well-represented on The Athletic's new top 100 prospects list ahead of the 2026 season.
Law heralds McLean as someone who could be a top-of-the-rotation starter, and writes that Benge could end up being an above-average defender in center field.
Regarding Tong, Law says he has the upside of a No. 2 starter.
As far as Ewing, Law notes that he could profile as a regular in center field, adding that there's a chance he becomes a star "if he lifts the ball a little more to get to more home run power."
McLean dazzled in 48.0 innings over eight starts during his big league debut last season, posting a 2.06 ERA and 1.04 WHIP while striking out 57 batters. He is expected to slot near the top of the 2026 rotation.
The other two prospects on the list could open 2026 in the minors.
Tong showed flashes during his first taste of the majors in 2025, but his arsenal can use some refining.
As far as Ewing, he had a breakout season in 2025, slashing .315/.401/.429 (.830 OPS) across three levels, ending with Double-A Binghamton. The speedy Ewing smacked 10 triples and 26 doubles while swiping 70 bases.
Jett Williams and Brandon Sproat, the prospects the Mets traded in the Peralta deal, ranked No. 45 and No. 75, respectively.
San Diego Padres pitcher Joe Musgrove said he is anxious to get back on the mound for his hometown team and a year of good health as he and the Padres look to return to the postseason according to Kevin Acee of the San Diego Union-Tribune. Musgrove spoke at a ribbon-cutting ceremony at San Dieguito Community Park where he and centerfielder Jackson Merrill were in attendance for the re-opening of a ballpark that is used for the Miracle League of San Diego. Musgrove said he wants to have a normal season but understands that the ultimate goal is to pitch in October.
Padres News:
Gaslamp Ball conducted a poll and asked readers which of three free agent pitchers they would prefer the Padres to sign, Lucas Giolito, Nick Martinez or Justin Verlander? The three pitchers were named as possible targets for San Diego by Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic. Readers overwhelmingly prefer to see Giolito on the mound for the Padres in 2026.
Baseball News:
MLB.com reported many teams are interested in signing Giolito and the most recent team to express its interest is the Detroit Tigers according to a report from MLB Network insider Jon Heyman.
For just the fourth time, a player has topped the ballot in his first try, and technically No. 1 overall voted prospect Braden Montgomery sorta doesn’t count. But this round, Zach Franklin has joined Mathias LaCombe and Ky Bush as first-timers and Vote winners all in one sweep. Franklin romped in sparse voting, with 15 of 39 (38%) votes:
Franklin’s 38% was the biggest share of the Vote in the last 11 rounds. It’s the righty reliever’s first time on our ballot.
Past No. 32s in the SSS Top Prospect Vote 2025 Voting lasted only 31 rounds 2024 Eric Adler (29%) 2023 Voting lasted only 24 rounds 2022 Voting lasted only 17 rounds 2021 Will Kincanon (43%) 2020 José Rodríguez (29%) 2019 Ryan Burr (67%) 2018 Justin Yurchak (37%)
Franklin became just second righty and third relief pitcher (and second still with the club, with Peyton Pallette’s loss to Cleveland) to advance:
For this round, it’s another righty reliever, Phil Fox, who joins the fun.
South Side Sox Top-Voted White Sox Prospects for 2026
Alexander Albertus Third Baseman Age 21 2025 high level Arizona Complex League (Rookie) Age relative to high level +0.4 years Overall 2025 stats 8 games ▪️ 0 HR ▪️ 2 RBI ▪️ .333/.520/.444 ▪️ 3-of-3 (100.0%) SB ▪️ 6 BB ▪️ 3 K ▪️ 1.000 FLD%▪️ 0.3 WAR
What can you say further about Albertus? He seems to have great tools but an uncanny ability to stay off of the field (just eight games in a season-plus in the White Sox system). In 2025, he was assigned to Kannapolis but was … wait for it … injured. He lasted just eight games of ACL rehab before hitting the IL-60 again.
