There is latent hope in just about every baseball prospect. Prospect, by definition, implies a good bit of promise and a lot of expectation with variability.
With Arnaldo Lantigua, though, there’s an added bit of prospect pressure. Acquired from the Los Angeles Dodgers, he was dealt to the Cincinnati Reds for an amount of international bonus pool cash that was directly used by the Trolleys to sign Roki Sasaki out of Japan, meaning the Reds – with Lantigua now in-tow – directly financed their rivals adding a potential star.
Lantigua, to his credit, has hit the ground running since joining the Reds organization despite the otherwise outsized expectations. In Arizona Complex League play in 2025 he swatted 10 homers in just 49 games – a mark that tied him with Dario Reynoso from the Giants organization for most in the league – and he slugged .445 with a .763 OPS in 129 PA after being promoted to Class-A Daytona in the pitcher-friendly Florida State League.
For reference, the likes of Tyson Lewis (.417 SLG) and Sammy Stafura (.410) were his teammates in Daytona, and Arnaldo just turned 20 years old in December.
There’s a whole lot of power in Lantigua’s bat, and there’s a whole lot to like about his power potential. That makes for quite the intriguing prospect, one you collectively ranked 10th in this year’s Community Prospect Rankings over the weekend!
Outfielder Kyle Tucker smiles during his introductory press conference at Dodger Stadium on Wednesday. (Ronaldo Bolaños / Los Angeles Times)
The Dodgers’ $240-million signing of Kyle Tucker revived anguished cries that the team is ruining baseball. It also revived a strange chapter in team history, with frenzied online commentary that the signing of Tucker was made possible in large part because Major League Baseball long ago rewarded the Dodgers’ owners with preferential financial treatment that continues to this day.
Is that true?
Yes and no.
Uh, thanks. Go on.
Remember Frank McCourt, the Dodgers’ former owner?
With the Dodgers’ local TV rights soon to expire, McCourt realized bidders for the team might offer more — and he might make more — if the bidders knew in advance how much the league would take from the sale of those rights.
In a settlement with McCourt — and to avoid the risk of the judge imposing a deal less favorable to the league — MLB agreed the fair-market value of a Dodgers TV deal would be based on the very Fox deal that Selig had rejected.
Why did that matter?
That value was $84 million for the first year and would increase thereafter, with the league taking its standard 34% cut and sharing that among all its teams.
However, with a bidding war looming between Fox Sports and Time Warner Cable, Selig knew the rights would be worth more than Fox had offered in its extension with McCourt, who needed immediate cash.
In bankruptcy court, an attorney for Guggenheim, the winning bidder and still the Dodgers’ owner, said the settlement represented a “substantial component of the value proposition of the transaction” — that is, a primary justification for the then-record $2.15-billion purchase price.
In 2013, one year after buying the team, Guggenheim sold those local TV rights. Were they indeed worth more?
You might as well ask if Shohei Ohtani is good. The rights that McCourt wanted to sell for $3 billion were bought by Time Warner Cable for a record $8.35 billion.
Because of the settlement, the league would take its cut based on a deal worth $3 billion rather than based on a deal worth $8.35 billion.
And the league was fine with this, because it wanted to help a marquee franchise return to glory?
LOL, no. In 2012, an MLB attorney had warned the court that the settlement could result in a league of “the Dodgers and the other 29 teams.” Under its terms, the Dodgers could keep tens of millions of dollars each year that otherwise would be shared with the league.
In the wake of the massive Time Warner deal, Selig’s office told other owners it planned to treat television revenue for the Dodgers like television revenue from any other team.
However, thanks to McCourt, the bankruptcy court was in charge, not the league. MLB did not have the power to redo the court-approved settlement, because Guggenheim could have asked the court to uphold the deal and order the league to abide by it.
After negotiations, MLB and Guggenheim made a modest adjustment, setting the “fair-market value” of the Time Warner deal at about $130 million for the first year rather than $84 million. That figure is used to determine the league’s cut, which for all local TV deals has since increased from 34% to 48%.
Just about every report on the Dodgers’ TV deal says the team is guaranteed $334 million each year. Is that accurate?
That $334 million is the annual average. The deal started at a lower value and increases every year.
By the time the deal ends in 2038, the Dodgers will be getting more than $500 million per year.
How is that possible? Aren’t local sports channels dying?
The parent company of the FanDuel Sports channels — including the one that carries the Angels — emerged from bankruptcy last year but now is fighting to remain in business. If your company spends millions upon millions on sports rights, and if your financial success depends on cable and satellite customers paying for a programming bundle that includes sports channels most viewers do not watch, you’re doomed.
The Angels’ local television revenue took a big hit last year and probably will do so again this year. The Milwaukee Brewers, the team that plays in the smallest market in the majors, reportedly got $35 million in its FanDuel deal last year.
The Dodgers own SportsNet LA through a related entity, American Media Productions (AMP), and the television revenue comes via a marketing and distribution agreement with Charter Communications, which inherited the deal when it acquired Time Warner Cable in 2016.
Charter’s revenue in 2024: $55 billion. The giant television, telephone and broadband company is not going out of business anytime soon, even as it is stuck with a money-losing Dodgers deal.
What did Dodgers chairman Mark Walter say upon the establishment of SportsNet LA?
“The creation of AMP will provide substantial financial resources over the coming years for the Dodgers to build on their storied legacy and bring a world championship home to Los Angeles.”
That would require teams to turn over their local broadcast rights to the league. The Dodgers’ local television revenues provide a massive competitive advantage. It’s hard to imagine Walter (and owners of other big-city teams with similar TV riches) surrendering those riches without the league offering him something significant in return.
Like what?
Perhaps a chance to exempt the Dodgers from sharing ticket revenue, or to secure the Japanese television rights now controlled by MLB. Maybe the league would buy SportsNet LA. Could be anything. But that is a 2028 issue. First up is collective bargaining, and the possibility of owners shutting down the sport next winter in pursuit of a salary cap.
Ben Williamson doesn’t rush; he just moves quickly. The defensive standout’s quick feet and steady hands earned him a promotion to MLB after just 689 plate appearances in the minors, despite his college career coming in the decidedly mid CAA. And he spent most of the first two-thirds of the 2025 season as the Mariners’ starting third baseman, despite questions about his bat.
Yet by August 1, he was back in Triple-A. While he’d been showing improvements with the bat over the course of his rookie campaign, an Eugenio Suárez reunion was too tempting for the Mariners to upgrade Williamson’s .253/.294/.310 line.
But that batting line only tells part of the story. Williamson’s 2025 reveals a fascinating development puzzle: he improved his plate discipline and contact rates as the season progressed, yet his power indicators collapsed. And while it’s as if a light bulb clicked on when he got back to Tacoma—turning in a 135 wRC+ over the last two months in AAA—key questions lingered.
The May Baseline
We checked in on B Willy after his first month in the show, when his 63 wRC+ looked concerning but there were promising signs under the hood.
The clearest room for growth was in his approach. He chased at unacceptable rates, swinging at 22.3% of pitches in the chase zone and 42.6% of pitches that were in the shadow zone but not the strike zone. And he was simultaneously too passive on hitter’s pitches, swinging at just 64.8% of pitches in the heart of the plate, compared to the league average of 72.4%. He was going fishing while avoiding meatballs like it was a Friday during Lent. While he made enough contact to avoid a Kelenic-esque strikeout rate, his walk rate jumped off the page in a bad way: 3.1%.
