Worldwide Sports News

1908
White Sox pitcher Ed Walsh won his 40th game of the season, as he beat Detroit, 6-1. It was a crucial win for the team, staving off pennant elimination and drawing the South Siders to within a half-game of the first-place Tigers. With the Naps splitting their final games of the season in a doubleheader with St. Louis, Cleveland was eliminated from the fierce, three-way battle for first place. Walsh’s win set up a winner-take-all game for the pennant vs. Detroit on the final day of the season.

Walsh himself completed one of the most extraordinary seasons in major league history. His 40 wins led the majors, and is a milestone no one has matched in 114 seasons since (the closest to 40 wins has been Walter Johnson, with 36 in 1913). The 40 wins tied for 30th all-time in major league history and made him just one of two pitchers to attain the mark in the 20th Century.

Walsh led the AL in winning percentage (40-15, .727), FIP (1.42) and K/W (4.80). In addition to wins, Walsh led all of MLB in games (66), starts (49), complete games (42), shutouts (11), innings (464) and strikeouts (269). Oh, and he led the majors in saves as well, with six.

And yet Walsh clocked “just” 10.3 WAR, which doesn’t even represent the best season of his career — he topped 11 WAR in both 1910 and 1912.

1959
The Go-Go White Sox found their backs against the wall, as the Dodgers won their third straight to take Game 4 of the World Series, 5-4. L.A. struck for four runs in the third, knocking starter Early Wynn out of the box. But in the seventh inning, the White Sox fought back to tie, courtesy of a Ted Kluszewski RBI single and three-run homer from Sherm Lollar. But in the bottom of the eighth, Gil Hodges led off with a solo shot off of Gerry Staley to end all scoring and put the Dodgers up, 3-1, in the Series.

A Series-record (and overall baseball record) 92,650 fans showed up to see the Dodgers win, breaking the record set in Game 3, one day earlier.

1980
Minnie Miñoso pinch-hit for Chet Lemon to lead off the bottom of the seventh inning during a triumphant season finale for the White Sox, grounding out to third in what would stand as the final at-bat of his career. The White Sox improved to 70-90 on the season with a 5-3 win over the California Angels.

Miñoso went 0-for-2 in two appearances as a pinch-hitter in 1980, marking his fifth decade playing pro baseball, stretching back to the 1940s. “Mr. White Sox” was slated to appear in the 1990s to mark a sixth decade, but in 1990 commissioner Fay Vincent blocked the move, and in 1993 commissioner Bud Selig and AL president Bobby Brown gave the approval, but White Sox players balked.

1983
Cy Young winner LaMarr Hoyt pitched a complete game, five-hitter in beating the Orioles, 2-1, in Game 1 of the ALCS. It was the first time since divisional playoffs started in 1969 that Baltimore lost the first game of a postseason series. Unfortunately, it would be the high-water mark for the Sox in the series.

Hoyt struck out four, and lost his shutout in the ninth inning on a bloop hit by Cal Ripken Jr.  With Ripken on base, Hoytgot slugger Eddie Murray to hit a ground ball up the middle and got a glove on the ball just enough to slow it down for Scott Fletcher to field it, step on second base, record the force out and end the contest played at Memorial Stadium.

1993
Game 1 of the ALCS was an unmitigated disaster — both on and off the field for the White Sox — in front of what remains the biggest baseball crowd ever in new Sox Park (46,246).

On the field, Toronto turned Jack McDowell tipping his pitches in to 17 hits and a 7-3 rout in the first White Sox playoff game at their new park, with the Blue Jays pitching around AL MVP Frank Thomas (one single, four walks). But by the middle of the game, not one fan cared. Reports were confirmed that the Bulls were holding a press conference the next morning so that Michael Jordan (who threw out the ceremonial first pitch for Game 1) could announce his retirement from basketball. Fans at the game and around the city were in shock. 

Adding insult to injury, future Hall of Fame catcher Carlton Fisk and Chicago native and former White Sox pitcher Donn Pall (both of whom had played for the White Sox that season) were turned away by security guards when they attempted to wish their former teammates good luck in the locker room before the game started. The White Sox claimed the rules were set by Major League Baseball, but no fan or media member was fooled by that comment. Most media members felt Fisk was turned away on explicit orders from owner Jerry Reinsdorf; it was an insult Fisk never forgot. 