Marcelo Alcala Center Fielder Age 20 2025 high level ACL (Rookie) Age relative to high level -0.6 years Overall 2025 stats 42 games ▪️ 7 HR ▪️ 19 RBI ▪️ .233/.325/.479 ▪️ 14-of-15 (93.3%) SB ▪️ 14 BB ▪️ 63 K ▪️ .935 FLD%▪️ 1.2 WAR
Alcala is a talent to dream on. Though still raw, he flashed power that we simply do not see in the White Sox system, especially when combined with the raw speed that can swipe bases at a 90%+ rate. Defense and bat discipline are issues to be sure, but imagine what additional outfield reps, AZ batting cage time, and even some training on the bases could do.
Aldrin Batista Right-Handed Starting Pitcher Age 22 2025 SSS Prospect Poll ranking 6 2025 high level Winston-Salem (High-A) Age relative to high level -1.2 years Overall 2025 stats 2-0 ▪️ 7 games (2 starts) ▪️ 14 IP ▪️ 5.79 ERA ▪️ 17 K ▪️ 7 BB ▪️ 1.429 WHIP ▪️-1.2 WAR
Batista was our No. 6-voted player in last year’s poll and top righthander — and then disaster struck, as he started the third Dash game of the season on April 6 and then was out more than four months with a stress fracture in his right (pitching) elbow. His return in late August was iffy, with three poor relief appearances of five. But he ended the season with a scoreless (two-inning) “opener” start, which hopefully reverses the curse for 2026.
Reudis Diaz Right-handed relief pitcher Age 20 2025 high level ACL (Rookie) Age relative to high level -2.1 years Overall 2025 stats 1-1 ▪️ 1 SV▪️ 21 games (4 finishes) ▪️ 27 2/3 IP ▪️ 2.28.ERA ▪️ 18 K ▪️ 8 BB ▪️ 1.084 WHIP ▪️1.2 WAR
Who? You’re forgiven for being unfamiliar with an extremely young arm who hasn’t yet gotten out of rookie ball, but our No. 77 prospect a year ago (then a starter, repeating the DSL and killing it) made a successful adjustment Stateside. He’ll return to starting in 2026, likely getting his feet wet in Arizona and getting a promotion to Low-A in the second half of the season.
Phil Fox Right-Handed Relief Pitcher Age 23 2025 high level Birmingham (AA) Age relative to high level -2.7 years Overall 2025 stats (High-A/AA) 2-3▪️ 11 SV ▪️ 46 games (23 finishes) ▪️ 63 2/3 IP ▪️ 3.25 ERA ▪️ 78 K ▪️ 14 BB ▪️ 0.974 WHIP ▪️ 1.0 WAR
The clear closer among those arms with little experience in the higher minors, Fox absolutely dominated High-A in 2025. While his ERA is a touch high given his amazing control (5.57 K/BB), Fox was pitching significantly young for his level even while at High-A, much less Double-A. He and Zach Franklin are the true top late options in the system.
Ryan Galanie First Baseman Age 25 2025 high level Birmingham (AA) Age relative to high level +1.3 years Overall 2025 stats (High-A/AA) 119 games ▪️ 11 HR ▪️ 94 RBI ▪️ .276/.327/.422 ▪️ 14-of-17 (82.4%) SB ▪️ 35 BB ▪️ 79 K ▪️ .995 FLD%▪️ 1.1 WAR
It’s been a slow but steady climb for this 13th-rounder in 2023. The good news here is, with the caveat that Galanie has always competed older than his level, Galanie has found some footing. While his power/slugging numbers are merely OK, he drove in 94 runs in 2025. He disappeared a bit in the playoffs for Birmingham (just four hits in six games, with five walks as well) but started every game in the march to a second consecutive Southern League title for the Barons.