But under the hood, his power indicators offered hope. His dynamic hard hit rate (DHH%) was above league average, suggesting big raw power even if it wasn’t always showing up in good contact. DHH% is the best indicator for young hitters because it shows power potential by measuring how hard a player hits the ball relative to launch angle: Despite being a worse result, an 80-mph pop up requires much more strength than an 80-mph line drive, so DHH% gives a player more credit for the pop-up. In addition, despite not swinging at the right pitches, he still managed a hard-hit rate and a barrel rate around league average. It suggested that if he could improve his swing decisions, the offense would pop.
As the season progressed, so did Williamson, but not always in the ways the early data suggested.
Improving at a Cost
From there, Williamson’s plate discipline improved—mostly. He showed real improvement in the shadow zone, learning to lay off borderline pitches, and his walk rate doubled while he cut down his strikeouts by a quarter. But he didn’t improve much on pitches even farther outside the zone, in the chase region.
Zone
Pre-5/15
Post-5/15
MLB Average
Chase
31.5%
32.2%
22.6%
Shaddow (balls only)
56.1%
37.8%
43.1%
Heart
64.8%
65.5%
72.4%
How could both be true? The League figured out how to attack him. He’d go fishing on changeups and sweepers about 25% more often than average. So pitchers peppered those pitches and knew they had a fat margin for error outside the zone.
This isn’t just a question of spin on the sweepers—he also struggled with sliders, but it wasn’t as pronounced. And his swing decisions and contact rates were actually better than the league against curveballs. Nor was it purely a question of timing—again, he was better against curveballs. Rather, what this suggests is a problem with horizontal movement. That’s what the changeup and sweeper have in common.
Making matters worse, the hope that he’d tap into his power crumbled along with his launch angle. He started his MLB tour with an elevated groundball rate, at 47.8% through May 15, relative to the league’s 41.8%. But from there, it’s like he was deliberately taunting the Shai-Hulud, spiking his groundball rate to 61.8%, second-highest in MLB over that stretch.
The good news is that a lot of those groundballs got through, as he kept his hard-hit rate around average. The bad news is his DHH% was a small-sample mirage, as it went from above league average before May 15 to about half of league average afterwards. There’s not as much power potential as we’d hoped, and he’s not a swing-path change away from becoming a 30-doubles hitter.
So his overall results got better, raising his wRC+ from 62 to 83, but the adjustments he made in his swing decisions weren’t enough to outrun the league figuring him out or the collapse in his launch angle. He became a better hitter in some ways while losing what made him projectable.
The Tacoma Breakthrough?
Ben Williamson’s best trait has long been his coachability. If you don’t believe me, ask his college coaches, as Kate did last summer. So it came as an encouraging sign that he seemed to learn some lessons from his first tour of MLB.
After he returned to Tacoma, his offense exploded, even by the standards of the PCL, where every night is 90s Night.
Metric
MLB 5/15 – 7/31
AAA post-7/31
PCL Average
Slash line
.262/.311/.311
.327/.417/.510
.271/.360/.440
BB%
6.1%
12.8%
11.0%
K%
19.7%
12.8%
21.6%
ISO
.049
.183
.172
wRC+
83
135
100
But the power was illusive. Even in Triple-A, his barrel rate was just half the PCL average, and his launch angle was just 1%. He wasn’t solving the fundamental bat path issue, just thriving despite it. His success came more from contact and discipline than from barrelling up the ball.
Unfortunately, his time in Tacoma tells us little about whether he solved his vulnerability to changeups and sweepers. He saw just 33 changeups and 43 sweepers after his demotion. The good news is he looked a lot better against the ones he saw. He cut his chase rate on changeups in half and then some, going from 45.1% in MLB to just 21.1% after his demotion; and he only whiffed twice on the 14 total swings on changeups. And against the sweepers, his chase rate fell from 39.1% to 23.1%; and he only whiffed three times out of his 19 total swings. The results were better, but the reality is that 33 AAA changeups and 43 AAA sweepers aren’t enough to know if he actually solved anything.
The Floor
Even if Williamson will never be Kyle Seager or Eugenio Suárez with the bat, his glove continues to give him a floor you could live with. He led AL third basemen in DRS at the time of his demotion, and ultimately finished sixth in MLB despite playing in just 85 games. While that didn’t show up in OAA, the eye test suggests DRS is truer to reality.
So even if his Tacoma results are his true AAA talent, and his MLB results are his true MLB talent—and it’s too early to know if either is true—you still can’t slap a Quad-A label on him.
Consider what it looks like if an 85 wRC+ bat with elite defense at third base is all he is? That’s the version of Williamson that we saw between May 15 and July 31, and it put him on pace for 1.2 fWAR over 150 games, but that’s using OAA for the defensive component, which I don’t trust for Williamson’s 2025. Looking instead at Ke’Bryan Hayes’s 2022 and Maikel Garcia’s 2023, I see pretty similar profiles (with slightly better baserunning) netting out to a 2-3 win player. Baseball Reference, which uses DRS for its defensive component, suggests a 1-4 win player.
That’s not a cornerstone of a championship favorite, but it’s good enough for an everyday player on a contender if he’s one of your weak points.
Seattle might be able to do better than that at third base in 2026. Suárez is still available for money, and Colt Emerson is knocking on the door. But having Williamson as a floor option leaves the Mariners in fine shape, even if his improvements in AAA don’t translate back to the bigs. And if they do, Williamson’s a star.
Editor’s Note: We are privileged to have today’s piece written by former Let’s Go Tribe/Covering the Corner writer, Matt Schlichting, who is one of my (Quincy’s) all-time favorite baseball writers. He writes the number nine prospect recap for us each season. Thank you, Matt!
Thank you, Brian, for inviting me to contribute to the Prospect Countdown once more. In previous years, I’ve had a lot of fun with the ninth spot on the Prospect Countdown. Ralphy Velazquez invented interstellar travel by smashing an airplane past Voyager 2 last year.
Today, there is no back catalogue of backs, zydeco tapes, or stock footage of an ambulance. There is simply Juan Brito, our no. 5 prospect as voted by readers in 2024 and 2025.
The infielder entered last season as a top contender to start at second base. In 2026, he is one of many vying for the role. Thumb surgery and a hamstring strain can do that, and they also fog the statistical lens. EXAMPLE:
Brito slashed .256/.365/.443 in 652 plate appearances across 144 games for the Triple-A Columbus Clippers in 2024.
In 2025? Ninety-Nine plate appearances. Twenty-four games. .256/.357/.463. While the slash line looks familiar, his strikeout rate rose 5% to 21.2%.
Prior to the injury, Brito posted a 143 wRC+, slashing .320/.390/.540 with a 15/10 K/BB/% in fourteen games. Injuries limited other second base prospects, including former first overall pick Travis Bazzana. However, missed opportunities often hurt worse than their causes. -Matt Schlichting
Impressed at the complex league, then hit the ground running in a late season promotion to Single-A before running out of steam late in his age-17 season. Loaded with potential.
Chourio was lining up to be Cleveland’s top prospect after a sensational 2024, but he was slowed in 2025 by a nagging shoulder injury and had a very average season. He’s looking to bounce back in 2026.
Acquired from Pittsburghin the Spencer Horwitz trade, Hartle was one of Cleveland’s most successful starting pitchers in its minor league system in 2025. Stands 6-foot-6, but doesn’t have a ton of velocity.
Cleveland’s first round pick in the 2025 MLB Draft, the 6-foot-6 LaViolette instantly becomes one of the top power hitting prospects in the system. Strikeouts and contact have been an issue, however.
One of Cleveland’s most impressive hitters in its minor league system during his stint at High-A Lake County as a 20-year-old. Rosario has a unique combination of speed and power, but will need to overcome his strikeouts.