Reinsdorf would then take an unprecedented step of apologizing to the team in the clubhouse before the start of Game 2, saying he had no wish to take away their spotlight because of the Jordan situation.

2005
The White Sox took a commanding lead in the the best-of-five ALDS, beating Boston, 5-4. The Red Sox had jumped to a 4-0 lead on Mark Buehrle, but Chicago put a crooked 5 up on the board in the bottom of the fifth. Aaron Rowand doubled in a run off of former White Sox villain David Wells, and one out later Joe Crede singled in Rowand to cut the Boston lead in half. Another ex-White Sox, Tony Graffanino, then flubbed a double-play grounder, turning escape from the inning for Wells into a ground ball through the legs that put runners on the corners. Wells still almost escaped, inducing Scott Podsednik into a pop foul out. But with the count even at 1-1, Tadahito Iguchi did this:

Iguchi’s blast provided a margin that held up, with Bobby Jenks pitching the final two innings for his first postseason save and just the seventh of his young career.

2008
In the postseason for the third time of the 2000s, the White Sox were on the brink of elimination in the 2008 ALDS. But behind a strong starting pitching effort from John Danks they beat Tampa Bay, 5-3, to survive another day. Danks pitched into the seventh inning, with seven strikeouts. A three-run fourth inning set the tone for the Sox in the game. Dewayne Wise continued an outstanding playoffs, with two RBIs for the Sox. 

2022
It was the end to one of the most disappointing seasons in White Sox history.

Six years earlier, GM Rick Hahn started the rebuild by saying that the franchise was “mired in mediocrity.” After the Twins pounded the Sox, 10-1, to end the 2022 campaign, the team finished … at 81-81 — the very definition of mediocrity.  

It was only the fifth time in team history the club ended a year exactly at .500.

The season was supposed to see the Sox make the postseason for a third straight year and potentially play in the World Series. Instead, the team was listless, seemed to have little sense of urgency, couldn’t stay healthy and was saddled with bizarre in-game decisions by manager Tony La Russa (who resigned before the season even ended because of serious health issues).

The year marked Year 10 under Hahn, whose track record was less than stellar: seven losing years, two winning ones and a .500 year. Under his watch, the Sox had two playoff appearances — but also two quick first round playoff exits. Not coincidentally, this would mark Hahn’s final full season in charge of the team.

The Pittsburgh Pirates are sitting at home for the playoffs, but their 82-80 record from the season suggests that they are close to playing in October.

It might only take one or two more moves to get there in 2027, especially if they make a big splash. Bleacher Report contributor Kerry Miller suggests the Pirates should acquire relief pitcher Trevor Megill from the NL Central rival Milwaukee Brewers for Double-A catcher Easton Carmichael and outfielder Lonnie White Jr.

“Pittsburgh finally had a winning season in 2026, but fell a few games shy of the much bigger goal of making it back to the postseason. Maybe Megill is the missing piece that gets them there,” Miller wrote.

Megill has recorded 81 saves over the last three seasons with the Brewers, which is one of the highest marks in the league over that span of time. Megill was an All-Star last season with Milwaukee and maintained an ERA of 2.63 throughout the 2026 campaign, which was close to where he was last year with the Brewers.

Mason Montgomery and Gregory Soto combined for 34 saves in 2026, but neither of them became a truly dominant closer. Out of the two, Montgomery had the better season with a 2.88 ERA, but it might make more sense to have him in the eighth inning setup role behind a player like Megill.

BD community, what do you make of this possible trade with the Brewers? Should the Pirates make a run for Megill? Let us know in the comments section below.

The Rockies are done. The postseason is rolling, and until the World Series is over, the hot stove remains pretty cold.

It is the kind of baseball lull that lets the mind of a Rockies fan start to wander.

Mine has landed on one incredibly important question: If you could have one Rockies shortstop at his peak for one game, who are you taking?

There are really only two choices:

Troy Tulowitzki or Trevor Story.

And it is harder to answer than it should be.

Maybe part of the reason is how high they set the bar — and how little daylight there was between them. Tulo was traded in July 2015, José Reyes finished out the year at shortstop, and by Opening Day 2016, Story had taken over.

One star shortstop essentially gave way to another.

After watching Tulowitzki and Story for so long, I started to expect elite shortstop play in Colorado. There were stretches in 2024 when Ezequiel Tovar made me wonder whether the Rockies might have another special one.