Jairo Iriarte Right-Handed Relief Pitcher Age 24 2025 SSS Top Prospect Vote Ranking 19 2025 high level Charlotte (AAA) Age relative to high level -4.3 years Overall 2025 stats (Rookie/AAA) 3-3▪️ 1 SV ▪️ 37 games (5 starts, 9 finishes) ▪️ 48 IP ▪️ 7.13 ERA ▪️ 50 K ▪️ 37 BB ▪️ 1.917 WHIP ▪️ -0.8 WAR
The 2025 season was an utter disaster for Iriarte, who went from prospective South Side rotation member to lost in space. The righty, who made his brief debut in the majors in 2024, both lost the plate and misplaced his strikeout power. The Brian Bannister Pitching Lab has its work cut out here, for sure.
Javier Mogollón Shortstop Age 20 2025 high level Kannapolis (Low-A) Age relative to high level -1.4 years Overall 2025 stats 51 games ▪️ 5 HR ▪️ 19 RBI ▪️ .220/.347/.387 ▪️ 15-of-21 (71.4%) SB ▪️ 30 BB ▪️ 56 K ▪️ .971 FLD%▪️ 1.0 WAR
An ascending star just one year ago, we have to tap the breaks a bit on Mogollón after a lackluster first full season of minors ball. While still young for his level and managing to keep his head above water in a new league every season of his career, Mogollón’s undeniable hitting in Rookie ball fell off significantly with the Cannon Ballers. However, how much of that was due to battling injury is undetermined, as Mogollón was shelved for what turned out to be the season on July 2.
Yobal Rodriguez Right-Handed Starting Pitcher Age18 2025 high levelDSL White Sox (Rookie) Age relative to high level -1.5 years Overall 2025 stats0-3 ▪️ 13 games (10 starts) ▪️ 30 1/3 IP ▪️2.97 ERA ▪️ 33 K ▪️ 13 BB ▪️ 1.022 WHIP ▪️ 1.2 WAR
Rodriguez is a rare DSL pitcher, not for his relatively light innings load, but as a primary starter — and at just 17 years old (Yobal turns 18 on February 9). Inasmuch as it’s tough to project anyone out of the DSL, especially pitchers, you could hardly have hoped for more from him in his pro debut.
Tyler Schweitzer Left-Handed Starting Pitcher Age25 2025 high levelCharlotte (AAA) Age relative to high level -3.3 years Overall 2025 stats (AA/AAA) 8-2 ▪️ 27 games (10 starts) ▪️ 99 2/3 IP ▪️4.61 ERA ▪️ 81 K ▪️ 41 BB ▪️ 1.344 WHIP ▪️ 0.8 WAR
Schweitzer relieved in most of his games in 2025, but he remains a starter in our eyes given he was consistently paired with Tanner McDougal in Birmingham Barons starts. And in Birmingham, Schweitzer was divine: 1.27 ERA that included a long scoreless streak leading to a Charlotte promotion, 0.946 WHIP. However, everything the southpaw did as a Baron, he undid as a Knight (7.92 ERA, 1.740 ERA). While other gilded arms (Drew Thorpe, Grant Taylor) get to skip Charlotte entirely, Schweitzer was not so lucky. And that luck could prevent him from ever seeing the majors.
Round 24 of voting was the last of 2023 (we did not do an actual wrap for the voting, but Jordan Sprinkle ended up being our final pick), and the full archive.
Despite temperatures in the feels-like single digits, you know baseball season is right around the corner when Evan Grant begins his roster projections.
The Orioles roster seems to be in pretty good shape. Mike Elias has beefed up the rotation and, if reports are to be believed, he could still bring in Framber Valdez. The additions of Pete Alonso and Taylor Ward should provide some pop in the middle of the lineup. And Ryan Helsley feels like a solid bet to bounce back and be a dependable ninth-inning option.
But that doesn’t mean that the squad is without flaws or question marks. The Orioles are far from runaway favorites in the American League. In fact, you could argue (pretty easily) that they are the fourth-best team in their own division, albeit with some untapped potential that others in the AL East lack.
