Once upon a time, a team ahead of the curve in analytics noticed how undervalued a skill it was “not to make outs”. They made a movie based on the 2002 Athletics and 24 years later the same organization has produced hitters who would be great a cyber crime because they are elite hackers.
The A’s resistance to being more discerning, more attentive to OBP, more committed to “grinding out at bats” is shown in many different ways and has several implications. More broadly, it helps to explain why even when healthy the A’s lineup sputtered in the middle of the pack offensively despite a lineup that looked far more potent on paper.
Opposing Pitchers
Recently we have seen numerous games in which the A’s allowed opposing starting pitchers to throw around 12 pitches/inning and the impact of that is seen in some less direct and obvious ways. The earlier you knock out a SP the more you bat against the “soft underbelly” of a team’s bullpen.
By hacking early and often, the A’s have too often allowed SPs to get through 6-7 innings which in turn enables managers to lean only on their best relievers to get a game to the house. It also means fewer “high stress” innings for SPs, boosting their effectiveness throughout a start.
Walks
Walks are the stat that most directly show levels of patience, discernment, and OBP. On the surface the A’s are just around average with regard to drawing walks, but a look under the hood shows that their ranking of 17th out of 30 teams is deceiving.
Much of their “ok” BB rate comes from one batter, Nick Kurtz, whose 434 PAs produced an 18.2% BB rate. Around 8% is league average and yet here are some BB rates A’s hitters have amassed:
Jacob Wilson: 3.6%
Alika Williams: 3.6%
Colby Thomas: 3.3%
Tommy White: 2.7%
Joshua Kuroda-Grauer 1.6% (1 BB in 62 PA and it was issued by a position player)
Outs
A lack of walks is not the only casualty of a hacktastic approach to hitting. There is also how the at bat becomes so much easier for the opposing pitcher.
In the case of Wilson, it’s not just the few walks that dragged down his 2026 performance. Wilson’s “chase rate” ranked in the 4th percentile leading to far more incidences of “getting himself out”.
In 2025 Fidgety Guy’s chase rate was 22nd percentile and he batted .311/.355/.444, 116 wRC+. Hacking at the 4th percentile level the numbers plummeted to .266/.298/.388, 83 wRC+.
Max Muncy has actually maintained a passable 7.5% BB rate in 2026. Trouble is he swings at so many bad balls that when he’s not walking he’s often striking out, something he has done at a 32.6% clip this season. A good case in point was the bottom of the 5th last night when Muncy saw 5 pitches, all of them out of the strike zone, swung at 4 at them and struck out.
Tommy White is another master at “getting himself out,” with a chase rate also at the bottom of the league. He may have two 4 hit games, but by putting so many “bad balls” in play he has not been able to tap into much power as his average exit velocities are also among the worst in the league. His slash line of .261/.279/.331, 61 wRC+ tells the tale of a batter lacking in discipline or discernment leading to mostly soft singles and a lot of outs.
Pedagogy
Whether A’s coaches and instructors aren’t preaching patience and discernment or the hitters aren’t listening is an open question. However, one answer is found in the basic philosophical shift of the organization. “Moneyball” informed us that one internal rule was a hitter was expected to show a 10.0% or better BB rate before earning a promotion.
Thomas was promoted from A+ after posting a 4.6% BB rate, then from AA after showing a 6.5% BB rate.
Wilson had a 2.2% BB rate at AA, apparently enough to warrant a promotion to AAA, where his BB rate was 7.8%.
Tommy White was called up from AAA where he was walking all of 4.8% of the time. His BB rates prior ranged from 6.2% to 8.5%.
Kuroda-Grauer’s BB rate across AA and AAA this season was 5.8%. JKG is an interesting one in that he came up and took the league by storm so you could argue what he is doing is working for him. Wilson’s 2025 and 2026 seasons, however, tell the cautionary tale of how things can shift if you don’t. My personal prediction is that either Kuroda-Grauer will show more plate discipline in 2027 or his stats will take a dive like Wilson’s did.
No doubt injuries have impacted the A’s offense, more so as the season has progressed. But they were having trouble scoring away from SHP from the git go and if you’re wondering why a good starting point would be to look at the A’s swing decisions.
Exhibit A is the much beleaguered Lawrence Butler, who has put together some of the A’s very best PAs since the All-Star break. His willingness to work deep counts and take close pitches off the plate have led to a .288/.379/.508, 141 wRC+ line in the 2nd half. And it comes with a 13.0% BB rate.
“Swing hard, early and often” is not a winning strategy no matter who you are. It’s one thing to chase a slider down and away because you didn’t pick up the spin. It’s another to approach every at bat with a “swing first, ask questions later” mindset. There are many reasons the A’s offense isn’t meeting its on paper potential, but an excellent starting point would be to address the lack of commitment, across so many hitters, to “hunting hittable strikes” — and spitting on the rest.