The past two seasons have been a reminder of just how rare Tulo and Story were.

Since I am simply an objective observer and am in no way emotionally attached, this should be easy.

Tulo felt inevitable

What I remember most about Tulowitzki is the way he moved.

He was long through the arms and legs, sturdy through the middle, but fluid enough to make it work. On a backhand deep in the hole, he could stretch nearly sideways to the ground, gather and uncork that side-sling howitzer across the diamond.

You noticed Tulo playing shortstop.

There were other versions of it — a ball up the middle, the spin, the pirouette, the throw. His body could get into strange positions and somehow everything still finished under control.

At the plate, it was much the same.

He stood tall, his head tucked behind his shoulder and the bat twitching up and down off his shoulder. Then his hips and hands fired, the bat screaming through the zone with both hands staying on the handle as the barrel finished against the No. 2 on his back.

When Tulowitzki came to the plate in a big spot, I expected something to happen.

He felt inevitable.

His 5-for-5 cycle against the Cubs felt like a perfect Tulo game: a great player imposing himself on everything around him.

And in 2010, he somehow got even better.

Tulowitzki hit .315/.381/.568 with 27 home runs and a 138 OPS+, producing 6.7 rWAR despite playing only 122 games.

September of that year was otherworldly.

Tulo hit .322 with 15 home runs and 40 RBI that month, setting Rockies single-month records in both categories.

That is probably the purest statistical version of peak Tulo.

Story was different

Trevor Story has always looked different from Tulowitzki.

More compact, thicker through the shoulders and chest, with strong arms and football-player quads.

A calm ball of force.

His defensive brilliance was less obvious than Tulo’s, and more uneven from year to year. Story was sturdy. The ball did not seem to get by him. The plays got finished. And over time, you realized how good he could be over at short.

Story is quieter in the batter’s box, too.

Upright like Tulo, but more open. His hands sit high near his ears, the bat angled sharply downward behind him. As the pitcher delivers, Story coils while his front foot seems to float until the ball comes out.

Then — BAM.

Explosive. Damaging. Powerful.

The three home runs were initially measured at a combined 1,380 feet, and each seemed more ridiculous than the last. The second one was originally measured at 505 feet, as if Story were trying to eighty-six the baseball from Coors Field altogether. Unfortunately, Statcast recalculated it down to a mere 487 feet.

Of course, the power announced itself almost immediately.

Story introduced himself to the majors by homering twice off Zack Greinke on Opening Day.

Subtle.

By 2019, all of it had come together. Story played 145 games, hit 35 home runs, stole 23 bases, scored 111 runs and produced 6.9 rWAR.

The power was obvious, but the speed was part of what made him different. Story stole 100 bases in six Rockies seasons and, at his peak, could pressure a defense with his legs in a way Tulo rarely did.

That 2019 version of Story is what makes this question considerably harder than it has any right to be.

It is too close to make the call on memory alone. So, let’s check the numbers.

The numbers

Raw career totals favor Tulo partly because he spent four more seasons in Colorado.

On a per-season basis, though, the comparison gets a little more interesting.

Those numbers need some context.

Story’s six seasons include the 60-game 2020 season, so this is not a perfect apples-to-apples measure of availability. But injuries were an undeniable part of Tulowitzki’s time in Colorado. He played 150 games just twice and topped 140 only three times.

Story had his own injury trouble. His rookie season ended after 97 games because of a torn ligament in his left thumb. But over the rest of his Rockies tenure, he was generally the more available player.

Tulo was the better overall hitter by rate. Story brought more speed, more raw power and more consistent availability.

At their peaks, it gets even tighter.

Story’s 2019 season edged Tulo’s abbreviated 2010 in total rWAR, while Tulo produced value at a faster rate and showed in 2009 that he could sustain superstar production across a full schedule.

The hardware followed.

Tulowitzki was a five-time All-Star with Colorado, won two Gold Gloves and two Silver Sluggers, and finished fifth in MVP voting twice. Story made two All-Star teams and won two Silver Sluggers as a Rockie.

Both also got Colorado to October twice.

Tulo in 2007 and 2009. Story in 2017 and 2018.

The rest of the picture

The numbers make the choice close. The way they occupied the position — and the franchise — is where they start to separate.