Acquired in the Josh Bell trade, Watson had his best season in 2025 after switching to the outfield from shortstop. Possesses a unique blend of speed and power mixed with great athleticism.
Daniel Espino, RHP (Age 25) 2025 (AAA): Threw 0.2 innings in Columbus at the end of the season, and threw 4 and 2/3rds innings in the Arizona Fall League. In those 5 and 1/3rd innings, he struck out 8 batters and walked 3. He gave up 7 hits (some rough batted ball luck) 2024 (IL): Missed all of 2024 and 2023 due to shoulder capsule repair issues, but as a 20 year-old in High-A in 2021 he had a 14.92/3.38 K/BB/9 and a 3.08 FIP
Espino has long been an object of wistful dreaming for Guardians’ prospect aficionados with his upper 90’s fastball and slider that might be even better than the heater. The question is whether he can ever be healthy enough to make the big leagues, where his path is probably now as a reliever.
The 19-year-old Venezuelan switch-hitting third baseman and shortstop was signed as an older 16-year-old in May 2023 (most of the highly touted prospects sign in January) to a small enough bonus that it wasn’t reported, indicating that Dalis wasn’t highly sought after as a prospect. No matter — Dalis went straight to the Dominican Summer League and though he struggled in 2023 there (69 wRC+), he was much improved when he repeated the DSL in 2024 (144 wRC+, 21 SB, more walks than strikeouts).
Mid-season 2025 Rank: NR
High Ballot: 14
Mode Ballot: 14, 27
Future Value: 35+, infield depth
Contract Status: 2023 International Free Agent, Venezuela, Rule 5 Eligible After 2027, three options remaining
MLB ETA: 2029
Dalis impressed again in fall instructs, then was a key player for a very good Rockies ACL team in 2025, where he was 1.6 years younger than league average. In 219 plate appearances, Dalis hit .352/.440/.525 with three homers, five triples, and 12 doubles along with 10 steals while walking in 13% of PA — good for a 149 wRC+ and a top 10 ranking in many offensive categories. He was even named the organizational player of the month for July.
After the ACL season ended, Dalis got a nice birthday present with a late July promotion to full-season ball with Low-A Fresno, where he was 3.2 years younger than league average. He got off to a hot start in Fresno with two multi-hit games off the bat, but he cooled off down the stretch. In 31 games at the level, Dalis hit .241/.333/.379 (100 wRC+) in 137 plate appearances, including three homers and seven doubles. On the year, Dalis was more effective hitting lefty (.890 OPS) than in a 46 plate appearance sample hitting right-handed (.733 OPS).
In the field, Dalis played mostly third base for the complex team but saw nearly half of his action in Fresno at shortstop with some second base sprinkled in. He committed 10 errors in 58 games at third, four in 22 games at shortstop, and another two in six games at second base.
Here’s some video of Dalis in Fresno this past season, including some slo-mo looks at his swing:
Dalis is a medium-framed 18-year-old Venezuelan infielder who had a good second year in the DSL, where he was among the team’s leaders in hard-hit rate.
Dalis has clearly become a prospect to watch with his strong stateside debut, though the national scouts haven’t quite caught up yet. He’ll likely begin 2026 back with Fresno, where he’ll still be one of the younger players in the league. Dalis is at least a 35+ FV player for me pending updated scouting reports and continued good performance in full season ball, ranking just off my top 30 list.
If you’ve been paying any attention over the last few years, you’ll have noticed thata smaller and smaller percentage of movies to make it to the theaters. These days, many if not most are being released directly to streaming. This used to be the sort of thing movie production companies only did when they had absolutely no faith that a movie would be well-received, now it’s the norm.
Thing is, movie companies own the streaming services, much like they used to own the theaters before the US Government forced them to divest in an anti-trust case. And the movie companies prefer the steady income of a subscription model to the boom-or-bust of the theater, so they release their movies directly to streaming – much to the frustration of the artists creating the films – because that’s all they really care about. It removes a lot of the risk from the equation for them – as long as they continue to create content and host old content that people still enjoy, they’ll get their $5-$20 bucks a month. A movie might be a critical bomb, but in this set up it can’t really be a commercial bomb – assuming they budget correctly for how many subscribers they have. On the other hand, without that risk, there’s no reward for a movie that does incredibly well, either. K-Pop Demon Hunters was a surprise smash hit for Netflix, but because it’s on their streaming service instead of in movie theaters, it couldn’t add hundreds of thousands in ticket sales; it simply maintained their subscriber numbers or maybe bumped them a little.*
*This has nothing to do with the point I’m trying to make, but spelling things out like this really gives you insight into why Netflix views “content” the way it does. Why would you give the creatives a little more time or money when it won’t benefit you in potential additional profits?
“What does this all have to do with baseball?“ I can hear you shouting, and, well, that’s easy. Baseball, with its focus on being a business, has adopted a very similar low-risk, low-reward plan. With a handful of exceptions.
The big-spending baseball teams buck the trend
People complain about the Dodgers and the Mets spending. But they don’t complain about the Yankees – except out of remembrance for what they did in the late ‘90s and early 2000s. I haven’t heard anyone complain about the Blue Jays, White Sox, Cubs, or even Red Sox despite those teams also residing in super-sized markets. Why is that? Well, because the Dodgers and Mets are doing what precious few other teams have been willing to do in recent years. They’re taking “risks.”
The Mets have an owner who has thrown the team’s maximization of profits out the window in an effort to chase wins because he’s a fan of the team first, and a business owner in his other endeavors – as I have often advocated MLB owners should be. The Dodgers are buoyed by not only a TV contract significantly better than most of the rest of the league, but one that they are not responsible for sharing with anyone else due to loopholes added to the team when MLB needed to find a buyer.
But the reasons these two teams are willing to outspend everyone are less important than the reality that they are willing to do it. The Yankees and Blue Jays didn’t get Kyle Tucker because they were simply unwilling to take the risks that the Dodgers were. And this is the thing that sets these two teams apart.
Some teams could have been doing much better
But it’s not just the Yankees who have been playing things safe. This brings us to the Milwaukee Brewers, a team held up as the modern ideal of a middle-market club in MLB. Last week, the Brewers traded away their ace, Freddy Peralta, for prospects – high-level prospects, to be sure, but prospects. They explicitly made their team worse in 2026, a year after reaching the National League Championship Series. Why did they do this? Was it because they couldn’t afford Peralta’s $8M salary? No. It was because they decided that they weren’t going to try to offer him an extension to keep him around for the rest of their young core after this season and they could improve the franchise’s total talent over the next few years by trading him. They traded known talent now for future potential talent. This is the kind of move that used to be reserved only for teams approaching the trade deadline who realized they had very slim odds of reaching the playoffs, but which are now common among the “smart” mid-to-small market teams such as the Brewers, Guardians, Rays, and even Mariners.
The Brewers, as I said earlier are held up as the best franchise going that doesn’t spend a ton of money. Royals owner John Sherman even pointed to them as the franchise he hoped to mold the Royals into. And, on the surface, that sounds like a good thing. They’ve made the playoffs seven of the last eight seasons. They’ve won their division five times in that span, including in each of the last three years. What Royals fan wouldn’t salivate over that kind of success?
But they’ve also only made it to the Championship Series twice, getting swept out of it last season, and they’ve gotten knocked out in the Wild Card round four times in those seven playoff appearances. They haven’t made the World Series even once. And after taking the Dodgers to a CS Game 7 in 2018, they haven’t gotten close.