Spring training is just two weeks away. Many of the players are likely to be in Sarasota sooner than that. Elias and the Orioles still need to sort out several things about their roster if they want to make a postseason run.
Is everyone in the rotation truly healthy?
It has become an annual tradition for Elias to address the media at some point in the spring and announce that at least one of the starters they were counting on has actually suffered a catastrophic injury.
The Orioles already have five solid rotation options in tow: Bradish, Trevor Rogers, Shane Baz, Dean Kremer, and Zach Eflin. And yet, they are continuing to seek out an upgrade.
Perhaps the plan is to proceed with a six-man rotation, or maybe they are just being extra cautious. After all, they got bit hard by the injury bug in 2025, and you can be sure Elias wants to avoid a similar fate in 2026. But there could also be an injury concern with at least one of the starters.
Eflin threw just 71.1 innings in 2025, and it’s unlikely the Orioles are going to expect him to go right back to be a 150+ inning pitcher in the next season. So don’t be shocked if he opens the season on the IL.
That makes the signing of Valdez, or anyone else, more important. Tyler Wells, Cade Povich, or Brandon Young could step in and pitch while Eflin recovers, but what if someone else goes down in the meantime? Then you have two of the fringy arms in the rotation, and we are right back where things where last year, when the rotation was scuffling.
Can the bullpen be trusted?
Just about every MLB team is crossing their fingers when it comes to their bullpen. It’s a fickle position group in which success one season does not guarantee success in the next. But the Orioles don’t even have a ton of prior triumphs to lean on in the unit.
FanGraphs’ Roster Resource tool projects Rico Garcia, Dietrich Enns, Colin Selby, and Kade Strowd to all be part of the Opening Day bullpen. Garcia is the most experienced of the group, but he only has 70 MLB innings under his belt, and nearly half of them came last year. Grant Wolfram, Yaramil Hiraldo, José Espada, and Cameron Foster are others that are expected to contribute, but they are similarly green.
The veteran duo of Helsley and Andrew Kittredge are likely to get most of the high-leverage innings. Helsely has a track record of success, just don’t look at his numbers with the Mets. There’s risk there, although the Orioles will tell you his stuff is fine. Maybe it was just mechanical issues that led to his struggles in Queens.
Even still, the relief group feels an arm (or two) light. Right now the middle innings are projected to belong to Keegan Akin, Yennier Cano, and Tyler Wells (if he doesn’t earn a spot in the rotation). That could be fine. It could also be a major concern. Signing or trading for a more dependable veteran wouldn’t be expensive, and it might level the group up just enough.
Who is going to be on the bench?
The Orioles have more MLB-quality position players than they have room for on their roster. That’s a good problem to have, but it’s still a problem.
The “everyday” lineup is pretty well set. Across the infield will be Alonso, Jackson Holliday, Gunnar Henderson, and Jordan Westburg. In the outfield it will be Ward, Colton Cowser, and either Tyler O’Neill or Dylan Beavers. Adley Rutschman and Samuel Basallo will be your catchers that also DH quite a bit.
That’s 10 players right there. Leody Taveras seems like the favorite to be the backup in center field. And then there is the Ryan Mountcastle/Coby Mayo dilemma.
It doesn’t make a ton of sense to have both players on the roster if they each still fit in the 1B/DH slot. Mayo can be demoted to Triple-A without losing him. Mountcastle would have to be on the big league roster. There is the outside chance that they co-exist, but only if Mayo takes on other positions. He has been a third baseman before. Maybe they drill that hard in the spring. Or perhaps he can learn a corner outfield spot, a move that has long been expected from scouts.
If the team keeps both Mayo and Mountcastle, then they won’t have room for Jeremiah Jackson, or any other “utility” player for that matter. That would mean no official backup to the infielders. They would have to rove around to give each other days off. Holliday can play shortstop. Westburg can play second base. Mayo would be the reserve at the hot corner. They would have a similar problem even if Jackson stuck around since he is not viewed as a shortstop option, although he can fill in at second and third.