Tulowitzki felt like the face of the franchise. He seemed cut from the same baseball cloth as Derek Jeter and Nomar Garciaparra.

Outside of his rookie season, when Matt Holliday was clearly Batman, Tulo was never Robin.

Story always was.

That was hardly Story’s fault. Nolan Arenado occupied the center of the Rockies universe during Story’s prime, and Story never quite received the national attention that followed Tulowitzki.

Their exits were different, too.

When Tulowitzki was traded in 2015, I was at work when I saw the update.

I just stood there.

Shock, then anger, sadness, and that miserable feeling that follows a breakup.

Story leaving felt completely different.

By then I was older, the Rockies had become a dumpster fire, and when he reached free agency, part of me was happy for him.

He got out.

I have rooted for him ever since, even as things in Boston have not gone the way I hoped they would for him.

Filling out the lineup card

At this point, I know the answer.

The numbers lean Tulo. If you give me the peak version of either player and tell me I need to win one baseball game, I am taking Troy Tulowitzki.

And I have a Tulo jersey hanging in my closet. It was a wedding present from my best man.

So, really, this should be easy.

Except it doesn’t feel quite right.

My five-year-old son’s name is Trevor.

And I know there is no way I could look Trevor Story in the eyes and tell him he is riding the bench.

Fortunately, this question exists only in my head, which means I am allowed to create a technicality.

Neifi Pérez has seniority.

He was the first shortstop who made me love the position, hit the second cycle in Rockies history and won a Gold Glove in 2000.

He gets the nod.

Tulo and Story can both take a seat on a technicality, I can abandon the whole “pick the best player and win at all costs” thing, and maybe — finally — this question will stop keeping me up at night.

Please keep in mind our Purple Row Community Guidelines when you’re commenting. Thanks! 

The general rule of thumb I have always heard when it comes to evaluating MLB general managers is that you should give them five years before you make any firm decisions. Picollo is now entering his fifth offseason, and his team has reached the playoffs once, finished over .500 twice, and finished with 90+ losses twice. If we were to evaluate only on record, this fifth season would seem to be a tipping point for a GM who has had one season where the team greatly outperformed expectations, another where they pretty badly underperformed expectations, and a pair of seasons where they were pretty close to expectations. Can he get one more overperformance? Or will he be searching for a new job this time next year?

While perhaps it makes little sense to spend a lot of time evaluating the four drafts the team has overseen since Picollo took charge – those also take a long time to truly shake out – it does seem worth noting that the Royals at least got Jac Caglianone from the 2024 draft, with David Shields and L.P. Langevin making waves and earning organizational awards. The 2025 draft also has an award winner in Josh Hammond, while Nolan Sailors and Kamden Edge have flashed. Justin Lamkin was looking really good before an injury shortened his AA season, and now he will pitch in the AFL against some of the best prospects in baseball. This year’s first-overall draftee, Zion Rose, has already debuted in A+. He and this year’s big international signing, Angeibel Gomez, will join Lamkin in the AFL.

That leaves the 2023 draft as a real dud. Blake Mitchell had a decent minor league season, but no one else from that draft has shown much to get excited about. I’m willing to forgive Picollo for that, because it might have just taken that long to get his preferred people and systems into place. Regardless, the drafting and international signings appear to have been overall positives for KC since Picollo took the reins.

With that shallow evaluation completed, I wanted to dig a fair bit deeper into his major league free agent signings and trades. You could argue that the players he has allowed to leave, non-tendered, or signed to minor league deals are nearly as important, but I think the thought processes that go into those kinds of decisions can be quite a bit more nebulous. Whereas, with MLB FA signings, it comes down to definitely wanting that guy to be on your team for sure, and trades show a desire to improve one area and a willingness to sacrifice another.

I have listed out all the MLB signings since Picollo took over, as well as all of the trades, plus extensions that added time to a player’s contract. The idea is to go through and evaluate each trade as a win, loss, or wash.

My methodology for trades will be thus: If the Royals have gotten good play from the player(s) they acquired, that’s a win regardless of what they gave up. If the Royals have not gotten good play, but the guy they traded hasn’t been particularly good either, that’s a neutral result. And if the Royals traded away someone they wish they had now and got someone who hasn’t really helped, that’s a loss.

I will be evaluating signings based on whether the player was a reasonable value for the money spent, with a starting point (though not an ending point) of 1 WAR being roughly equivalent to $8 million.