The Cleveland Guardians have made the playoffs in seven of the last ten seasons. They have made it to the Championship Series twice, the World Series once – in 2016. They haven’t won it all. The Rays have made the postseason five of the last seven seasons, but neither of the last two. They’ve made the Championship Series and World series once each, in the same season. The Mariners have won more games than they’ve lost in each of the last five seasons, but made the playoffs only twice and the Championship Series in 2025 was the limit of their reach. It was also, notably, the first time in years that they approached the deadline by adding some of the best available talent in Josh Naylor and Eugenio Suárez at the deadline instead of trading away some of their players for more prospects.
How different might things be if these teams took a few more risks? Sure, there’s a chance they’d make a dud move like signing Albert Pujols, Anthony Rendon, or Jason Heyward. But if one of these teams had been the ones to add a Teoscar Hernández or Brandon Nimmo or Cody Bellinger, how much more success might they have had? But risk-aversion means they play it safe, consistently win games, but never end having a real shot at glory. They do just enough to keep their fans invested, but never enough to get over that hump because they’re more terrified that they’ll miss than motivated to try to win.
The Royals are different – but only a little
The Royals have set themselves apart from these other small market clubs with their willingness to spend in recent years. Two offseasons ago they went out and gave real dollars – though not a ton of them – to pitchers Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha to stabilize their rotation. Then, over the past two seasons, they’ve given those guys extensions to keep them around while their farm system catches up. At the trade deadlines, while other teams with similar records like the Guardians and Diamondbacks were selling, the Royals were buying. This off-season, it’s easy to be frustrated with how little the Royals have done, but look around the league at what other teams are doing.
The Guardians have added no one, though at least they’ve also not lost anyone of note. The Rays have traded away Kam Misner, Shane Baz, Brandone Lowe, Jake Mangum, and Josh Lowe. They refused to tender Pete Fairbanks despite him being one of the better relievers in baseball last season. They’ve added only Gavin Lux, Cedric Mullins, and Steven Matz – once-good players nearing the ends of their respective careers. The Mariners kept Josh Naylor and added Rob Refsnyder, but let Jorge Polanco and Eugenio Suárez go.
The Brewers, the so-called model franchise, let Rhys Hoskins go before dealing away Nick Mears, Isaac Collins, Tobias Myers, and Freddy Peralta. They’ve added no one projected to be worth even a single fWAR to their major league team.
This isn’t a defense of the Royals. They’d be easy favorites for the division if they’d been willing to take the risk of signing Cody Bellinger or Bo Bichette. But they’re still trying harder than their peers, and that means something. At least for now. As I said earlier, John Sherman wants to ultimately become a Brewers clone. If he ever gets there, we might be in for the same frustration that I am sure Brewers fans feel right now of watching their team sit right on the edge of greatness but unwilling to ever take a step forward toward the ultimate prize for fear of tripping over their own feet.
Jonathan India is the prime example of the Royals sitting in the middle-ground
If Jonathan India hadn’t played for the Royals last year, and KC had given him the deal they did, many Royals fans would be celebrating the choice to bring a bounce-back candidate in to give Michael Massey some competition for his roster spot. Especially because at one year and $8 million, it’s an extremely reasonable contract to give a guy who is still only entering his age-29 season, who still showed elite chase rates in 2025, and was a productive major leaguer for the previous four seasons. It would be a risk, sure, but a reasonably smart one.
Instead, because he did play for the Royals last year it reads as an extremely safe play, a choice to preserve the floor he represents to the team rather than go out and take a real risk by signing someone like Jorge Polanco or Bo Bichette. And that, I think, is the lens through which to view their move in keeping India.
The problem with keeping India isn’t that his contract is a little risky, it’s that the upside of such a risk is so low as to feel pointless. Let’s be clear, the Royals could have cut him and “played it safer”; certainly other teams made those choices such as when the Rays moved on from Christopher Morel or the Brewers dealt Isaac Collins. But it’s one of the “safest” risks the Royals could have made. And that’s why it disappoints so many of us. Go big or go home, as the saying goes.
The Royals are trying to straddle a line that pretty much no other team is even willing to approach. We’ll have to see both if it pays off in 2026 and if they’re willing to continue being even this aggressive into the future.
After six months of intermittent rumors, the Mets finally completed a trade for Luis Robert. The 28-year-old center fielder heads to Queens in exchange for Luisangel Acuña and Truman Pauley, the Mets’ 12th-round pick in last year’s draft. Robert is under contract for $20M in 2026 with an additional club option for $20M in 2027.
If you’re a Robert skeptic, I hear you. He batted only .223/.297/.364 for the White Sox last year, posting a pitiful 84 wRC+ equivalent to his 2024 mark. A history of hamstring, hip flexor, and other injuries (groin, calf, and wrist among them) has prevented Robert from ever topping 145 games in a season; he’s only topped 100 games twice in his six-year career. We’re now three years removed from Robert’s last above average offensive season, his career-best 2023 in which he hit 38 HR, posted a 129 wRC+, and accrued 4.9 fWAR.
Let’s lay out the positives, though. Even as his offense has fallen off the last two seasons, Robert has remained a high-quality defender in center field (1 OAA in 2024, 7 OAA in 2025). The physical skills—chiefly his bat speed and sprint speed—are both pretty clearly intact given the better-than 90th percentile marks he posted last season. Even his strikeout rate, which increased in 2023 and peaked over 30% in 2024, improved markedly in 2025, driven by both a higher contact rate and better swing decisions. In fact, Robert ran a 95th percentile SEAGER last season, the highest mark of his career.
That paints the picture of a player with a pretty solid floor, a high-quality center fielder with speed and power. There’s real upside here beyond that, though, as Robert was one of the unluckiest hitters in baseball last season by xwOBA. It’s not because his spray angles suck either, as he manages above average pulled fly ball rates. If you’re a fan of arbitrary endpoint analysis, we might’ve already gotten a glimpse at a more accurate representation of Robert’s output from June to August last season; .262/.326/.431, with a 109 wRC+.
We’ve not addressed the injuries of course, and indeed the date window above ends in August because Robert pulled his hamstring and missed the rest of the season. The Mets are particularly well positioned to accommodate this sort of injury prone upside play because of Carson Benge.
Benge is the #2 prospect in the system and is going to be a consensus top-20 or higher name by the end of the offseason (BA had him 19th, BP will have him higher). The Mets are pretty clearly giving Benge runway to win a job out of spring training and run with it, something they’re incentivized to do under the PPI system. With Robert around, Benge now projects as the starting left fielder, but he’s completely capable of sliding over to center if/when Robert misses time. If things really go south for whatever reason, Benge can stay in center with Brett Baty in left. Or maybe A.J. Ewing is ready. Or maybe the Mets make a trade for a corner bat (something that is usually pretty cheap at the deadline). The point is that the Mets have the optimal roster construction to roll the dice on a high-upside, injury prone center field option like Robert
In a vacuum, the return here is not strictly nothing. Luisangel Acuña has enough defensive utility to be an interesting bench bat and could maybe get the offense to passable given enough runway to figure it out. Truman Pauley is a fun prospect, a Harvard sophomore who never posted impressive stats but popped on stuff models. Both of those profiles have some level of value.
For the Mets, though, the cost is fairly inconsequential. Acuña’s bat is a weakness (no, you shouldn’t care about his Winter League home run barrage) and his ability to play shortstop doesn’t matter with the Mets’ current roster. Critically, he’s also out of options, meaning the Mets would have had to either carry a sub-optimal player on the bench and give him no development runway or lose him through waivers. Trading him is a far better outcome, both for the Mets and Acuña, who should get an extended run to see if things click in Chicago.
As for Pauley, you’d love to keep all of these guys, but the Mets drafted literally four other arms that fit this broad description with higher picks in the same draft, and have shown a penchant for improving most any arm they bring into the system. Moving this kind of player is an option afforded to you by having the best pitching development apparatus in baseball.