Health plays a big role in all of this, and that could be why Elias is waiting on making a move as long as he can. Things happen in the spring all the time. If a significant player needs to open the season on the IL, like Henderson did last year, it would be nice to have a big league-quality solution in place rather than scrambling to add a Quad-A type in mid-March.
Much like a group you may have heard about from Liverpool, the Red Sox have a quartet of young, talented lads who are breaking through a top 100 chart in the middle of the decade. Maybe that’s a stretch, I dunno, but I’m happy that we do have a Fab Four to call our own.
On Friday, MLB Pipeline released their updated rankings of the top 100 prospects in baseball. While it’s certainly not the be-all-end-all of prospect evaluation, Pipeline’s latest list gives us an opportunity to take stock in what we have at the top of our farm system.
The answer to that question: a trio of talented pitchers and a middle infielder. Left-handers Payton Tolle (number 19 in the league wide Top 100, according to Pipeline) and Connelly Early (number 56) are joined by 2025 first-round draft pick Kyson Witherspoon (number 84) on the bump, while shortstop Franklin Arias (number 31) represents the sole position player within the organization who currently makes the grade (another reference to that Liverpudlian band for ya).
Does that crop of players represent the most talent, on paper and in the eyes of Pipeline’s evaluators, across the sport? No, but there’s some legit juice among our representatives.
We’ve already seen glimpses of the potential that both Tolle and Early have from the left side; the former has a dynamite heater, while the latter has already displayed an ability to step into a massive role and provide his club with a chance to win a do-or-die game (they died, lmao, sure, but I’d hardly pin the majority of the blame on Early for how Game 3 in New York went down a few months ago). Witherspoon projects to be a guy who can deploy swing-and-miss stuff via multiple pitches, especially if he can develop his command. There’s a very real chance that Arias is up in Boston before we know it, possibly serving as a long-term solution on the infield dirt with his steady glove and ability to get lumber on the ball (Pipeline grades his hit tool as a 60 on the 20-80 scale; in plain English, that’s quite good).
This next wave, mixed with the group of guys who were on Pipeline lists of past and have already graduated from the minor league system, could very well be exciting! Of course, no prospect is a sure thing—although I’m still holding out hope for a Lars Anderson renaissance—but one can hope that this is a sign of continued progress within the Sox’s player development system. Craig Breslow has stressed his desire to build a sustainable winner, one that is primed to compete in both the short-term and for the long haul. Your opinion on that philosophy along with how the front office has actually done in carrying out that vision may vary, but if that master plan were to eventually bare fruit, it could look a little something like what we’re currently seeing: another hoard of players on the precipice of contributing to the major league club within the next 12 to 18 months or so.
Even with that in mind, I’m curious: does a continued faith in Boston’s player development open the door, perhaps, to some trades for veterans that can round out the roster—be it this winter, next summer, or in future offseasons (even if we might not have the patience for that)?
There are young position players already primed to play major roles in 2026, while you can point to plenty of young arms that can make an impact before their arbitration years are up. There’s an embarrassment of riches within the organization’s pitching depth—could that be leveraged in the future, especially if Breslow and Co. trust their own models and methods to develop pitching? Early was a fifth round draft pick a few years ago, and I can confidently assume that he wasn’t on many folks’ radars at this time last year (I can only speak with certainty for myself; if you had the Early emergence on your 2025 bingo card, hats off to ya), and he’s now been thrown around in trade ideas for multi-time All-Star players. Does the organization have faith in themselves to produce more Connelly Early-types?
Regardless of future transactions, the strides being made in the minors gives me some hope. There’s more work to be done—Tolle needs to work on his secondary pitches, Early has to be stretched out for longer outings, etc.—but the Red Sox aren’t in a bad spot right now. If they flip some of this prospect capital for a win-now type of player in the future, sure. If they keep them and they turn out to be big league contributors, sure. Either outcome would be a huge win for the work being done on the farm.
Now stop procrastinating and go shovel that snow, dear reader.