The goal is to get to the end, count the wins, losses, and ties, and hopefully have a better idea of whether Picollo is more often successful for the value given up when acquiring players or more often unsuccessful. This will then, ideally, allow us to state with some level of certainty whether Picollo has been hampered by an inability to acquire good players or if he simply hasn’t had the resources (money and inherited prospects) to put together a better team. This should give us some idea of whether to have much hope for next season.

If the results of this exercise do not appear particularly clear-cut, I may do this exercise again with another GM (or, baseball gods help me, two) who is generally considered to have been good at his job over the last 3+ years. Off the top of my head, I’m thinking Chris Getz’s White Sox could be a good example. Matt Arnold’s Brewers might be even better. I’m open to suggestions here, so feel free to drop your thoughts in the comments below.

We are very specifically not evaluating whether any of these deals made sense when they were done. Nor whether Matt Quatraro used them as best he could. Those are mostly irrelevant to whether Picollo actually got the job done. It’s a bit like the distinction between a barrelled ball that was an out, except in reverse because when evaluating on this scale, the results matter as much or more than the process. If you have a perfect process for four years but no results, you still gotta change something.

Without further ado, let’s begin the evaluation.

2023

Signed Aroldis Chapman

Setting aside the moral issues, Chapman was worth 1.3 fWAR in 29.1 innings even before the Royals traded him, so I don’t even have to cheese my gimmick to make this one an absolute win for the $3.9 million the Royals paid him.

1-0-0

Signed Ryan Yarbrough

The Royals gave Ryan $3 million. He was worth 0.7 fWAR before he was traded. Which means he was worth double his contract, the Royals didn’t even pay it all, and they got trade him later.

2-0-0

Signed Jordan Lyles

Lyles was given $17 million for two years. He was bad the first year and barely pitched the second year. This was a deal that always looked questionable, and it didn’t age well.

2-1-0

Signed Zack Greinke

Greinke got $8.5 million when Picollo signed him back. Unfortunately, he was significantly worse in his final season. He earned 1.1 fWAR, so I guess that means the Royals broke even on the deal, but boy, it didn’t feel like it. Still, someone had to pitch the innings and he didn’t otherwise hurt the team or preclude other pitchers from developing.

3-1-0

Traded Michael A Taylor for Evan Sisk and Steven Cruz

I’ll warn you now, it’s nearly impossible to lose a trade when the team is in a non-competitive year. Even so, while Sisk likewise didn’t contribute to the club, Cruz has proven to be at least a useful middle relief piece. So that’s a win.

4-1-0

Traded Adalberto Mondesi for Josh Taylor

Taylor was replacement level for the Royals and Mondesi never played in the bigs again. This one is a wash.

4-1-1

Traded Junior Marin for James McArthur

Marin never made it out of the Complex Leagues. McArthur has been worth 0.6 fWAR for the Royals and might yet provide more value if he sticks around. Still, I’ll try to play things a bit conservatively, and we’ll call it a wash leaning towards a win.

4-1-2

Traded Aroldis Chapman for Cole Ragans and Roni Cabrera

It doesn’t matter if Ragans never throws another pitch for KC and Cabrera doesn’t get to the big leagues; this was a win for the Royals all day based on what Ragans did in 2024 alone.

5-1-2

Traded Jose Cuas for Nelson Velázquez

Cuas was bad for everyone he pitched for in between Royals stints. Velázquez was very good for half a season and quite bad for half a season. It’s a wash.

5-1-3

Traded Ryan Yarbrough for Derlin Figueroa and Devin Mann

The Royals didn’t miss Yarbrough for the rest of the season. Unfortunately, Mann is out of affiliated ball, and while Derlin Figueroa had a hot start as a 22-year-old in A+ this season, it didn’t end well. So we’ll call it a wash – but it could still be a win someday.

5-1-4

Traded Scott Barlow for Henry Williams and Jesus Rios

Rios is out of the org; Henry Williams has pitched poorly. Barlow pitched better for the Padres, but he couldn’t have helped the Royals anyway.

2023 Total: 5-1-5

2024

Signed Garrett Hampson

The Royals gave Garrett Hampson $2 million and got half a win from him. We wanted more from him, especially as he ended up involved in 113 games throughout the course of the season. By pure WAR per dollar, it would be a win, but the Royals needed him to be an elite runner and adequate defensive replacement. He wasn’t really those things.