So in total, the Mets got a high-upside center field option with a clear floor independent of his top-line offensive output. They have the right roster construction to appropriately hedge the associated injury risk. If things work out, they can keep Robert for another season at only $20M; if not, they can decline the option and move on. And to add this player, they paid a cost that is inconsequential to the organization. Every part of this is a slam dunk win, making this move a clear A+.
One of the things the Cubs lacked in their 92-win team in 2025 was a good, traditional backup outfielder.
They had Vidal Bruján backing up Pete Crow-Armstrong in center field, and that, as you know, was hardly optimal. Willi Castro and Jon Berti also played outfield for the Cubs last year. Apart from Ian Happ, PCA, Kyle Tucker and Seiya Suzuki, the only true outfielder who played for the 2025 Cubs was Owen Caissie.
The Cubs are attempting to address this by adding some outfield depth. Last week they signed Chas McCormick, formerly of the Astros, to a minor-league deal with a NRI to Spring Training (Bluesky link):
McCormick had a really good year for Houston in 2023, batting .273/.353/.489 with 22 home runs in 115 games, good for 3.4 bWAR. Injuries ruined McCormick’s last two years; he played in just 64 games in 2025 and didn’t crack a .600 OPS either of the last two seasons.
I don’t think the Cubs are looking for miracles here, though McCormick has been a useful outfielder at times in his career. He turns 31 in April. Most likely, he gets stashed at Triple-A Iowa as outfield insurance. He does have 33 games of postseason experience.
Oh, and his actual given name is… Chas. It’s not short for “Charles.”
There’s been no official announcement by the team regarding another signing, but there’s a clue from this social media post:
There was some ambiguity about whether the Cubs would sign Dylan Carlson with Chas McCormick and Justin Dean in the organization, but it’s my understanding Cubs are signing Carlson to an MiLB deal with a ST invite. He’s battled health issues, but could be a nice add if healthy. https://t.co/bAQZqJNieJ
So, if Dylan Carlson is working out with Cubs players at the Sloan Park complex, I’d think that’s a pretty good sign that he’s also, as noted, been signed to a minor-league deal with a Spring Training NRI.
Just five years ago, Carlson was a Top 20 prospect in all of baseball. Indeed, he had a really good year with the Cardinals in 2021, batting .266/.343/.437 with 31 doubles and 18 home runs. That got him a third-place finish in Rookie of the Year voting.
His numbers declined in 2022 and by 2023 he was a backup outfielder with the Cardinals. As was the case with McCormick, injuries appear to have been a lot of the issue here, including a hamstring strain, oblique strain, shoulder strain. Lastly, there was an ankle sprain that eventually required surgery.
In 2025, Carlson rode the Orioles’ Triple-A shuttle, recalled and optioned the maximum allowed five times, and batted just .203/.278/.336 in 83 games with Baltimore. He did hit well in 28 games at Triple-A Norfolk, .294/.421/.451.
Fun fact: At the trade deadline in 2024, Carlson was traded to the Rays from the Cardinals for Shawn Armstrong. Exactly a month later the Cardinals waived Armstrong and the Cubs claimed him. Armstrong posted a 4.91 ERA and 1.909 WHIP in eight games for the Cubs in September 2024. He’s played for eight teams, which makes him a great Immaculate Grid answer.
Carlson is only 27. If he’s healthy, perhaps he can recover some of that ability that made him a top prospect. At this point, on a NRI he’s certainly worth it. If he can’t play, he just gets released. If he can? Maybe he makes the team and Kevin Alcántara goes back to Iowa. Carlson’s a switch-hitter, so there’s that.
Just thought this would be a useful topic of discussion on a January day when there’s not much news.
When Brewers fans talk about the bullpen, names like Trevor Megill or Abner Uribe usually dominate the conversation. That makes sense. Closers and flamethrowers tend to get the attention. But one of the most important arms in Milwaukee’s bullpen is not the one finishing games or lighting up the radar gun. It is Jared Koenig, a pitcher whose value lies in how often he keeps games from getting away in the first place.
Koenig is not flashy, and he does not fit the archetype of the modern reliever who racks up saves or piles up strikeouts in highlight clips. His stat line — 2.67 ERA, 3.31 FIP, 131 Ks, 128 IP over 127 appearances in 2024 & 2025 — doesn’t blow you away either.
What he does instead is quietly stabilize games. Over the course of the last two seasons with Milwaukee, he has taken on a steady diet of meaningful innings and turned them into outs with remarkable consistency. That kind of contribution rarely drives headlines, but it often determines whether a team survives the grind of 162 games.
His path to this role makes his emergence even more notable. Koenig was drafted in the 35th round in 2014 and spent years bouncing around independent leagues, including stops overseas, simply trying to keep his career alive. There was no fast track, no top-prospect pedigree, and no guarantee he would ever see sustained major league time. That background usually leads to a brief appearance in the majors, not a dependable role on a contending roster. Yet Koenig has carved out exactly that.
The Brewers have built much of their recent success on finding value where others do not, particularly with pitching. Koenig fits neatly into that organizational identity. He commands the strike zone, limits free passes, and misses enough bats to escape trouble. As a left-hander, he provides matchup flexibility, but he is far more than a situational specialist. Milwaukee has shown a willingness to deploy him against a wide range of hitters and in a variety of leverage spots, which signals genuine trust rather than simple necessity.
What makes Koenig especially important is the role he plays in the middle innings. Not every game is decided in the ninth, and many are won or lost in the sixth or seventh, when a starter exits and the opposing lineup turns over again. Koenig has been one of the Brewers’ most reliable options in those moments. He does not just bridge innings. He prevents momentum from swinging. When he enters with runners on base or a slim lead, the game often slows down.
That reliability matters even more for a roster built on depth and flexibility. Milwaukee rarely leans on a single dominant bullpen arm for long stretches. Instead, responsibility is spread across multiple relievers, with roles shifting as performance ebbs and flows. Koenig’s ability to absorb innings without drama allows the Brewers to protect their higher-octane arms and avoid overexposing younger or less consistent relievers. Over a long season, that kind of workload management can be the difference between a bullpen holding together in September and October or unraveling.
There is also reason to believe Koenig’s performance is not a fluke. He showed signs of breaking out last season, and rather than regressing, he has built on that success. That kind of year-to-year stability is rare for relievers, whose results are often driven by small-sample volatility. Koenig’s continued effectiveness points to a skill set that is more repeatable than random.
Pitchers like Koenig are easy to overlook because they do not fit neatly into traditional narratives. They do not close games, do not collect awards, and do not dominate trade deadline discourse. But teams that consistently reach October almost always have several players like him. They are not stars, but they are indispensable. They turn close games into wins and prevent losing streaks from spiraling.
If the Brewers are going to sustain success and push deeper into the postseason, they will need contributions beyond the obvious names. Koenig represents the kind of hidden value that has defined Milwaukee’s approach for years. He is not the most exciting Brewer, but he may be one of the most important.
We have hit the lull in between the hot stove league and Spring Training. There will be more deals made between now and then, but your Houston Astros are probably winding down their additions and changes. This affords us time to dive into some side conversations that could prove interesting. Last week, the BBWAA elected former Astro Carlos Beltran into the Baseball Hall of Fame along with Andruw Jones. This year’s induction ceremony will feature two former Astros.
The Hall of Fame index is a systemic way to look at Hall of Fame fitness, but like most methods it needs context and counterbalances to be meaningful. The index combines baseball-reference WAR and Fangraphs WAR into one number. It is similar to JAWS in that it combines career value and peak value for one tidy number. The number itself is only relevant if we compare it to other players at the same position. Since Beltran spent much of his career as a center fielder, we will compare him with the four players closest to him in the index.