On Saturday night, Detroit Tigers’ ace Tarik Skubal made baseball history by collecting his second straight American League Cy Young award. For all the conversation around Skubal as he prepares for his last season prior to free agency, the basic calculus for all parties involved revolves around the fundamental question; how long can Tarik Skubal stay at this level?
Since the middle of the 2023 season when he settled in after 2022 flexor tendon surgery, Skubal has been the best pitcher in baseball. When we talk about his arbitration battle with the Tigers, whether he should be traded or extended, and what he will ultimately be paid in a long-term contract next offseason, it all comes down to an assessment of how good Tarik Skubal will be going forward, and for how long.
Assuming he has another great season in 2026, which certainly isn’t guaranteed, Skubal is set to ask for $400 million in free agency over a 10-year span, and he may end up making more than that. To be worth such a deal, Skubal needs to have numerous great seasons ahead of him, and to be able to still produce good numbers in his decline phase. No one is going to expect Cy Young caliber production out of him for 10 years, but they’ll be paying like he can average well above average production over the life of the deal. In reality, deals like this are really only about the first 5-6 years, with a big spending team expecting to eat much of the remaining contract.
The game has changed so much over the last quarter century that drawing reasonable comparisons to other great pitchers is difficult.
We can look to former Tigers ace Justin Verlander as one possible point of comparison. The future Hall of Famer has been the most valuable pitcher in the game over the last 20 years, though the title of “best” may go to Clayton Kershaw. It’s difficult to use JV as a comp because Verlander is a freak. He was throwing 100 mph by the time he was 21-22 years old, and he was able to reach back for triple digits with his max fastball for over a decade before settling into steady mid-to-high 90’s velocity for much of another full decade. Skubal had his first major arm surgery when he had Tommy John in his freshman year of college. A 2022 flexor tendon injury also required surgery and cost him over a season of work. Verlander had one stretch in 2014-2015 of core and shoulder trouble, but was otherwise unscathed until he finally blew out his UCL in 2020. He then returned at age 39 and won his long coveted second American League Cy Young award in 2022.
Verlander possesses a once in a generation type combination of arm strength, durability, hunger, and work ethic that can really only be surpassed by the likes of Nolan Ryan and Randy Johnson, and even now he’ll land himself a solid one-year deal in the coming weeks as he reaches his 43rd birthday. Roger Clemens and Pedro Martinez had better careers than Verlander, though he’s closing in on Pedro, but they didn’t throw as hard nor maintain that kind of top shelf velocity deep into their careers.
Comparing aces
Other contemporary examples of a true ace, rather than just a good pitcher who had a peak season or two, may be a little more instructive than Verlander. So let’s take a quick look at the other top pitchers over the last 20 years and see what happened from age 30-35.
This chart below is the top 20 pitchers in fWAR from 2005-2025. Essentially you can see how much in fWAR they were worth prior to their 30’s, and then how much fWAR they earned in successive seasons. I left out guys who started their career in the 90’s like Roy Halladay. The 2020 season throws a bit of a wrinkle into this, and makes it a lot more of a project to take all these pitchers and get a fair average by each year of their career from age 30 onward. It’s not exactly cutting edge statistical analysis, but this is enough to give you a pretty good picture of the risk of a serious performance drop off from age 30 on.