0-0-1

Signed Will Smith

Will Smith was worth -0.3 fWAR. That makes this a loss no matter how much they paid him, but they gave him $5 million. Ouch.

0-1-1

Signed Chris Stratton

Same as above, but Stratton got $8 million. And a second year. Double ouch.

0-2-1

Signed Seth Lugo

We’ll get into the extension later, but the initial deal worked out amazingly well for the Royals. There is no one on earth who can claim to have believed he could finish second in Cy Young voting in 2024 after the Royals signed him.

1-2-1

Signed Michael Wacha

Wacha might not have gotten Cy Young votes, but he was still worth every penny the Royals paid him in 2024.

2-2-1

Signed Hunter Renfroe

The Royals gave Renfroe $12 million for two seasons, a pretty reasonable salary if he’d been a positive contributor at all. He was worth a total of -0.8 fWAR, so he wasn’t. It’s worth noting that he didn’t hurt the team in his first season, but that player option really hurt the team.

2-3-1

Signed Adam Frazier

-0.5 fWAR in 2024. Nope.

2-4-1

Traded Taylor Clarke for Ryan Brady and Cam Devanney

Clarke didn’t pitch in the big leagues in 2024, so the Royals didn’t lose anything on this trade. Brady is a minor league free agent; Devanney went to Japan and was awful. It’s good that Clarke didn’t contribute because…woof.

2-4-2

Traded David Sandlin for John Schreiber

If you evaluate this just by 2024, this is a clear-cut win. It gets a bit murkier if you add in the final two years of Schreiber’s time with Kansas City, but Sandlin hasn’t been much and there’s no guarantee he’ll ever be more. Schreiber was a key reliever for one season and an almost-competent one for two others. Sandlin may end up providing more value during his rookie contract than Schreiber did in his time playing for KC, but the criteria wasn’t that the player(s) acquired be worth more than the one(s) given up, but that they were successful in Kansas City. Schreiber was successful enough.

3-4-2

Traded Cayden Wallace for Hunter Harvey

Wallace was tearing up AA for Washington this season and did well enough in AAA that he is looking like a potentially good player. Harvey barely pitched for Kansas City. I’m afraid I have to count this as a loss.

3-5-2

Traded Walter Pennington for Michael Lorenzen

Pennington hasn’t pitched in the bigs since 2024. Michael Lorenzen was a key piece of the 2024 team down the stretch.

4-5-2

Traded Will Klein, Mason Barnett, and Jared Dickey for Lucas Erceg

This one is rough. On the one hand, Erceg was lights out in 2024, successful with flaws in 2025, and a tire fire in 2026. Dickey stopped hitting after he left the Royals organization; Will Klein didn’t stick in Oakland but has found a home as a useful middle reliever in Los Angeles; and Mason Barnett has a 6.97 ERA as a big league pitcher. The Royals probably miss Klein right now, but they needed Erceg in 2024. He looked good enough at the end of this year that I’m willing to believe he’ll be at least as good as Klein next year. I’m going to call it a controversial win for the Royals.

5-5-2

Traded Jarold Rosado for Paul DeJong

Rosado struggled badly after getting promoted to AA this year at age 23. DeJong wasn’t worth much to the Royals, but I can’t say they really miss Rosado. We’ll call it a draw.

2024 total: 5-5-3

Two-year total: 10-6-8

2025

Signed Michael Wacha again

Wacha has been worth 6.3 fWAR since signing back with KC. The WAR value of $51 million is 6.4. I think we can give J.J. the win on this one.

1-0-0

Signed Michael Lorenzenagain

The Royals gave him $7 million, including the buyout, for 1.4 fWAR. Another win.

2-0-0

Signed Carlos Estévez

The Royals gave him $22.2 million, and he provided 0.9 fWAR. He was a win after the first year of the deal, but he accrued -0.3 fWAR this season in a single appearance. I’m afraid we have to call this a loss. That’s the third time J. J. would have done OK if he hadn’t given an extra year.

2-1-0

Traded Brady Singer for Jonathan India and Joey Wiemer

The Royals didn’t miss Singer this year, but they missed him a lot last year. Meanwhile, India was below replacement level. We can argue all day about whether the process of the trade made sense (I think it did). But the results weren’t there.