We will look at the index itself, but we will also look at offensive metrics, fielding metrics, overall metrics, and a deeper dive into WAR to see how those wins were parceled out. We do that because some people are not big on WAR and WAR itself has its own secret sauce which is difficult to understand for many fans. We want to look at its components so that it makes more sense. We will start with the index itself.
The Hall of Fame Index
BWAR
FWAR
BWAR10
FWAR10
Index
Billy Hamilton
63.2
70.3
55.8
61.0
250.3
Carlos Beltran
70.1
67.8
54.8
56.2
248.9
Andruw Jones
62.7
67.0
57.9
61.0
248.6
Duke Snider
65.9
63.5
60.0
56.1
245.5
Jim Edmonds
61.4
64.5
55.0
58.4
239.3
There are two important parts of the index that make it different from JAWS. The first thing is the addition of FWAR. is the first major difference. Different WAR formulas look at performance slightly differently and including both of those gives us a richer view of the player. Fielding seems to be most significant difference, but there are some differences on the offensive end as well. The second major difference is a ten year peak versus a seven year peak. The additional three seasons adds key data, but the biggest reason is that it takes ten seasons to be eligible for the Hall of Fame, so it felt appropriate to make the peak ten seasons.
The key is how we interpret the index. It is not meant to rank order players. It is meant to measure fitness. Beltran is not necessarily better than Jones. They are virtually similar in terms of value. Furthermore, all of these players are similar in value. It is more accurately used like Bill James’ similarity scores. If a player is similar to others that are universally seen as Hall of Famers then they are probably a Hall of Famer. If they are similar to players that are not seen as Hall of Famers then their case is a little more shaky.
We look at the other numbers (offense, fielding, and durability numbers) to provide more context and determine how WAR was arrived at. On the offensive end, we are using OPS+ which compares players with the league at the time. 100 is considered to be average with most of these players coming above that. We also include offensive winning percentage which assumes a regular lineup of nine players identical to him with average pitching. We will also use real offensive value and bases per out that I have used in previous articles. Real offensive value combines batting average and secondary average. Bases per out combines total bases, walks, stolen bases, and hit by pitches and divides that by total outs.
Offensive Numbers
OPS+
ROV
OW%
BPO
Billy Hamilton
141
.384
.731
1.178
Carlos Beltran
119
.312
.612
.835
Andruw Jones
111
.308
.554
.806
Duke Snider
140
.339
.707
.923
Jim Edmonds
132
.337
.659
.917
Offensive winning percentage is one of my favorite metrics. Imagine a team that has a .731 winning percentage. it is staggering. Hamilton’s numbers are just stupid. A part of the problem with 19th century players is that some of the data is unavailable. So, his numbers are relevant in comparison with his contemporaries, but not as relevant in comparison with these guys. However, that BPO is ridiculously good. He combined high average, on base skills, and speed to enormous value.
The biggest takeaway here is that Edmonds looks a lot better than we thought he would and I imagine better than most of the voters thought. In comparison, Jones and Beltran look a little more ordinary. Of course, hitting is not the only part of value. No single test qualifies or disqualifies a player. We take them all in concert to get an overall look at a player. This is why numerous statisticians like stats like WAR. It aims to include everything a player does into one tidy number. I include all of the components because WAR is not universally recognized as a valuable tool.
In terms of fielding we are looking at Rfield from baseball-reference.com. It is closely correlated to defensive runs saved, but obviously predates that for most of these players. DWAR and FG are similar numbers that measure a player against the replacement level fielder. In this case, it is an overall look at the baseball universe, so certain positions are assumed to be more valuable than others. Some of these players played other positions than center field, so their DWAR and FG will be affected. However, the differences between DWAR and FG can help explain the differences between BWAR and FWAR. In the last category we simply look at the Rfield for just center field.
Fielding
Rfield
DWAR
FG
CF
Billy Hamilton
30
-5.2
-5.0
30
Carlos Beltran
39
2.0
0.4
33
Andruw Jones
235
24.4
27.9
253
Duke Snider
-22
-5.9
-4.6
-21
Jim Edmonds
37
6.4
7.3
48
I don’t think it is hypebole to say that Jones is the most valuable defensive center fielder in the game’s history. He surpasses Willie Mays in Rfield and DWAR. Obviously, all rating systems include some level of subjectivity. However, Jones performance here helps explain where his value comes from. When you include off the charts defensive value with good offensive value you get a compelling case for the Hall of Fame.
When we remove Snider, we see that the other three are pretty similar in value. Hamilton’s DWAR and FG lag behind largely because of the era. Other positions were considerably more valuable and most of those came on the infield. It was likely the nature of the game itself which was what historians would call “inside baseball”. If homers are depressed then players will focus on line drives and ground balls. That puts more of a premium on infield defense.
In Beltran’s case, we see overall good defensive value and offensive value. When you are good at both then you are very good overall. The last leg of the value puzzle is longevity. We use Bill James’ total runs formula to calculate that. We add runs created, fielding runs, base running runs, and a positional adjustment to come up with total runs.
Total Runs
RC
Rfield
Rbaser
Rpos
TR
Billy Hamilton
1225
30
53
-86
1222
Carlos Beltran
1731
39
55
-15
1810
Andruw Jones
1255
235
9
16
1515
Duke Snider
1475
-22
13
-26
1440
Jim Edmonds
1408
37
-11
31
1465
This is the missing piece. Beltran doesn’t look overwhelming when we look at the offensive and fielding value numbers, but these numbers are staggering. If a good player adds 100 total runs a season then he has three seasons worth of production over all of these players. It helps explain how Hamilton could be so good in the value numbers, but similar in overall value to the other four.
When we combine these three tests we get a pretty clear picture of these five players. However, we have one more test to go. In this case, we are looking at BWAR seasons to determine how often they were among the league’s best. It isn’t always universal, but five WAR seasons make you among the league’s best. Four win seasons are usually all-star campaigns. Solid regulars get three WAR. Additionally, we will note how often each player led the league in BWAR.
BWAR Seasons
5 WAR
4 WAR
3 WAR
MVP
Billy Hamilton
6
4
0
2
Carlos Beltran
6
3
2
0
Andruw Jones
6
2
2
0
Duke Snider
7
1
1
2
Jim Edmonds
7
2
1
0
A lack of leading the league does not make someone unfit for the Hall of Fame. Obviously, the reverse is also true. However, it does add needed context to a career. Players can accumulate WAR over 20 seasons or 12. This table helps illustrate that. Most baseball fans are captivated by greatness. In many ways, that is the deciding factor when looking at a borderline Hall of Famer. How often were they great?
Each of these players end up being pretty close in that regard. I’d say the biggest takeaway is that Beltran overwhelmed through longevity, Jones overwhelmed with defense, and Jim Edmonds has gotten the shaft to date. He should be next in line.
The Mets have one of the best farm systems in baseball -- even after trading two of their top prospects in the Freddy Peralta deal -- and they're well-represented on The Athletic's new top 100 prospects list ahead of the 2026 season.
Law heralds McLean as someone who could be a top-of-the-rotation starter, and writes that Benge could end up being an above-average defender in center field.
Regarding Tong, Law says he has the upside of a No. 2 starter.
As far as Ewing, Law notes that he could profile as a regular in center field, adding that there's a chance he becomes a star "if he lifts the ball a little more to get to more home run power."
McLean dazzled in 48.0 innings over eight starts during his big league debut last season, posting a 2.06 ERA and 1.04 WHIP while striking out 57 batters. He is expected to slot near the top of the 2026 rotation.