Pitcher
20-29 fWAR
Age 30
Age 31
Age 32
Age 33
Age 34
35+
Clayton Kershaw
57.7
3.4
3.6
3.4
3.9
5.6
Max Scherzer
26.1
6.5
5.6
6.4
7.5
6.5
14.9
Felix Hernandez
52.6
1.1
0.3
0.3
-0.1
Jacob deGrom
15.5
9.0
6.9
4.9
2.2
5.3
Zack Greinke
31.4
4.5
5.3
2.3
4.9
2.7
11.7
Corey Kluber
16.6
4.9
7.2
5.5
0.6
1.4
Chris Sale
40.9
3.6
0.8
0.2
2.1
10.0
David Price
31
4.4
1.5
2.4
2.3
0.8
Sonny Gray
18.5
2.5
2.4
5.4
3.8
3.6
Aaron Nola
29.9
3.8
3.1
0.9
Zack Wheeler
12.4
7.2
4.2
5.9
5.4
4.0
Jon Lester
24.1
5.4
4.9
4.2
2.9
1.8
3.1
Cole Hamels
32.9
4.5
4.5
3.3
1.7
2.2
2.6
CC Sabathia
40.2
5.8
4.1
2.1
0.0
1.2
7.1
Adam Wainwright
17.6
3.9
6.2
4.9
0.9
2.8
9.4
Clliff Lee
14.8
6.4
7.3
7.1
5
5.6
2
Jake Peavy
32.1
2.9
4.3
2
1.5
1.2
0.7
Dan Haren
31.5
5.9
1.8
1.6
1.7
1.1
Justin Verlander
38.3
4.8
3.2
3.1
5.4
4.1
25.4
Avg fWAR
4.8
4.4
3.2
3
3.1
Again this only tells you so much, but it’s already pretty clear that paying a pitcher $35-40 million a year in their 30’s is never going to go very well. There’s a pretty good chance he’ll be a good pitcher for several more years, but the odds of many more Cy Young award caliber seasons isn’t great. Beyond 34, really only Justin Verlander remained a pretty valuable pitcher for a long time.
We should also note that most of these pitchers either never had a Tommy John surgery, or didn’t have one until they were already into their 30’s. DeGrom has already had two, and Zack Wheeler had the surgery in 2015 and came back very strong. Adam Wainwright had the surgery in 2011 and came back strong for another decade. Chris Sale had the surgery in 2020. Otherwise, the only other TJ guy on the list is Verlander, and he was 37 at the time with a crazy amount of mileage and high velocity heat behind him.
Now let’s consider the actual specimen himself.
Skubal is at the height of his powers
Tarik Skubal’s main attributes as a pitcher are velocity, a pretty unique fourseam fastball shape, a deceptive delivery, and one of the best changeups in baseball. The velocity isn’t going to last, but the other traits do bode well for Skubal remaining a pretty good starting iptcher even when he’s sitting 95 mph rather than the 97.6 mph he averaged in 2025. Frankly there’s a pretty good chance we’ve already seen peak velocity from the big left-hander. He averaged 95.8 mph in his 2023 return from flexor tendon surgery. He averaged 96.8 mph in winning his first Cy Young in 2024. That’s a pretty incredible trendline, but it can’t last forever.
Still, even when Skubal eventually falls back to averaging 95-96 mph again, his seam-shifted changeup is still going to remain a great weapon. Per Statcast, Skubal’s changeup was worth 26.8 runs above average, easily the best changeup is baseball. Christopher Sanchez of the Phillies was second at 19.8 runs above average, and only three other pitchers were above 10 runs above average. Certainly a great changeup benefits from a great fastball, and the changeup won’t be as effective when his velocity declines, but it’s so good it should remain a well above average pitch for Skubal for many years to come.
The distinctive thing about Skubal’s fourseamer is the fact that it’s basically a straight pitch. His ability to tie up right-handed hitters inside is predicated both on the velocity and deceptive delivery, but it’s also the fact that not many left-handers have a fourseamer with that shape. It’s almost a 97-98 mph cutter, and hitters cannot get used to the idea that it won’t run back over the plate at all. And just as he’s got you recognizing that fact, he’ll mix in a sinker that does swing back 10 inches on average more than the fourseamer, and he can start that pitch right at a right-handed hitters’ hands and nail the inner edge of the strike zone. There’s just no way to get experience against that combination of velocity and stuff.