2-2-0

Traded Cam Devanney for Adam Frazier

We already discussed how Devanney has been doing; Frazier was really good in his second tour with KC.

3-2-0

TradedAndrew Hoffmann for Randal Grichuk

Grichuk didn’t add anything to the Royals. Fortunately for Picollo, Hoffmann has an ERA over 7.00 since being traded to the Diamondbacks.

3-2-1

Traded Evan Sisk and Callan Moss for Bailey Falter

Sisk hasn’t been great, but he’s been pitchable – something that couldn’t be said for either Falter or the Royals’ 2026 bullpen. Callan Moss doesn’t look like he’s going to develop, but it doesn’t matter.

3-3-1

Traded Freddy Fermin for Stephen Kolek and Ryan Bergert

This trade was so good for the Royals that I almost want to give it two wins. Getting either of those pitchers for Fermin would have been a steal. Getting both is one of the most lopsided trades any team has consummated over the past few seasons.

4-3-1

Traded Yunior Marte for Mike Yastrzemski

Yaz was great for KC; Yunior has been nothing useful in the bigs.

5-3-1

Extended Seth Lugo

Rather than trade the veteran, the Royals doubled down with him. Up until that point, Lugo had a 2.95 ERA in 2025 and had, as noted earlier, been runner-up for the Cy Young Award in 2024. Since this extension was inked, he has a 5.69 ERA. You could try to argue that the process made sense, though I’m not sure I’d join you on that. Regardless, it didn’t work out.

Given the way Lugo finished the 2025 campaign, he very possibly could have opted into his player option after all. The Royals could have paid him less this season and been able to walk away after the repeat performance. Instead, they paid the premium, they’re on the hook for 2027, and they need to navigate around his innings totals to prevent his club option from vesting and forcing them to pay him in 2028, too.

For those of you keeping score at home, that’s the fourth time Picollo hung on to a vet too long.

2025 Total: 5-4-1

Three-Year Total: 15-10-9

2026

Extended Maikel Garcia

Maikel was hurt this year, so he didn’t play much or particularly well. But FanGraphs still has him at 1.8 fWAR, and he was paid $4.2 million for this one. I expect him to rebound next year. It’s a win.

1-0-0

Extended Salvador Perez

This one is kind of interesting because the extension basically took his existing team option and spread it over two years in terms of true value because of all the deferrals. (See, teams other than the Dodgers can do that, too!) That means it’s tempting to say the extension is a win because, depending on how you look at it, they either paid him less for this season or got a second season for free. But Salvy was -1.1 fWAR and could easily make that number go further down next year, which means the Royals would have been better off paying him the full amount this year and moving on. Or just declining the player option. I know that would have upset a lot of people who wanted to see Salvy break the franchise home run record, so maybe Picollo was trapped here. But the raw numbers say this was a poor choice.

You could argue this was the fifth time Picollo hung on to someone past the expiration date of their career.

1-1-0

Signed Alex Lange

At a lower cost, he had the same value as Salvy; since that value was negative, it’s still bad.

1-2-0

Signed Lane Thomas

0.8 fWAR for something less than $5.25 million and accomplished what the team needed from him (hitting lefties) at a level commensurate with what could have reasonably been expected. That’s a win.

2-2-0

Signed Starling Marte

Even $1 million is too much to pay for -0.5 fWAR.

2-3-0

Signed Craig Kimbrel

The Royals paid him the prorated amount of the major league minimum for his time in KC, he gave them 0.1 fWAR, and he helped stabilize a bullpen that was in freefall. It’s the tiniest of wins, but a win.

3-3-0

Traded Matthew Hoskins for Kam Misner

Hoskins put up a mediocre ERA in the ACL as a 22-year-old. Misner contributed nothing to the Royals. It’s a wash.

3-3-1

Traded Logan Martin for Mason Black

Martin lost his ability to control his pitches this year; Black was worth -0.5 fWAR. No value gained for either side.

3-3-2

Traded Angel Zerpa for Nick Mears and Isaac Collins

Zerpa was terrible for the Brewers before he got hurt; Mears and Collins combined for 0.1 fWAR.

3-3-3

Traded Jonathan Bowlan for Matt Strahm

This one still hurts because I still think it made all the sense in the world. Also, Strahm was a perfectly adequate pitcher before he got hurt, and I don’t think he ever got healthy. But Picollo was in charge of the training staff that oversaw that disaster, too.