The other two prospects on the list could open 2026 in the minors.
Tong showed flashes during his first taste of the majors in 2025, but his arsenal can use some refining.
As far as Ewing, he had a breakout season in 2025, slashing .315/.401/.429 (.830 OPS) across three levels, ending with Double-A Binghamton. The speedy Ewing smacked 10 triples and 26 doubles while swiping 70 bases.
Jett Williams and Brandon Sproat, the prospects the Mets traded in the Peralta deal, ranked No. 45 and No. 75, respectively.
San Diego Padres pitcher Joe Musgrove said he is anxious to get back on the mound for his hometown team and a year of good health as he and the Padres look to return to the postseason according to Kevin Acee of the San Diego Union-Tribune. Musgrove spoke at a ribbon-cutting ceremony at San Dieguito Community Park where he and centerfielder Jackson Merrill were in attendance for the re-opening of a ballpark that is used for the Miracle League of San Diego. Musgrove said he wants to have a normal season but understands that the ultimate goal is to pitch in October.
Padres News:
Gaslamp Ball conducted a poll and asked readers which of three free agent pitchers they would prefer the Padres to sign, Lucas Giolito, Nick Martinez or Justin Verlander? The three pitchers were named as possible targets for San Diego by Ken Rosenthal of The Athletic. Readers overwhelmingly prefer to see Giolito on the mound for the Padres in 2026.
Baseball News:
MLB.com reported many teams are interested in signing Giolito and the most recent team to express its interest is the Detroit Tigers according to a report from MLB Network insider Jon Heyman.
For just the fourth time, a player has topped the ballot in his first try, and technically No. 1 overall voted prospect Braden Montgomery sorta doesn’t count. But this round, Zach Franklin has joined Mathias LaCombe and Ky Bush as first-timers and Vote winners all in one sweep. Franklin romped in sparse voting, with 15 of 39 (38%) votes:
Franklin’s 38% was the biggest share of the Vote in the last 11 rounds. It’s the righty reliever’s first time on our ballot.
Past No. 32s in the SSS Top Prospect Vote 2025 Voting lasted only 31 rounds 2024 Eric Adler (29%) 2023 Voting lasted only 24 rounds 2022 Voting lasted only 17 rounds 2021 Will Kincanon (43%) 2020 José Rodríguez (29%) 2019 Ryan Burr (67%) 2018 Justin Yurchak (37%)
Franklin became just second righty and third relief pitcher (and second still with the club, with Peyton Pallette’s loss to Cleveland) to advance:
For this round, it’s another righty reliever, Phil Fox, who joins the fun.
South Side Sox Top-Voted White Sox Prospects for 2026
Alexander Albertus Third Baseman Age 21 2025 high level Arizona Complex League (Rookie) Age relative to high level +0.4 years Overall 2025 stats 8 games ▪️ 0 HR ▪️ 2 RBI ▪️ .333/.520/.444 ▪️ 3-of-3 (100.0%) SB ▪️ 6 BB ▪️ 3 K ▪️ 1.000 FLD%▪️ 0.3 WAR
What can you say further about Albertus? He seems to have great tools but an uncanny ability to stay off of the field (just eight games in a season-plus in the White Sox system). In 2025, he was assigned to Kannapolis but was … wait for it … injured. He lasted just eight games of ACL rehab before hitting the IL-60 again.
Marcelo Alcala Center Fielder Age 20 2025 high level ACL (Rookie) Age relative to high level -0.6 years Overall 2025 stats 42 games ▪️ 7 HR ▪️ 19 RBI ▪️ .233/.325/.479 ▪️ 14-of-15 (93.3%) SB ▪️ 14 BB ▪️ 63 K ▪️ .935 FLD%▪️ 1.2 WAR
Alcala is a talent to dream on. Though still raw, he flashed power that we simply do not see in the White Sox system, especially when combined with the raw speed that can swipe bases at a 90%+ rate. Defense and bat discipline are issues to be sure, but imagine what additional outfield reps, AZ batting cage time, and even some training on the bases could do.
Aldrin Batista Right-Handed Starting Pitcher Age 22 2025 SSS Prospect Poll ranking 6 2025 high level Winston-Salem (High-A) Age relative to high level -1.2 years Overall 2025 stats 2-0 ▪️ 7 games (2 starts) ▪️ 14 IP ▪️ 5.79 ERA ▪️ 17 K ▪️ 7 BB ▪️ 1.429 WHIP ▪️-1.2 WAR
Batista was our No. 6-voted player in last year’s poll and top righthander — and then disaster struck, as he started the third Dash game of the season on April 6 and then was out more than four months with a stress fracture in his right (pitching) elbow. His return in late August was iffy, with three poor relief appearances of five. But he ended the season with a scoreless (two-inning) “opener” start, which hopefully reverses the curse for 2026.
Reudis Diaz Right-handed relief pitcher Age 20 2025 high level ACL (Rookie) Age relative to high level -2.1 years Overall 2025 stats 1-1 ▪️ 1 SV▪️ 21 games (4 finishes) ▪️ 27 2/3 IP ▪️ 2.28.ERA ▪️ 18 K ▪️ 8 BB ▪️ 1.084 WHIP ▪️1.2 WAR
Who? You’re forgiven for being unfamiliar with an extremely young arm who hasn’t yet gotten out of rookie ball, but our No. 77 prospect a year ago (then a starter, repeating the DSL and killing it) made a successful adjustment Stateside. He’ll return to starting in 2026, likely getting his feet wet in Arizona and getting a promotion to Low-A in the second half of the season.
Phil Fox Right-Handed Relief Pitcher Age 23 2025 high level Birmingham (AA) Age relative to high level -2.7 years Overall 2025 stats (High-A/AA) 2-3▪️ 11 SV ▪️ 46 games (23 finishes) ▪️ 63 2/3 IP ▪️ 3.25 ERA ▪️ 78 K ▪️ 14 BB ▪️ 0.974 WHIP ▪️ 1.0 WAR
The clear closer among those arms with little experience in the higher minors, Fox absolutely dominated High-A in 2025. While his ERA is a touch high given his amazing control (5.57 K/BB), Fox was pitching significantly young for his level even while at High-A, much less Double-A. He and Zach Franklin are the true top late options in the system.
Ryan Galanie First Baseman Age 25 2025 high level Birmingham (AA) Age relative to high level +1.3 years Overall 2025 stats (High-A/AA) 119 games ▪️ 11 HR ▪️ 94 RBI ▪️ .276/.327/.422 ▪️ 14-of-17 (82.4%) SB ▪️ 35 BB ▪️ 79 K ▪️ .995 FLD%▪️ 1.1 WAR
It’s been a slow but steady climb for this 13th-rounder in 2023. The good news here is, with the caveat that Galanie has always competed older than his level, Galanie has found some footing. While his power/slugging numbers are merely OK, he drove in 94 runs in 2025. He disappeared a bit in the playoffs for Birmingham (just four hits in six games, with five walks as well) but started every game in the march to a second consecutive Southern League title for the Barons.
Jairo Iriarte Right-Handed Relief Pitcher Age 24 2025 SSS Top Prospect Vote Ranking 19 2025 high level Charlotte (AAA) Age relative to high level -4.3 years Overall 2025 stats (Rookie/AAA) 3-3▪️ 1 SV ▪️ 37 games (5 starts, 9 finishes) ▪️ 48 IP ▪️ 7.13 ERA ▪️ 50 K ▪️ 37 BB ▪️ 1.917 WHIP ▪️ -0.8 WAR
The 2025 season was an utter disaster for Iriarte, who went from prospective South Side rotation member to lost in space. The righty, who made his brief debut in the majors in 2024, both lost the plate and misplaced his strikeout power. The Brian Bannister Pitching Lab has its work cut out here, for sure.