If there’s any flaw in his game right now, it’s that Skubal doesn’t really have a good breaking ball indpendent of his other pitches. His slider plays up because his two main offerings are both elite, but it’s really a pretty average slider that thrives on velocity and the need for hitters to worry about the fastball-changeup combination. It’s a straight 90 mph pitch that doesn’t really break at all, with very pedestrian spin considering the velocity he’s throwing with. As the effectiveness of his two main pitches declines along with his velocity, he isn’t going to have that third pitch to fall back on unless he comes up with something new.
Of course, maybe he will. One of the unifying tendencies of the greats is the insane work ethic and dedication to keep making adjustments as their peak phase of raw athleticim starts to decline. Skubal can occasionally dump in a solid curveball, and as his velo declines perhaps he leans more into the sinker and converts to a pitcher who gets more ground balls than fly balls, playing the sinker and changeup off each other. When you have such outsized weapons, coming up with adjustments as they decline may be a little bit more straightforward.
Full steam ahead to 2026
For now, there’s nothing to suggest that Skubal isn’t going to go right back out there in 2026 and win his third straight Cy Young award. Garrett Crochett, Hunter Brown, Cole Ragans, and a few others, will try and step up to challenge him, but until Skubal starts losing velocity or gets injured, he’s going to remain really hard to beat.
At some point in the next few years, Skubal is basically guaranteed to have a letdown year. Maybe it will be an injury, maybe wear and tear will just sap a little gas out of the tank, but it’s bound to happen. No pitcher can maintain a peak like this for a half decade or more, particulary once they’re into their 30’s. Then the question will be if Skubal can adapt. Justin Verlander has been able to do so because he has a great slider, outstanding command, and the spin rates to continue throwing a good fastball even without the ability to scrape triple digits. Max Scherzer mixed fastball types and leaned into his excellent slider-changeup combination to continue pitching well through his mid-30’s.
Perhaps Skubal will simple mix fourseamers and sinkers more, while still relying on a changeup that wreaks havoc on either-handed hitters to remain a well above average starting pitcher. Right now, his stuff is so overpowering that he doesn’t rely on pinpoint command, but at lower velocities he may be forced to spot his stuff a little more precisely rather than just aiming over the middle and trusting his stuff.
What I hope this post illustrates, is why signing Skubal long-term was never really in the cards for the Tigers. With no apparent interest in an early extension after 2023 or 2024, he was always going to free agency.
Based on the Tigers payroll, they could afford $40 million a year for great Skubal. They would still be fine paying him $40 million a year for just good Skubal. The club is paying Javier Báez $24 million to be a quality utility player and that isn’t killing them right now. One underwater contract is not the end of the world. But what Scott Harris probably can’t do under the Ilitch family’s payroll restrictions, is pay $40 million a year for 5-6 seasons while Skubal is injured or just a fairly average pitcher down the road. That’s the fear. Such a deal could work out for the Tigers, but it’s hard to fault Scott Harris for not making that move without the Ilitch family committing to eating some of the back of that contract without limiting the rest of the Tigers’ payroll should things go that way. This is the kind of deal that ownership has to make happen. No doubt if Mike Ilitch were still around he would be pretty likely to push it through. Unlikely that the Ilitch family trust controlling the Tigers now feels the same way.
If Skubal is great for 2-3 more seasons and then is still a good starting pitcher into his mid-30’s, he’ll be plenty worth his money. If it all starts to unravel for him in his early 30’s, whoever signs him long-term is going to have a problem. But, for the likes of the Dodgers or the Mets? Just another huge deal they can easily absorb.
For now, we still have 2026 to enjoy this, so let’s just hope Skubal has at least one more monster year in him.
As we enter the last week of January, Spring Training is coming into full view and is about three weeks away for most teams. But many teams still have a need or two to address before the prep for the season arrives. The need for the Braves remains starting pitching, with some intriguing names still available. MLB.com looks at how current FA starter Zac Gallen can return to form plus reports many teams have interest in Lucas Giolito. It will be interesting to see who the Braves may target to add to their staff.
MLB.com looked back at 10 memorable games from the 2025 season. From the World Series to the All-Star game, there were certainly some fun moments to relive.