3-4-3

Traded A.J. Causey for Mitch Spence

Spence was bad, but Causey does not appear to be progressing.

3-4-4

Traded Denis Samudio for Connor Seabold

Seabold was bad; Samudio gets strikeouts but lacks control in A-Ball.

3-4-5

Traded cash for Randy Dobnak

Dobnak was better than he had any right to be. Dobnak Time may or may not be completely finished, but this was a stellar trade result, regardless.

4-4-5

Traded Max Martin for Nate Pearson

I’ve said basically the same thing so many times. You give up nothing, you get nothing. Still, Pearson was slightly more than nothing, and I’d rather have him for 2027 than Martin.

5-4-5

Traded Lane Thomas and Bailey Falter for Lucas Braun and Carter Holton

This can only be a wash at worst because Lane Thomas couldn’t do anything positive for the Royals by the time they traded him. Picollo is lucky we aren’t grading the processes here because tacking Falter onto this deal almost certainly lowered the value he got in return. Braun started getting strikeouts when he got to Omaha, but also started giving up line drives and runs. Holton does not appear to have pitched in affiliated ball after being acquired by KC. Sure seems like Moore should have been able to get more for someone who was one of the most coveted types of player available at the deadline.

5-4-6

Traded Kris Bubic for Carlos Duran

Would I rather have Bubic than Duran for 2027? Yes. But the Royals can still have Bubic in 2027 if they want; he’s a free agent.

5-4-7

Traded Manuel Colon for Nolan Hoffman

Hoffman actually showed a little something for the Royals.

6-4-7

Claimed Matthew Lugo

I don’t see it for this Lugo, either.

6-4-8

Claimed Connor Thomas

Thomas showed as much or more than Hoffman at a lower cost

7-4-8

Claimed Spencer Bivens

The Royals might have something in Bivens, but they don’t yet.

7-4-9

Claimed Luke Little

The not-so-little Little spends very little time in the strike zone.

2026 total: 7-4-10

Picollo’s total: 22-14-19

Well, that total isn’t as definitive as I would have liked, but it seems to me that Picollo has actually done pretty well with the deals he’s made, even within the moderately strict analysis I performed. In a total of 55 transactions, he screwed up something less than a third of the time. I am leaning towards believing that this shows his limitations are not his own abilities or the abilities of the front office he has assembled, but rather the resources he has had available to him.

I did see a concerning pattern develop as I went through the exercise, unfortunately, where Picollo has given players an extra year or signed them to extensions to keep them in Kansas City longer than they’re good to keep around. You could argue in the case of Stratton and Renfroe that the team was paying a premium for having been so bad just to get the guys in the door. But that’s not the case with re-signing Lugo or adding an extra year to Salvy. It’s hard to know if the Royals would have been able to get Estévez without the second year; it’s easy to believe they were actually bidding against someone for his services. And I’d be happy to cut him some slack on that if it wasn’t part of the pattern. India’s final arbitration year getting picked up wasn’t evaluated above because, as I said earlier, the reasons for doing that can be a bit nebulous. But it would seem to go into this pattern as well, even if we disregarded how poorly India played before that.

Still, signing Lane Thomas for $5 million is smart baseball. Sure, it would be better for the team to sign a Kyle Schwarber or Cody Bellinger, but Sherman can’t or won’t give him the money to do that. You’d like to see more trades that worked out for the Royals, but they also have only three times in four years given up a player who has contributed positively at the big league level at a time when the Royals could have benefited from it in a trade. And two of those trades still seem to have favored the Royals.

Picollo inherited a farm system bereft of talent and an owner who was unable or unwilling to outlay for a truly impactful free agent after the team added Seth Lugo and Michael Wacha (at mid-low tier SP prices, no less). I’m not going to stand here and tell you he’s the Stephen Hawking of MLB front offices, but it looks to me like he’s doing at least as much as could be expected from a GM in his position. No GM is going to get every move right, and every GM must work within the constraints of his team’s ownership.

That said, I think I’m willing to do this one more time (it’s hugely time-consuming; I don’t think I have it in me to do it more than that without getting paid a lot more than I currently get). So let me know in the comments which GM you’d like me to compare him to, and we’ll see what there is to see.