Javier Mogollón Shortstop Age 20 2025 high level Kannapolis (Low-A) Age relative to high level -1.4 years Overall 2025 stats 51 games ▪️ 5 HR ▪️ 19 RBI ▪️ .220/.347/.387 ▪️ 15-of-21 (71.4%) SB ▪️ 30 BB ▪️ 56 K ▪️ .971 FLD%▪️ 1.0 WAR
An ascending star just one year ago, we have to tap the breaks a bit on Mogollón after a lackluster first full season of minors ball. While still young for his level and managing to keep his head above water in a new league every season of his career, Mogollón’s undeniable hitting in Rookie ball fell off significantly with the Cannon Ballers. However, how much of that was due to battling injury is undetermined, as Mogollón was shelved for what turned out to be the season on July 2.
Yobal Rodriguez Right-Handed Starting Pitcher Age18 2025 high levelDSL White Sox (Rookie) Age relative to high level -1.5 years Overall 2025 stats0-3 ▪️ 13 games (10 starts) ▪️ 30 1/3 IP ▪️2.97 ERA ▪️ 33 K ▪️ 13 BB ▪️ 1.022 WHIP ▪️ 1.2 WAR
Rodriguez is a rare DSL pitcher, not for his relatively light innings load, but as a primary starter — and at just 17 years old (Yobal turns 18 on February 9). Inasmuch as it’s tough to project anyone out of the DSL, especially pitchers, you could hardly have hoped for more from him in his pro debut.
Tyler Schweitzer Left-Handed Starting Pitcher Age25 2025 high levelCharlotte (AAA) Age relative to high level -3.3 years Overall 2025 stats (AA/AAA) 8-2 ▪️ 27 games (10 starts) ▪️ 99 2/3 IP ▪️4.61 ERA ▪️ 81 K ▪️ 41 BB ▪️ 1.344 WHIP ▪️ 0.8 WAR
Schweitzer relieved in most of his games in 2025, but he remains a starter in our eyes given he was consistently paired with Tanner McDougal in Birmingham Barons starts. And in Birmingham, Schweitzer was divine: 1.27 ERA that included a long scoreless streak leading to a Charlotte promotion, 0.946 WHIP. However, everything the southpaw did as a Baron, he undid as a Knight (7.92 ERA, 1.740 ERA). While other gilded arms (Drew Thorpe, Grant Taylor) get to skip Charlotte entirely, Schweitzer was not so lucky. And that luck could prevent him from ever seeing the majors.
Round 24 of voting was the last of 2023 (we did not do an actual wrap for the voting, but Jordan Sprinkle ended up being our final pick), and the full archive.
Despite temperatures in the feels-like single digits, you know baseball season is right around the corner when Evan Grant begins his roster projections.
The Orioles roster seems to be in pretty good shape. Mike Elias has beefed up the rotation and, if reports are to be believed, he could still bring in Framber Valdez. The additions of Pete Alonso and Taylor Ward should provide some pop in the middle of the lineup. And Ryan Helsley feels like a solid bet to bounce back and be a dependable ninth-inning option.
But that doesn’t mean that the squad is without flaws or question marks. The Orioles are far from runaway favorites in the American League. In fact, you could argue (pretty easily) that they are the fourth-best team in their own division, albeit with some untapped potential that others in the AL East lack.
Spring training is just two weeks away. Many of the players are likely to be in Sarasota sooner than that. Elias and the Orioles still need to sort out several things about their roster if they want to make a postseason run.
Is everyone in the rotation truly healthy?
It has become an annual tradition for Elias to address the media at some point in the spring and announce that at least one of the starters they were counting on has actually suffered a catastrophic injury.
The Orioles already have five solid rotation options in tow: Bradish, Trevor Rogers, Shane Baz, Dean Kremer, and Zach Eflin. And yet, they are continuing to seek out an upgrade.
Perhaps the plan is to proceed with a six-man rotation, or maybe they are just being extra cautious. After all, they got bit hard by the injury bug in 2025, and you can be sure Elias wants to avoid a similar fate in 2026. But there could also be an injury concern with at least one of the starters.
Eflin threw just 71.1 innings in 2025, and it’s unlikely the Orioles are going to expect him to go right back to be a 150+ inning pitcher in the next season. So don’t be shocked if he opens the season on the IL.
That makes the signing of Valdez, or anyone else, more important. Tyler Wells, Cade Povich, or Brandon Young could step in and pitch while Eflin recovers, but what if someone else goes down in the meantime? Then you have two of the fringy arms in the rotation, and we are right back where things where last year, when the rotation was scuffling.
Can the bullpen be trusted?
Just about every MLB team is crossing their fingers when it comes to their bullpen. It’s a fickle position group in which success one season does not guarantee success in the next. But the Orioles don’t even have a ton of prior triumphs to lean on in the unit.
FanGraphs’ Roster Resource tool projects Rico Garcia, Dietrich Enns, Colin Selby, and Kade Strowd to all be part of the Opening Day bullpen. Garcia is the most experienced of the group, but he only has 70 MLB innings under his belt, and nearly half of them came last year. Grant Wolfram, Yaramil Hiraldo, José Espada, and Cameron Foster are others that are expected to contribute, but they are similarly green.
The veteran duo of Helsley and Andrew Kittredge are likely to get most of the high-leverage innings. Helsely has a track record of success, just don’t look at his numbers with the Mets. There’s risk there, although the Orioles will tell you his stuff is fine. Maybe it was just mechanical issues that led to his struggles in Queens.
Even still, the relief group feels an arm (or two) light. Right now the middle innings are projected to belong to Keegan Akin, Yennier Cano, and Tyler Wells (if he doesn’t earn a spot in the rotation). That could be fine. It could also be a major concern. Signing or trading for a more dependable veteran wouldn’t be expensive, and it might level the group up just enough.
Who is going to be on the bench?
The Orioles have more MLB-quality position players than they have room for on their roster. That’s a good problem to have, but it’s still a problem.
The “everyday” lineup is pretty well set. Across the infield will be Alonso, Jackson Holliday, Gunnar Henderson, and Jordan Westburg. In the outfield it will be Ward, Colton Cowser, and either Tyler O’Neill or Dylan Beavers. Adley Rutschman and Samuel Basallo will be your catchers that also DH quite a bit.
That’s 10 players right there. Leody Taveras seems like the favorite to be the backup in center field. And then there is the Ryan Mountcastle/Coby Mayo dilemma.
It doesn’t make a ton of sense to have both players on the roster if they each still fit in the 1B/DH slot. Mayo can be demoted to Triple-A without losing him. Mountcastle would have to be on the big league roster. There is the outside chance that they co-exist, but only if Mayo takes on other positions. He has been a third baseman before. Maybe they drill that hard in the spring. Or perhaps he can learn a corner outfield spot, a move that has long been expected from scouts.
If the team keeps both Mayo and Mountcastle, then they won’t have room for Jeremiah Jackson, or any other “utility” player for that matter. That would mean no official backup to the infielders. They would have to rove around to give each other days off. Holliday can play shortstop. Westburg can play second base. Mayo would be the reserve at the hot corner. They would have a similar problem even if Jackson stuck around since he is not viewed as a shortstop option, although he can fill in at second and third.
Health plays a big role in all of this, and that could be why Elias is waiting on making a move as long as he can. Things happen in the spring all the time. If a significant player needs to open the season on the IL, like Henderson did last year, it would be nice to have a big league-quality solution in place rather than scrambling to add a Quad-A type in mid-March.
